REFERENCES FOR COLLATERAL READING

DE GREEF, G., Introduction à la sociologie, Vol. II, Ch. 7.
HARRISON, J., Ancient Art and Ritual, Ch. 7.

HIRN, Y., The Origins of Art.

HOLBORN, I. B. S., The Need for Art in Life.

SNEDDEN, DAVID, The Waning Powers of Art, Amer. Journ. of Soc.

XXII: 801.

TAINE, H. A., Lectures on Art.

TOLSTOI, L., What is Art?

WRIGHT, C. D., Practical Sociology, Ch. 19.

CHAPTER XXX

SCIENCE

Science is usually defined as a classified body of knowledge; but this definition implies a completeness in our knowledge which the present discussion cannot assume. In considering the effects of science on social progress, it will be necessary to go back of the advanced stage of scientific thought and take account of positive knowledge in its beginnings, before it assumed the classified form. Science as used here, therefore, refers to the spirit of investigating phenomena, or studying facts, as over against the spirit of mere speculation or of superstitious belief. The growth of science represents a new spirit or state of mind in society, and it also presents an explanation of the universe founded on intelligence and reason instead of on the imagination.

Effects of Science on Social Progress. The consequences of the growth of positive knowledge are so complicated and farreaching that it is impossible to follow them in all their ramifications. Only their more general effects can be indicated. The difference between knowledge and ignorance seems at first glance to be sufficient to account for the entire difference between progress and stagnation; but such is not the case, for certain kinds of progress, such as those resulting from selection, take place independently of positive knowledge. The effects of scientific knowledge are of two kinds, those which influence the mind, and those which affect the environment. The first effect of science is to expand the mental horizon, giving us broader conceptions and a more active mental life. This is especially true of astronomy, which enlarges our ideas of time and space by revealing the vastness of other planetary systems; but the same thing is true of other sciences which reveal the composition of matter in our own world and teach the marvellous laws of life.

A second result of science, which has been emphasized by Fiske, is that it gives man a conception of law, an understanding of true cause and effect. This not only helps to develop the mind, but it has also a direct effect upon conduct, removing it from the influence of superstition to the domain of reason. After man learns to separate real cause and effect from the mere sequence of events he can adapt himself better to external influences and avoid much suffering. He learns also to take account of the future instead of confining himself entirely to the present. For example, when man understands the true nature of such phenomena as volcanoes, earthquakes, and floods, instead of attributing them to the vengeance of an angry god, he is in a position to protect himself intelligently from their injurious effects.

A third effect of science is that it restrains and directs the emotional life. In helping to make reason instead of impulse the guide to action, science accomplished more than seems at first apparent, even though science has tended at times to go too far in stifling the legitimate action of the feelings. Under the increasing domination of reason man has attained a better perspective and has been able to distinguish more intelligently between important and unimportant things. At the same time he has attained greater self-control. Instead of yielding blindly to the emotions he has acted with greater and greater deliberation. This increased power of discrimination and self-control have had a remarkable effect upon man's actions. In giving him greater toleration they have done much to lessen opposition and to restrain the inclination to go to war over fancied grievances or over petty differences. Indeed, he is much more likely to count the cost before entering upon any kind of activity. He will not, from a passing impulse, enter upon great undertakings which are impossible of execution. Reason, therefore, in supplementing impulse, has been a powerful agent both in causing man to avoid destructive and useless activities and in enabling him to economize time and strength in the pursuit of useful ends.

The final result of science upon progress is the one most

1 Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy, Pt. II, ch. XXI; reprinted in Carver's Sociology and Social Progress, p. 478.

generally recognized. Science being the basis of art, the progress of knowledge bas stimulated and perfected useful arts. Science has enabled us to make great strides in the conquest of nature, and has made possible to some extent the control of different forms of life. The resulting increase of wealth has intensified happiness and has opened new channels of social progress. The influence of science is so far-reaching that only its general effects can be mentioned here. The more detailed results will be considered later in connection with the discussion of the separate sciences.

Individual Causes of the Advancement of Science. As the progress of science has altered the course of human progress so materially in the past, and as it is likely to be the most important factor in determining social progress in the future, it will be of great advantage to study the immediate causes of the advancement of science, and also the social conditions in which these causes are most likely to operate. The distinction between the causes and conditions of the advancement of science is not hard to understand, though it may not be possible always to follow the dividing line exactly in discussion. Science is advanced by individual effort, and stimuli to the individual form the immediate cause of its advancement. But these stimuli to the individual will act strongly only under favorable physical and social influences, and these are what I have called the conditions of the advancement of science. They are a step farther removed from the product than is the cause. As crops are cultivated in soils of different degrees of fertility, so science is pursued under conditions more or less favorable to its advancement, but science cannot reach a high stage of development except under favorable social conditions.

The causes leading to the advancement of science are difficult to trace, so many and varied are the influences affecting the intellectual life. Chance discovery has of course increased scientific knowledge, but the amount of credit which should be given to this factor will depend upon our ideas of what really is accidental in discovery. The alchemists, in trying to produce gold from the baser metals, discovered a number of valuable chemical compounds. These discoveries were accidental in the

sense that they were not the real objects of the researches, yet the compounds would not have been discovered if the alchemists had not been experimenting in the field of discovery and with particular chemical elements. Chance discoveries are seldom made far from the field which is the center of attention. Certain discoveries, like the properties of saltpeter, may have been wholly accidental; but such instances are rare. Therefore instead of making pure accident an important cause of the advancement of knowledge, it is more nearly correct to say than an unexpected element often enters into scientific discovery.

1

Another minor factor aiding the progress of knowledge is idle curiosity. Probably the early observations of the stars and the planets were due to little else. Few discoveries, however, can be attributed to this incentive alone, although curiosity in some form enters into the majority of scientific discoveries. Ward 1 quotes De Candolle as saying that, "the principle of all discoveries is curiosity." But such an assertion gives us little help. Our task lies in attempting to discover those influences which arouse curiosity. Mere curiosity accompanied by no other motive seems really to have had little influence in advancing science. It is true that students engaged in research may select one problem rather than another, simply because they have a greater interest in it; but their motive for investigating any problem is quite different from idle curiosity.