attack in the latter brought out the abilities of every officer in the army, simultaneously, and, with but few exceptions, in independent commands.

Immediately after the victory of the 8th, General Scott commenced a series of strict and daring reconnoissances of the ground in the vicinity of the capital, and the principal works of the enemy. These were conducted by the able engineers, Captain Lee, and Lieutenants Stephens, Tower, and Beauregard. This service was, in point of danger, equal to battle, stations being frequently chosen within full range of the enemy's batteries, and even within musketry range of the works. The observations were directed principally to the southern defences, the strongly fortified gates of Piedad, San Antonio, San Angel, or Niño Perdido, and Paseo de la Vega. These presented a chain of ditches, intrenchments, gullies, breastworks, towers, and mines, appalling to any general save one of the first military genius and experience. "This city," says the American commander, while speaking of these defences, "stands on a slight swell of ground, near the centre of an irregular basin, and is girdled with a ditch in its greatest extent-a navigable canal of great breadth and depth-very difficult to bridge in the presence of an enemy, and serving at once for drainage, custom-house purposes, and military defence, having eight entrances or gates, over arches, each of which we found defended by a system of strong works, that seemed to require nothing but some men and guns to be impregnable.

"Outside and within the cross-fires of those gates, we found, to the south, other obstacles but little less formidable. All the approaches near the city are over elevated causeways, cut in many places, (to oppose us,) and flanked on both sides by ditches, also of unusual dimensions. The numerous cross-roads are flanked in like manner, having bridges at the intersections, recently broken. The meadows thus checkered are, moreover, in many spots, under water or marshy; for, it will be remembered, we were in the midst of the wet season, though with less rain than usual, and we could not wait for the fall of the neighbouring lakes, and the consequent drainage of the wet grounds at the edge of the city-the lowest in the whole basin."

An attack upon the city in this quarter would perhaps have been successful; but it would have been at a loss greater than has ever yet been experienced by an American army. General Scott, therefore, with that regard to the lives of his soldiers which has ever formed a prominent feature in his character, and rejecting the vain glory acquired by gaining a great battle at any expense, promptly determined to avoid the network of obstacles on the south, and seek less unfavourable approaches by a sudden inversion towards the west

SCOTT'S STRATAGEM.

T%

565

10 economize the lives of our gallant officers and men," says the general, "as well as to insure success, it be came indispensable that this resolution should be long masked from the enemy; and again, that the new movement, when discovered, should be mistaken for a feint, and the old as indicating our true and ultimate point of attack." This design could be executed only by means of a well conducted stratagem, whose most important part would be to prevent the enemy from removing his guns in the southern defences to the new point of attack. This was executed in a manner which, while securing the lives of the troops, threw the balance of advantages in their hands, and afforded one more instance of the eminent scientific abilities of the man who, with a handful of troops, had fought his way through hostile armies to the gates of the enemy's capital. We give the arrangements of his plan in his own words:

"Accordingly, on the spot, the 11th, I ordered Quitman's division from Coyoacan, to join Pillow, by daylight, before the southern gates, and then that the two major-generals, with their divisions, should, by night, proceed (two miles) to join me at Tacubaya, where I was quartered with Worth's division. Twiggs, with Riley's brigade, and Captains Taylor's and Steptoe's field-batteries-the latter of twelvepounders was left in front of those gates to maneuver, to threaten, or to make false attacks, in order to occupy and deceive the enemy Twiggs's other brigade (Smith's) was left at supporting distance in the rear, at San Angel, till the morning of the 13th, and also to support our general depot at Mixcoac. The stratagem against the south was admirably executed throughout the 12th, and down to the afternoon of the 13th, when it was too late for the enemy to recover from the effects of his delusion.

"The first step in the new movement was to carry Chapultepec, a natural and isolated mound, of great elevation, strongly fortified at its base, on its acclivities and heights. Besides a numerous garrison, here was the military college of the republic, with a large number of sub-lieutenants and other students. Those works were within direct gunshot of the village of Tacubaya, and, until carried, we could not approach the city on the west without making a circuit too wide and too hazardous.

"In the course of the same night, (that of the 11th,) beavy batteries within easy ranges, were established. No. 1, on our right, under the command of Captain Drum, 4th artillery, (relieved the next day, for some hours, by Lieutenant Andrews, of the 3d,) and No. 2, commanded by Lieutenant Hagner, ordnance-both supported by Quitman's division. Nos. 3 and 4, on the opposite side, supported by Pillow's division, were commanded, the former by Captain Brooks and Lieutenant S. S. Anderson, 2d artillery, alternately, and the latter by Lieutenant Stone, ordnance. The batteries were traced by Captain Huger and Captain Lee, engineer, and constructed by them, with the able assistance of the young officers of those corps and the artillery.

"To prepare for an assault, it was foreseen that the play of the batteries might run into the second day; but recent captures had not only trebled our siege pieces, but also our ammunition; and we knew that we should greatly augment both by carrying the place. I was, therefore, in no haste in ordering an assault before the works were well crippled by our missiles."

The former duty was intrusted to General Twiggs, with Riley's brigade and two batteries; while Smith's brigade remained as a supporting reserve. At the same time, the divisions of Quitman and Pillow marched by night from the neighbourhood of the southern defences, and joined General Scott at Tacubaya, preparatory to the assault upon Chapultepec. This hill lay between Twiggs's station and the western portion of the city, whither General Scott designed to make his attack. To pass between it and the city wall was impossible; and to march around on the opposite side would have consumed so much time as to unfold the stratagem to the enemy, and

thus defeat one important object of it. There remained, therefore, no alternative but to storm the fortress, since, by so doing, the enemy would still be in the dark as to the ultimate point of attack, and might easily be induced to believe that, in case of capturing it, the Americans would resume their station near the southern gates. Subsequent disclosures proved that they laboured under this delusion.

The two batteries of Captain Drum and Lieutenant Hagner, supporting Quitman's divison, and those of Captain Brooks and Lieutenant Stone, supporting Pillow, opened on the castle, early on the 12th. The bombardment and cannonade were superintended by Captain Huger, and continued during the whole day. During the continuance of this dreary work, Twiggs was actively plying his guns on the southern side, in order to prevent the arrival of reinforcements at Chapultepec. The bombardment at length became so severe, that all the garrison, excepting a number sufficient to manage, abandoned their works, and formed on a secure position of the hill, where they could easily return in case of an assault. As night approached, the fire of the assailants necessarily ceased; but it was observed that a good impression had been made upon the castle and its outworks.

No changes of position were made during the night of the 12th, so that early on the following morning the guns reopened upon the castle. At the same moment those of Twiggs were heard battering the gates of San Antonio and Piedad. The Mexicans were again

observed upon the hill, holding themselves in readiness for an assault.

Meanwhile the general-in-chief was actively preparing to storm the work. The force designed for this service consisted of two columns, acting independently and on different sides of the hill. The first was led by General Pillow, the second by General Quitman-the commands of these officers being reinforced by corps from other divisions. On the previous evening, Worth had received orders to designate a party from his division to assist Pillow, and immediately organized a command of two hundred and sixty men, with ten officers, under Captain McKenzie. He was also advised to take position with the remainder of his division and support Pillow, in case that officer should request his aid. He accordingly chose a favourable position, and reported himself to Pillow. At the same time Smith's brigade was ordered to proceed towards the hill and support Quitman's column. These troops arrived on the following morning, after marching over an exposed road two miles in length. Twiggs also supplied a reinforcement to Quitman's storming column, about equal in number to that from Worth's division, and commanded by Captain Casey.

The signal for the march of the storming parties was the momentary cessation of fire from the heavy batteries. At about eight o'clock on the morning of the 13th, General Scott dismissed an aid to General Pillow, and another to Quitman, to inform them that this was about to be given. Immediately the whole field was covered with the troops of the assailing parties, moving into position. At the same moment a number of Mexican soldiers outside the fort, rushed into it and prepared to resist the assault.

ENERAL PILLOW, in the morning, had placed two field-pieces of Magruder's field-battery inside the Molino del Rey, to clear a sand-bag breastwork which the enemy had constructed without the main wall surrounding Chapultepec, so as to annoy any party assailing the principal works. Through the houses and walls of the mills, he had also placed a howitzer battery, to aid in driving the enemy from a strong intrenchment which ex

tended near.y across the front of the forest and commanded the only approach to Chapultepec on that side. At the same time he placed in position four companies of the voltigeur regiment, under Lieute