620

INJURIOUS ACTS BY FRANCE.

[CHAP. VIII.

their vessels, and the appropriating them to public use, without paying for them, or paying inadequately, or delaying payment for a great length of time.

Fifth. The non-performance of contracts made by the agents of the Government for supplies.

Sixth. The condemnation of their vessels and cargoes under such of the marine ordinances of France as are incompatible with the treaties subsisting between the two countries.

Seventh. The captures sanctioned by a decree of the Convention of the ninth of May, 1793, which declared enemy's goods on board of their vessels lawful prize, and directed French ships-of-war to bring into port ships laden with provisions, and bound to an enemy's port.

Examples of all of which injuries he adduced, showing thirty-six claims for indemnity recovered, some of which were still unpaid; and one hundred and seventy claims for cargoes, or parts of cargoes unjustly seized; one hundred and three vessels detained at Bordeaux by embargo; for which acts of illegal detention or seizures, the claims amounted to many millions of livres.'

1

The third of March terminated the session, and the eight years' administration of George Washington.

The prominent events of Washington's second term were the proclamation of neutrality, the Pennsylvania insurrection, and the British treaty.

As soon as England was added to the list of the enemies. of France, the lively interest which the great mass of Americans had taken in the French revolution, together with the hostility felt towards England, which neither time nor the haughtiness of the British Ministry had yet suffered to subside, strongly disposed a considerable portion of the people to take sides with France.

1 III. State Papers, page 47.

1797.]

PACIFIC POLICY OF WASHINGTON.

621

But

National gratitude, they alleged, as well as the holy cause of liberty, required them to take this course. Washington and his Cabinet, backed by the whole Federal party, and the sober-minded of all parties, reflecting on the serious evils of war, and the sure gains of neutrality, decided on preserving peace, if possible. Hence the proclamation of neutrality, which, whatever may be thought of the constitutional scruples of Madison (in his pamphlet under the signature of Helvidius), was, in its effects, as all now admit, a wise and beneficent measure.

The danger of war, however, did not then cease The arts and address of Genet gave a fresh impetus to the popular zeal in behalf of the French, who, availing themselves of some provisions in the treaty of 1778, were able to give so much annoyance to British commerce, and so to strengthen their interest in the United States, as to incline the British Ministry to hostilities; it regarding open war with the United States as preferable to their one-sided neutrality. Hence the speech of Lord Dorchester to the Indians, which probably had the double purpose of securing the support of the savages, and of deterring the Americans from giving further cause of provocation.

The insults to the American administration into which the rash and too confident ardor of Genet betrayed him, together with the masterly arguments of Jefferson, enabled Washington to get rid of this troublesome envoy without offending a majority of the American people.

The disposition of the British Government to use its naval superiority to injure a foe now become as formidable as it was detested, then proved a new source of danger to the United States. To make this superiority more efficient, England decided on stepping over those neutral rights which stood in her way. The failure of the har

622

WASHINGTON'S PACIFIC POLICY. [CHAP. VIII.

vest in France compelled that nation to look abroad for supplies; and nowhere could they be obtained in such abundance and cheapness as in the United States, which, moreover, abounded in the means of transport. Hence the British orders in council of June and November, 1793, by which the neutral rights of the United States were grossly violated. The resentment which these wrongs excited in the whole Republican party, and all the Federalists whose patriotic pride was stronger than their party attachments, again threatened war with England. Hence the propositions to sequester and otherwise retaliate, in 1794. The administration, still bent on preserving peace, decided on a special mission to England, which resulted in the British treaty.

The very unequal terms of the treaty, together with the vehement opposition to it, produced by friendship to France, and resentment towards England, caused Washington to hesitate about the ratification, especially when he learned that Great Britain had renewed her orders in council. But the breach with Mr. Randolph, and the unsatisfactory course of Mr. Monroe, threw their weight into the doubtful balance, and decided the President on ratifying the treaty, unequal as it was.

The violations of neutral rights by France, of which there had been previously not a few examples, became then general, and almost co-extensive with her power. In pursuance of the same pacific policy which the interests of his country, just recovered from a desolating war of eight years, so strongly recommended, Washington was induced again to resort to negotiation, and General Pinckney was sent to France, as Mr. Jay had been sent to England, to try the effect of remonstrance, and an appeal to justice. What might have been the effect of Pinckney's mission, had Washington's administration con

1797.] EFFECT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA INSURRECTION. 623

tinued, cannot now be known. But until this moment he had secured to his country the solid blessings of peace amid the perils which for four years had threatened it. Nor was there probably another individual in the United States who had at once the desire and ability to preserve pacific relations with both countries, the rulers of which had shown themselves to be almost as unscrupulous as they were powerful.

In the partial resistance to the excise laws which manifested itself in Pennsylvania, there was nothing which seriously threatened the Union, or the welfare of the Confederate States; but in showing the promptitude with which men of all parties would support the authority of the Government, even in measures which they did not wholly approve, this occurrence afforded very high gratification to the friends of the Federal Government, and especially to those who had previously entertained doubts of its competency to maintain law and order against strong popular resistance. In no State was the excise law more distasteful than in Virginia, both as to its objects, and its means of execution; yet in no State did men of all parties less hesitate to take up arms to quell the insurrection. Nay, even the Democratic Societies, which had been charged with bringing about this resistance to the laws by their inflammatory publications, came openly forward in opposition to the insurrection, and some of their members acted as volunteers in the army raised to put it down. Both friends and foes of the administration, at home and abroad, saw, in the measures which it adopted, an alacrity and efficiency which that Government had not been supposed to possess, and which promised to protect it equally from foreign and domestic foes.

It was fortunate for Washington's administration, and

624

JEFFERSON AND HAMILTON.

[CHAP. VIII.

for the welfare of the United States, that Jefferson and Hamilton were members of the Cabinet; and they contributed to these happy results by the qualities in which they differed, as well as by those in which they agreed. They both were eminent for their talents and political information; both at the head of their respective parties, zealous in support of their political principles, and of unwearied diligence in promoting them. Neither of them cordially approved the new Constitution, which, with their aid, was about to be tested by experiment. Here their resemblance ends. No two American citizens were more dissimilar in their political principles.

Jefferson was ardently attached to popular government, and had the most thorough conviction that the people of every civilized and intelligent community were competent to construct and to carry into execution their own system of polity. He considered that a government so formed was safer, wiser, and conferred more happiness than any other on a greater number. Hamilton had no such confidence. Having seen, in the politics of New York, and of other States, that majorities would sometimes trample on the rights of minorities; and, under the impulse of sudden feeling, would occasionally do that which was unwise or unjust, and of which they themselves would subsequently repent, he was desirous of providing an adequate control of a power which was so liable to be seriously abused. He thus became the honest advocate of a strong government which could repress or punish disorder; provide a revenue adequate to all emergencies; and go to war when justice or policy required. Hamilton disapproved of the new Constitution, because he thought it deficient in the controlling power which he deemed indispensable; but he was finally reconciled to it, because he thought, from the