proper construction of section 1674 of the Civil Code in Johnston v. Blanchard, 16 Cal. App., at page 328, [116 Pac. 973], as is shown by the opinion in this case. We are satisfied that the opinion in this case correctly states the law on the point discussed, and that what was said thereon in Johnston v. Blanchard, supra, must be disapproved.

[Civ. No. 1907. First Appellate District.-March 22, 1917.] EDWARD L. SOULE, Respondent, v. NORTHERN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY (a Corporation), Appellant: ALBERT ABRAMS et al., Respondents.

BUILDING CONTRACT INSTALLATION OF REINFORCING STEEL-REQUIREMENTS OF SUBCONTRACTOR.-Where a contract for the construction of a garage requires the contractor to construct a concrete building, to be reinforced by steel bars, fabric stirrups, and tying wire, and the specifications provide that bars will be used in all footings, bcams, girders, walls, but in no floor or roof slabs, a subcontractor who takes over the contract for the general installation of the reinforcing steel for the building, is required to install reinforced steel bars or fabric in the floor and roof slabs entering into the construction of the building, where his contract requires him "to furnish and set in place in a workmanlike manner all reinforcing steel bars, tying wire, etc., required to be used in the construction of that certain building to be erected on the lands hereinafter described in accordance with the plans and specifications for the construction of said building"; as the expression "etc." means "other reinforcing material," which includes fabric.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, and from an order denying a new trial. Bernard J. Flood, Judge.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

N. A. Dorn, for Appellant.

Jordan & Brann, for Respondent Edward L. Soule.

Henry Ach, for Respondent Albert Abrams.

Cushing & Cushing, for Respondent First Federal Trust Co.

KERRIGAN, J.-This is an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien. From the judgment given and entered against it the defendant Northern Construction Company has appealed. The sole point in the case is whether or not, under a fair construction of a contract entered into between the plaintiff and said company the former was required to install reinforced steel bars or fabric in the floor and roof slabs entering into the construction of a certain building. From the record it appears that the Northern Construction Company on the twenty-first day of April, 1913, entered into a written contract with Albert Abrams for the construction of a garage upon a lot in San Francisco. Under the terms of this contract the company was required to construct a concrete building, to be reinforced by steel bars, fabric stirrups, and tying wire. In the specifications, which were a part of the contract, there was a general provision reading: "Bars will be used in all footings, beams, girders, walls, but in no floor or roof slabs." Following upon the execution of this contract the company entered into a contract with plaintiff, who was a dealer in and a contractor for the installation of reinforcing steel, by the terms of which plaintiff agreed "to furnish and set in place in a workmanlike manner all reinforcing steel bars, tying wire, etc., required to be used in the construction of that certain building to be erected on the lands hereinafter described in accordance with the plans and specifications for the construction of said building." It is the contention of the plaintiff that under the terms of this contract he was not required to furnish and set in place reinforcing steel for the floors and roof of the building.

Before discussing this point it may not be amiss to say that a slab in concrete construction is that portion of the structure underneath and supporting the floor and extending between the beams and girders. The beams support the slabs, while the girders are what are commonly termed the long supports which run a few feet apart longitudinally through the interior of the building, and which are generally supported by the columns. Reinforcing steel bars are small sections of steel made into straight or twisted bars, which are embedded in the concrete to take up the tensional and shearing strains which are due to the longitudinal load of the structure where such strains are encountered. Tying wire is No. 16 black fencing wire, and is used to fasten the steel together. Fabric

In pass

consists of a union of drawn wires made up in rows. ing it may also be stated that no personal judgment is sought against Albert Abrams or against the First Federal Trust Company. They are merely formal parties defendant to the action.

Under one provision of the specifications no bars are to be used in the slab reinforcement of the floors and roof, while under another provision it is optional with the contractor as to whether or not in the slab reinforcement of the floors and roof bars or fabric shall be used. There is a conflict between those two provisions of the specifications; but the provision stating that no bars shall be used in the floor and roof reinforcement is general in its character, while the other provision refers specially to floors and roof, and perhaps that provision therefor should control as to the nature of the work to be done on that part of the building. We have no doubt, however, but that under these two provisions the original contractor was required to furnish and set in place either bars or fabric for the floor and roof reinforcement; and this, of course, is required of the subcontractor unless, as asserted by him, the expression "etc." found in his contract is without force, and means nothing.

He took over the contract for the general installation of the reinforcing steel for the building; and when he did so it was doubtless expected that all work of that character would be done by him; and we think this contract when fairly construed so provides. The contract requires him to furnish and set in place all the reinforcing bars, tying wire, "etc., cording to the plans and specifications for the building. The words et cetera, abbreviated to the form etc., are said by Webster to be equivalent to the phrase "others of like kind; and the rest; and so on." In the case of Gray v. Central R. R. Co., 11 Hun (N. Y.), 70, 75, it was held that the term "etc." as used in a contract for the sale of a boat, where the parties agreed to take the boat "provided upon trial they were satisfied with the soundness of her machinery, boilers. etc.," meant "other things" referring to other material parts of the boat. The expression "etc." as used in the contract before us certainly must have been used for some purpose; and we think it means "other reinforcing material," which, of course, would include fabric. There is nothing in the case which would warrant us in holding the term to be meaningless. In

our opinion its effect, taken in connection with the provision of the specifications above quoted, was to require the contractor to furnish and install bars or fabric in the slab reinforcement of the floor and roof. We think the trial court was in error in exempting the plaintiff from this obligation, and that the judgment should be reversed. It is so ordered.

Lennon, P. J., and Richards, J., concurred.

A petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on May 21, 1917.

[Civ. No. 1626. Third Appellate District.-March 22, 1917.] EDWARD B. TAUGHER, Respondent, v. RICHMOND DREDGING COMPANY (a Corporation), et al., Appellants.

ACTION AGAINST CORPORATION AND STOCKHOLDER-LEGAL SERVICES-SEPARATE JUDGMENTS-LACK OF PREJUDICE.—In an action for legal services brought against a corporation and a stockholder who owned all of the stock but two shares, the defendants are not prejudiced by the entry of a judgment in a fixed sum against each, since a payment of the judgment by the corporation would discharge the liability of the stockholder, and the payment by the stockholder of the amount adjudged payable by him would discharge the corporation pro tanto.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, and from an order denying a new trial. W. M. Conley, Judge presiding.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

W. H. H. Hart, and Frank W. Hooper, for Appellants.

J. L. Taugher, for Respondent.

CHIPMAN, P. J.-The action is by the assignee of the claim of J. L. Taugher for legal and professional services as

attorney at law alleged to have been rendered and performed at the special instance and request of defendant Richmond Dredging Company, at divers times between May 1, 1910, and March 8, 1912, both dates inclusive, which said services were of the alleged value of $13,180, no part of which has been paid. Cutting was made a party defendant as a stockholder in said Dredging Company. The complaint specifies five different matters in which said attorney performed services of considerable consequence to the Dredging Company. One of these matters related to services rendered in commencing and conducting an action in the superior court of Contra Costa County wherein said Dredging Company was plaintiff and the Santa Fe Railroad Company the defendant, in which plaintiff recovered judgment for $25,925. Another was for services in connection with the recovery of the possession of the dredger "Richmond No. 1" prior to the filing of a libel in the United States district court, in admiralty, and also for services in said admiralty court in connection with said libel. Other services are alleged to have been rendered for said Dredging Company in and about two certain actions commenced in the superior court of the city and county of San Francisco by the Richmond Light & Power Corporation against said Dredging Company. Also for services in connection with a certain contract wherein the Santa Fe Railroad Company was party of the first part, the said Dredging Company party of the second part, and the East Shore & Suburban Railway Company party of the third part.

It is alleged that the capital stock of said Dredging Company was two hundred thousand dollars, divided into two thousand shares, each of the par value of one hundred dollars, and that all of said shares were subscribed, of which said. stock said Cutting was, at all times mentioned in the com plaint, the owner of 1,998 shares in his own right. The pleadings are verified.

In their answer the defendants made certain admissions, but denied in substance that said attorney performed the services alleged to have been performed by him, and denied any indebtedness to him or to plaintiff on account of any said alleged services; denied, on information and belief, that J. L. Taugher "ever was, or now is, a duly, or otherwise qualified, or licensed attorney, or counselor at law, or licensed, or practicing as such, or entitled to practice at any time as such";