Opinion of the Court--Hoffman, J. [November, By abandoning these he may discharge himself from all personal liability. The creditors are thus restricted to a particular fund, and being so restricted, the maritime law gives them a privilege or lien upon it. "When the law," says Mr. Justice Ware, "confines a creditor to a particular fund for his remuneration, it cannot be so absurd as to prohibit him from making that fund available, by laying his hand on and securing it. The maritime law is not chargeable with any such absurdity after it has, on principles of a general policy, restricted him to a particular fund; it not only permits him to proceed directly against it in specie but gives him a privilege against it over the general creditors of his debtor." (The Rebecca, Ware's R., 199.) If, then, the lien of the creditor is co-extensive with the liability of the ship-owner, in ascertaining the limits of the latter, we necessarily determine the extent of the former. Any general considerations, therefore, which show that appurtenances of a ship, such as those in question in this case, and in The Dundee, ought not to be exempt from liability, also show that they should be subject to the creditor's lien.. The statutes in England and America, to which I have referred, merely re-establish the ancient rule of the maritime law, which prevailed universally among the commercial nations of the Continent. (Norwich Co. v. Wright, 13 Wall., p. 48.) These laws were for the encouragement of commerce, but were not intended to favor one class of vessels more than another. "If a ship," says Lord Stowell, "is run down at sea by a merchant vessel, the wrong-doing vessel is by the act that diminishes the general responsibility, still liable to contribute not only to the extent of herself, but to that of her freight outward and of her freight homeward if contracted for, and for what her owner's property would have paid for freight if it had been liable for freight. But in this class of vessels” (i. e. fishing vessels) there is no freight either outward or homeward, nor any owner's property on board and 1874.] Opinion of the Court-Hoffman, J. * * * * * unless the fishing stores are made responsible in contribution, there is no fund for compensation but the vessel itself, as is actually contended for in the present instance. This class of vessels is highly favored by the British legislature and most deservedly. But surely it can be no part of the intended encouragement that they shall be qualified to do mischief at a cheaper rate than other vessels. If nothing but the vessel itself be liable, that would present a result apparently very unequal and unjust, not only to the injured vessel whose compensation was so much abridged, but likewise to all other vessels which, having committed the like injuries, were subjected to a so much severer retribution. (The Dundee, ubi sup.) There is great force in these observations, and if they show that "fishing stores" ought not to be, and are not exempt from liability to contribution, they also, as before remarked, prove that the lien of the creditor must extend to them. The denial of the lien in the present case would be peculiarly unjust. It is not disputed that the persons who have furnished the diving-bell, air-pump, etc., have a lien on the vessel for their price. They thus come in concurrently with the other material-men for their proportion of her proceeds. It would be most unjust that the very articles, the supplying of which gave birth to this lien, should be exempted from its operation. I think, therefore, that the lien in this case extends to all the articles belonging to the owner, which (not being cargo) have been placed on board for the objects and purposes of the voyage and enterprise in which she was about to engage. The supplies appear to have been ordered in part by the master, with the owner's knowledge and consent, and in part by the latter. Under such circumstances the supply-men have a lien in rem, for the satisfaction of their claims. (The Grapeshot, 9 Wall. 129; The Gay, 9 Wall. 758, 4 Bened. R. 16.) The parties may, very possibly, be able to settle by agreement, the amounts due to the several libellants. Should any controversy arise, it may be brought before the court or referred to the commissioner to take testimony and report. WM. N. MEEKS v. FERDINAND VASSAULT ET AL. 1. VOID PROBATE SALE-LIMITATION.-Under section 190 of the probate act of California, an action to recover lands in the possession of a purchaser, at a sale made by an acting administrator under the orders of a Probate Court, even though the sale is void, must be brought within three years next after the sale, or it will be barred. 2. REAL ESTATE-ASSETS.-Under the statutes of California, real estate of deceased parties is assets in the hands of the administrator, to be administered like personalty. 3. SAME RIGHT OF POSSESSION.-Under the statutes of California, the exclusive right to the possession of real estate of the deceased, and the exclusive right of action to recover it is vested in the administrator, pending the administration, or till the lands are distributed to the heirs. 4. SAME-ACTION BY HEIR.-The heir cannot maintain an action to recover the real estate of the deceased after administration has com menced, until the administration is closed, or the land has been distributed to the heir. 5. ADMINISTRATION-LIMITATIONS-DISABILITIES.-The pendency of administration and the inability of the heir to maintain an action to recover real estate by reason thereof, and of the present right of action being in the administrator, do not constitute a disability on the part of the heir within the meaning of section 191 of the probate act of California. Such a state of facts does not interrupt or prevent the running of the statute, as provided in section 190. 6. ADMINISTRATOR-TRUSTEE-For the purpose of bringing an action to recover land belonging to the intestate's estate, the administrator is the trustee or representative of the heir, and since the exclusive right to bring the action is vested in him, the law also imposes upon him the duty to bring it. 7. ADMINISTRAtor Barred-HEIR BARRED.--Where the administrator neglects to bring an action to recover property of the estate until it is barred under the statute of limitations applicable to the subject, the heir is also barred, even though the heir is a minor at the time the action accrues to the administrator. 8. SAME REMEDY OF HEIR.-In such case the heir has his remedy against the administrator and his bondsmen, or he may, in a proper proceeding, compel the administrator to sue. 9. TRUSTEE--CESTUI QUE TRUST.--Where the trustee having the right of action is barred, the cestui que trust is barred. 10. ADMINISTRATOR-JUDGMENT, EFFECT OF.-If the title to real estate' of the deceased is put in issue and determined in an action between the administrator and another, the judgment will bind the heir to the same extent that it binds the administrator. 11. SECTIONS 258 AND 259 OF THE PROBATE ACT do not limit the operation of section 190. 12. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-TITLE UNDER.-An adverse possession of land for the time prescribed by the statute of limitations, vests the title thereto in the adverse possessor. Before SAWYER, Circuit Judge. Ejectment. The land in controversy is one hundred-vara lot number ten, of the hundred-vara survey south of Market street, in the city of San Francisco, and within the limits embraced by the Van Ness ordinance, the decree confirming the Pueblo title, and the acts of the legislature of California and of Congress, confirming it; and not within any of the exceptions mentioned in said decree or in said. acts. Said lot was granted by George Hyde, alcalde of San Francisco, to James G. D. Dunleavy, January 14, 1847, and possession duly taken under said grant. Said grant was duly recorded in "Book A" of alcalde grants on the same day. On June 2, 1847, said Dunleavy conveyed said lot to George Harlan, who afterwards died intestate in Santa Clara county, of which he was then a resident, July 8, 1850, seized of all the right, title and interest in said land derived from said grant and the possession thereunder. Said George Harlan left surviving him as his heirs-at-law, a widow, six children, and two grandchildren, lawful issue of a deceased child, who died during the lifetime of said Harlan, of whom four of said children, and the two grandchildren were minors, and the others adults of full legal age. The said widow and three eldest children conveyed all their interest in said lot to plaintiff at various times prior to August 11, 1874; the three next eldest in 1869, and the two grandchildren in 1872, by virtue of which said several conveyances, all the interest of the heirs of Harlan, deceased, in said lot, became vested in said plaintiff before the commencement of this suit. Some of said heirs attained their majority within three years next before the commencement of this action. Before, and at the time of the commencement of this action, the several defendants were severally in possession of the portions of said lot described in their respective answers. On August 19, 1850, Henry C. Smith was appointed by the Probate Court of Santa Clara county, administrator of the estate of said George Harlan, deceased. Letters of administration having issued to him, he duly qualified and entered upon his duties as administrator. On December 31, 1853, said Henry C. Smith, without first having settled. his accounts as administrator, filed in the Probate Court his resignation in writing of his administratorship; and thereupon the court, without in express terms accepting said resignation, made an order in which, after the introduction, "Now comes Henry C. Smith, administrator of the above estate, and files his resignation as administrator of said estate," he is ordered to turn over to John Yontz, public administrator, all the said estate; to make with said public administrator a full and complete settlement relating to said estate on or before the first day of the next succeeding term of said court, and providing that upon such full settlement he and his sureties should be discharged. And it was further ordered that said estate be placed in the hands of said public administrator "for purposes of general administration." Sufficient funds had come to the hands of Smith, had they been properly applied to have paid all the debts of the estate, together with the expenses of administration. No final settlement of the accounts of said Smith as administrator was ever made, either with the public administrator or the court, but no further proceedings were had with respect to his removal except such as are implied from the recital in the foregoing order and from the appointment of a successor, and the subsequent recognition of the latter as administrator in the further proceedings of the court. On June 15, 1855, Benjamin Aspinwall, on his own peti |