sine die on 2 March. The peaceful acceptance of the decision was much helped by the Democratic speaker, Randall of Pennsylvania, who firmly checked all Democratic attempts to "filibuster." The proceedings of the Commission may be found in the 'Congressional Record' (Vol. V, Part IV, 1877). Consult Haworth, The Hayes-Tilden Disputed Presidential Election of 1876) (Cleveland 1906).

ELECTORAL FRAUDS AND SAFEGUARDS AGAINST. The most common electoral fraud is bribery (q.v.), consisting of the gift of money or the promise of some reward either to vote "right" or to remain away from the polls. Employers of labor have been accused of attempting to influence the votes of their employees by threats of loss of work, reduced wages, etc.; physical violence has been used many times; and sometimes the threatened loss of social caste has operated to sway the voter. Priests have no right, either in or out of the pulpit, to influence electors to vote a particular way, by threats of excommunication, refusal of the sacrament and the like, and if they do so, it is, according to court decisions, an undue influence which may vitiate the election. The insertion of fictitious names on the roll, the registration of non-residents or noncitizens, etc., is almost impossible under present methods of registration. One source of election evil is found in faulty methods of identifying voters. The fraud that results takes the form of "impersonation" (voting on another man's name), or "repeating" (voting more than once). Sometimes forged naturalization papers are issued to prevent the discovery of fraudulent voting. Floaters are employed in many cases, especially in the crowded districts where election officials do not know the individual voters. Where a party has too many votes in one precinct and too few in another, colonization is sometimes practised (see BLOCKS OF FIVE; and in this connection see also GERRYMANDER); groups of actual voters may be transferred from a "safe" precinct to a "doubtful" one and still fulfil the letter of the law if only a brief residence be required. To lessen the likelihood of these crimes, some States require every voter to establish anew each year his right to vote; others allow a name once on the lists to stay there till death or removal causes it to be dropped. With our dread of red tape and formalities, we hesitate to adopt the ultimate remedy prevailing in France, where every man, as he steps up to the ballot-box, must produce his "electoral card" on which are inscribed his full name, profession and residence. This card is issued by the mayor of the town where the voter lives, after the latter has established his identity and majority by the production of a properly attested "act of birth. Each electoral card is numbered, and when it is presented at the polls, the judge of elections takes it, and calls off the number and name, while two other judges, with the official poll-list before them, repeat aloud the number and name and check off on the register. Then, and not till then, the first judge accepts the ballot from the voter and drops it into the box; and before handing back the card, he tears off a corner of it, which renders it useless for further voting that day. These bits of card are strung on a wire and are counted, at the close of the polls, to see if

they tally with the number of ballots in the box. Various methods are employed to destroy the efficacy of a ballot after it has been marked by the voter. False counting of ballots has been an easy and common way to vitiate election results. Knavish counters may nullify ballots by adding marks or altering them; ballots may be rejected on trivial grounds; and sometimes ballot boxes may be stuffed before the polls open. Defective ballots may be printed by omitting or shifting the position of candidates' names.

Election frauds developed early, and an especial abuse was the temporary conveyancing of lands, so as to enable the grantees to vote for a certain candidate. The election laws of Rhode Island, New Jersey and Virginia for the decade 1760-70 declared penalties for these frauds. The illicit use of money in elections began almost at the beginning of political history in America. Rhode Island, for instance, found it necessary to pass a general act against bribery and corruption in 1737, and 10 years later replaced it with one even more stringent. Judging by its provisions the evil must have been persistent in that colony. On 14 Oct. 1643 the General Court of Massachusetts ordered "that if any freeman shall put in more than one paper or beane for the choyce of any officer, he shall forfett 10s 1d for every offence; and any man that is not free, putting in any vote, shall forfett the like somme of 10s 1d." The other New England colonies found no such laws necessary, but all the others had them save New York and Maryland. In England the purchase of votes was for centuries as natural a thing as the sale of boroughs, and, no serious attempt to prevent it was made until 1854, when the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act defined bribery, forbade certain petty expenditures and required publicity of election expenses of a certain character. Despite this and other legislation, the evil did not greatly diminish and in 1883 a more drastic measure was adopted, which has served as a model for legislation elsewhere. In England and Scotland if the number of electors does not exceed 2,000, the Parliamentary candidate's maximum allowance for expenses is £380, with an additional £30 for every 1,000 electors above 2,000. In Ireland (which contains many small borough electorates), where the number does not exceed 500, £200; exceeds 500 but does not exceed 1,000, £250; exceeds 1,000 but does not exceed 1,500, £275. After this number has been reached, the rate is the same as in England. In the counties where the number of electors does not exceed 2,000 (in England and Scotland) the maximum allowance is £650, with an additional £60 for every complete 1,000 above 2,000. In Ireland, for the same number of electors, the maximum allowance is £500 and £540 respectively, with an additional £40 for every complete 1,000 above 2,000. These items do not include returning officers' fees or the personal expenses of candidates. In the United States all the States have enacted laws penalizing those who commit offenses against the suffrage. Most of the States have provided means to control the use of money in elections, some limiting the amount that may be expended by each candidate and compelling a sworn statement of receipts and expenditures; some defining the objects for which money may be spent; some re

quiring campaign financial committees to render a detailed statement of sources of receipts and objects of expenditures; and many prohibiting absolutely the gift of money or property to any political party, committee or organization by any corporation or joint-stock company. The more recent enactment of direct primary, initiative, referendum and recall measures (qq.v.) has also done much to rid politics of corrupt influence. Moreover, if at all possible, the courts prefer to give effect to elections, particularly if they give evidence of having been conducted fairly and honestly; and even the most glaring irregularities not actually constituting fraud have been held not to invalidate an election. See CORRUPT PRACTICES ACTS; BALLOT, etc. Consult Brooks, R. C., Corruption in American Politics and Life' (New York 1910); Ford, H. J., Rise and Growth of American Politics (ib. 1898); Griffith, E. C., 'Rise and Development of the Gerrymander' (Chicago 1907); Lowrie, S. G., Corrupt Practices at Elections (Madison, Wis., 1911); Shaw, A., 'National Lesson from Adams County) (in Review of Reviews, Vol. XLIII, pp. 171-180, New York 1911); Schaffner, M. A., Corrupt Practices at Elections (Madison, Wis., 1906); and authorities cited under article CORRUPT PRACTICES ACTS.

ELECTORAL QUALIFICATIONS; TERMS OF AND QUALIFICATIONS FOR OFFICE. The theory that suffrage is a natural, inherent right, belonging to every man, is now generally discredited. Political rights are not essential to citizenship, and in a dissenting opinion in the case of Amy vs. Smith (1 Litt. [Ky.], 326, 333, 342), one judge said:

"A State may deny all her political rights to an individual and yet he may be a citizen. The rights of office and suffrage are political purely, and are denied by some or all the States to part of their population, who are still citizens. A citizen, then, is one who owes to government allegiance, service, and money by way of taxation, and to whom the government, in turn, grants and guarantees liberty of person and of conscience, the right of acquiring and possessing property, of marriage and social relations, of suit and defence, and security in person, estate and reputation. These, with some others which might be enumerated, being guaranteed and secured by government, constitute a citizen."

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Again the Supreme Court has held that "The fact that one is a subject or citizen determines nothing as to his rights as such. They vary in different localities and according to circumstances. Citizenship has no necessary connection with the franchise of voting, eligibility to office, or indeed with any other rights, civil or political. Women, minors, and persons non compos are citizens and not the less so on account of their disabilities." (United States vs. Rhodes, 1866, Abb. U. S. 28, Fed. Cas. No. 16,151; see also Minor vs. Happersett, 1874, 21 Wall. 162).

That suffrage cannot be termed a "right" is obvious since no community can ever enfranchise all its citizens, two-fifths of whom are excluded from participation in governmental affairs because legally they are infants and, as such, unfitted to cope with government problems to the benefit of the State. Hence there is no necessary relation between citizenship and the right to vote. Minors and women (the latter save in those States having woman suffrage) do not usually possess the right to vote, although they are citizens; and on the other hand, some States and many municipalities permit persons to vote who have no claim to citizenship merely because they are residents and possess the other qualifications. Such a thing as the "popular vote" does not exist since millions of

women have not yet been vested with full suffrage; in many States bigamists, bribers, idiots, insane persons, etc., cannot vote; certain classes of foreigners may never exercise the elective franchise; paupers, as dependents, do not participate in shaping the government on which they are a burden and to which they contribute nothing; and the criminal, by his very acts, has exhibited his total incapacity to understand his citizenship privileges. Nevertheless, and in spite of the above restrictions, the suffrage is gradually widening and broadening, partly due to the progress of woman suffrage.

The Right to Vote and the Power to Confer It. As previously stated, the elective franchise is a privilege rather than a natural right; its extension to any excluded class is a question of political expediency; it may be taken away by the power which conferred it and if this be done no vested right is violated nor bill of attainder passed. Subject to the restrictions of the national Constitution as to race, color and previous condition of servitude, each State possesses the supreme and exclusive power to regulate the right of suffrage and to define the qualifications of its voters, however unwise, unjust or even tyrannical its regulations may be or seem to be in this regard. Hence the clauses in some State constitutions requiring of voters the ability to read, understand or interpret reasonably any section of such constitutions are not in contravention of the United States Constitution. Once granted by a State constitution, the right to vote cannot be abridged by the legislature; if they be fixed by the constitution that body cannot add to the qualifications of voters nor create other classes of voters, nor dispense with any of the constitutional qualifications nor enact provisions imposing upon a particular class of citizens conditions and requirements not imposed upon all others. On the other hand, the legislature may enact laws to regulate the exercise of the elective franchise, if those laws do not deny the right of the franchise itself. Under the national Constitution Congress cannot prescribe the qualifications of electors in the States, but Congress may penalize a criminal by forfeiting his United States citizenship, and if under the State constitution only United States citizens are allowed to vote, Congress may thus deprive a person of the opportunity to enjoy a right which belongs to him as a citizen of the State, even the right of voting, but cannot deprive him of the right itself. The Constitution does not confer the right of suffrage upon anyone individually nor upon any class of persons - the United States has no voters of its own creation in the States. It is true that the Fifteenth Amendment is usually interpreted as giving the negro the right to vote, but it merely exempts from discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise and no negro possesses the right to vote unless he conform to all the qualifications and restrictions imposed by the State constitutions upon white voters. But Congress may punish any State official who refuses to perform the duties necessary to qualify all colored citizens. Thus the right to vote in the States is conferred by the States but the right of exemption from the prohibited discrimination comes from the national government.

The Constitution says that Congressmen

shall be chosen by the people of the several States and that "the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature" (Art. 1, § 2, ¶ 1). The States do not define who shall vote for Congressmen but merely prescribe the qualifications of those who vote for the popular branch of their own legislatures and the Constitution says that the same persons vote for Congressmen. Hence Congressional electors do not owe their right_to vote to the State law in any sense which makes the exercise of the right exclusively dependent on the law of the State. Since the right to vote is not natural, the State, unless expressly prohibited by its constitution, may confer the right only on those who pay taxes for the support of the government; and even though the constitution fix the qualifications of voters at general elections, yet the legislature, in granting municipal charters and providing for special local elections, may make the payment of taxes a condition precedent to the right to vote at such elections. If United States citizenship be a requisite qualification of an elector, a forfeiture of that citizenship will disqualify him, provided a regular legal trial and conviction be shown. Many of the State constitutions provide that persons convicted of infamous crimes or crimes of a high degree lose the privilege of voting and it has been held also that a conviction of crime of a disqualifying nature in a Federal court has the effect to exclude the person convicted from office and suffrage the same as if he had been convicted in a State court. A general absolute pardon of the executive restores the convicted person to the full enjoyment of his civil rights, including the right to vote, and a Presidential pardon likewise restores the right to those convicted in Federal courts, but while a Presidential pardon restores the criminal to the rights and privileges of a citizen of the United States, it does not, without the assent of the State, restore him to the exercise of that right if the sovereign power of the State has excluded him from the right of suffrage. Unless pardoned by the executive, ex-convicts continue to be disfranchised. In this connection the existence of a double citizenship in the United States should be mentioned. One authority says:

"There is a clear distinction between national citizenship and State citizenship. A person who is a citizen of the United States and a resident of a particular State is necessarily a citizen of that State. On the other hand a person may be a citizen of the United States and not a citizen of any particular State. This is the condition of citizens residing in the District of Columbia, and in the territories of the United States, or who have taken up a residence abroad. So a person may be a citizen of a particular State and not a citizen of the United States, as an alien who has declared his intention to become a citizen and who is by local law entitled to vote in the State of his residence and there to exercise all other local functions of local citizenship, such as holding office, the right to poor relief, etc., but who is not a citizen of the United States. Nothing which a State can do will invest a foreigner with the rights and privileges of a citizen of the United States." ('Corpus Juris,' Vol. XI, p. 777).

Colonial Electoral Qualifications. The principal qualification required of the early colonial electors was that they should be "freemen," a term of various interpretations even in the colonies themselves, but held generally to mean persons of recognized responsibility. In Virginia and North Carolina, Indians and negroes were not allowed to vote. In South

man

Carolina and Georgia the privilege was restricted to white men, but the law was not rigidly enforced, for free negroes were recorded as voting in South Carolina in 1701. In Pennsylvania only natural-born subjects of England could vote; in Massachusetts, after 1664, only Englishmen could vote.. In South Carolina, however, the French Huguenots had equal franchise with the English "freemen.» In general, the voter was required to be of good moral character and obedient to the laws; immoral behavior might result either in temporary or permanent disfranchisement. In Plymouth voters were to be "orthodox in the fundamentals of religion." Massachusetts in 1631 demanded also, to the end that the body of the freemen may be preserved of honest and good men," that "henceforth no shall be admitted to the freedom of the commonwealth but such as are members of some of the churches within the limits of this jurisdiction." This provision, however, lasted only until 1664 or 1665. Massachusetts excluded Quakers, but they were permitted to vote in Rhode Island and Connecticut, which colonies did not specify church membership; while in the other colonies their reluctance to take oaths usually operated to debar them from the franchise. In most of the colonies Roman Catholics were not allowed to vote, New Haven and, for a time, Maryland being notable exceptions. New York excluded Catholics in 1701 and Jews in 1737. Virginia was the only colony specifically debarring women from the franchise, though they were effectually excluded in South Carolina, Georgia and Delaware; but the others incidentally excluded them by according the vote only to "freemen," or by confining the suffrage to males of at least 21 years of age. However, the laws often read "freeholders," rather than "freemen," and it is impossible to tell how far under this the women voted, though at least a few voted in New Jersey. In Virginia a property qualification was required: a voter must be a "housekeeper," either as owner or tenant. Massachusetts, Delaware and Maryland required an estate of at least $200; after 1699 New York required that voters for members of the lower branch of the legislature be "freeholders" of an estate valued at not less than £40, but in Albany and New York city all "freemen" were allowed to vote. Rhode Island stipulated that voters must possess "competent estates," which, later, were defined as the possession of $500, or a rental list of at least $10 (afterward $50, and still later, $100) per annum. Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia required the possession of 50 acres of land, of which a certain (varying) portion should be under cultivation. Virginia required the possession of 100 acres of land if untenanted, and 25 acres if a residence not less than 12 feet square were built upon the land and occupied. The same size of house on a small lot in a town fulfilled the colony's requirement in this respect. At Wilmington, only those could vote who had occupied brick houses at least 16 feet wide and 20 feet long, and for at least three months preceding the election. The residence qualification in other colonies varied from six months in Georgia_to two years in Pennsylvania and Delaware. See also UNITED States — SuffragE IN THE.

Broadening of the Suffrage. When the Constitution was framed in 1787 suffrage qualifications were so divergent in the various States that no attempt was made to impose restrictions and the States were allowed to modify their electoral qualifications as they deemed wise, the only restriction being that contained in Article I, § 2, 11 which provides that Congressmen shall be elected by people in the various States "who have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature." At that time this distinction was of great importance since all the States required the payment of taxes or ownership of real or personal property varying in value from $33 to $200. Moreover, North Carolina distinguished between electors for members of her legislature; to vote for a member of the lower house the elector need only to have paid taxes, but to vote for a member of the senate he must own a freehold of 50 acres. New York required that all voters for members of the assembly own a freehold valued at £20 or pay rent of 40s. and that taxes must have been paid to the State during the previous year; while the person who voted for senator must be possessed of an unencumbered freehold valued at not less than £100. Gradually these requirements were eliminated, the property test being abolished by Maryland in 1801 and 1809, New York and Massachusetts in 1821, Tennessee in 1834, New Jersey in 1844, Connecticut in 1845, Virginia in 1850, South Carolina in 1865, North Carolina in 1854 and 1868; and the tax-paying test being abolished by New York in 1826, Louisiana in 1845, Ohio in 1851 and Virginia and Mississippi in 1882. Nevertheless, many States continued to insist upon the poll tax and Rhode Island still has a law that prohibits a person who has not paid during the previous year a tax upon his property in the State valued at $134 at least from voting for city councilmen or upon any measure of municipal finance. Some of the other States now have tax or property tests as will appear in the subjoined table. The next great extension of the suffrage was an outcome of the Civil War, when during the Reconstruction period (see UNITED STATES-RECONSTRUCTION IN THE) the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution were adopted, forbidding the States to discriminate against the negro. Finally women have won voting privileges on an equality with men in Wyoming (1869), Colorado (1893), Utah (1896), Idaho (1896), Washington (1910), California (1911), Kansas (1912), Arizona (1912), Oregon (1912), Alaska (1913), Montana (1914), Nevada (1914), New York (1917, effective 1918). In other States they possess a restricted suffrage, for details of which see WOMAN SUFFRAGE. See also BALLOT; VOTE, Voters, VOTING.

Modern Electoral Qualifications. Most of the States have uniform laws for electors of every officer to be elected in the State, though this statement must be qualified as to those States which permit women to vote in the election of school boards or committees, or which allow women who are taxpayers to vote upon financial measures. Unlike some European countries, such as Germany, the vote of the lodging-house dweller, the loafer, etc., in

the United States carries as much weight in the election as the vote of the wealthiest or most distinguished citizen. Most of the States require that their voters be full-fledged United States citizens. As a rule the State constitutions require that a voter be a male, at least 21 years of age, who is a citizen of the United States, either native or naturalized, and can read or write English or both. The "male" provision, of course, is inoperative in those States wherein women enjoy the suffrage. Some States, particularly those that are anxious to obtain immigrants as agricultural laborers, extend the privilege of voting to an alien who has declared his intention of becoming a citizen and has resided in the State a certain period of time before election—usually six months to a year. Such a voter is not bound by an oath of allegiance to the United States nor has he foresworn allegiance to his native land; hence a situation might arise under which this voter would help elect the officers of the United States government and the next day the United States might become involved in a dispute with the government of his native country over some question respecting his citizenship. Courts have ruled that if a father become a naturalized citizen of the United States before his son shall have attained his majority, the latter, though alien-born, ipsofacto becomes a citizen and need not undergo the formality of naturalization if dwelling within the United States (Revised Statutes," Title XXX, § 2172); but the son of an alien cannot be vested with citizenship by implication merely because the father declared his intention of becoming a citizen prior to the time the son attained his majority. Basing his statements on court decisions, one authority says:

"While it has been held that citizenship will not be presumed merely from the fact of having owned real estate, having voted, or having held an elective office, it seems that having participated in elections and having held elective offices are facts strongly tending to establish at least a prima facie case of citizenship; and it has been held that, where the State confers the right of State citizenship on aliens who have declared their intentions to become citizens of the United States, the act of voting is conclusive proof of an acceptance of such State citizenship by them." ('Corpus Juris, Vol. XI, p. 787).

Some States enfranchise men of Indian descent, native of the United States, while others grant the privilege to Indians who have been declared citizens of the United States by act of Congress, and to civilized Indians, not members of any tribe. As a rule, idiots, insane persons and felons are not allowed to vote and sometimes vagrants, paupers, persons convicted of treason, bribers, embezzlers, bigamists, Chinese, etc., are excluded. Some constitutions state that United States soldiers and seamen gain no voting residence by being stationed in the State, while the residents of the District of Columbia, when it became the seat of the general government, lost the right to vote therein for national officers or on matters of national concern.

Educational and Other Tests.- The educational, property, tax, and good character tests, grandfather clauses, etc., have operated to exclude many thousands of voters-particularly the negro voters of the South. Connecticut in 1854 and Massachusetts in 1856 led the other States in requiring of voters the ability to read the constitution and (in Massachu

setts) to write their own names. To some extent the national naturalization laws have offset the effects of these tests since an applicant for citizenship must sign the application in his own handwriting and when taking_out his final papers must be able to speak the English language. (See ALIENS; CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES; NATURALIZATION). The exclusion of the negro in the South was undertaken to assure permanence of white rule, since the negro, during the Reconstruction period, had displayed a total unfitness to govern. Constitutional amend

ments were adopted to attain this end by law rather than by force, intimidation or fraud. In addition to a new registration law, already in vogue, the Mississippi constitution of 1890 required that a prospective voter be registered, a payer of a poll tax, and, after 1 Jan. 1892, able to read any portion of the constitution or to understand it when read to him, or to render a reasonably accurate interpretation of it. The South Carolina constitution of 1895 permitted the registration of an otherwise qualified person, "provided that he can both read and write any section of this constitution submitted to him by the registration officer, or can show that he owns and has paid all taxes collectible during the previous year on property in this State assessed at $300 or more.» The Louisiana constitution of 1898 contained similar clauses, but for would-be voters, who might be excluded by these tests, the constitution provided that any male person "who was on January 1, 1867, or at any date prior thereto, entitled to vote under the constitution or statutes of any State of the United States, wherein he then resided, and any son or grandson of any such person not less than twenty-one years of age at the date of the adoption of this Constitution" should be allowed to register and vote at all elections without possessing the educational or property qualifications. In 1901 Alabama incorporated a provision requiring that voters be of "good character" and "understand the duties and obligations of citizenship under a republican form of government." Virginia has imitated this qualification. (See also UNITED STATES-SUFFRAGE IN THE). The constitutionality of these provisions has not been definitely decided by the Supreme Court, though several cases have been considered. Regarding the Mississippi constitution (Williams vs. Mississippi, 170 U. S. 213), the Court declared that the qualifications did not "on their face discriminate between the white and negro races, nor amount to a denial of the equal protection of the law secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution; and it has not been shown that their actual administration was evil, but only that evil was possible under them." The Court further stated (Giles vs. Harris, 189 U. S. 474) - "Relief from a great political wrong, if done as alleged, by the people of a State, or by the State itself, must be given by them, or by the legislative and political departments of the government of the United States."

On 21 June 1915 the Supreme Court declared void the "grandfather clauses" of the Maryland and Oklahoma constitutions. In Maryland the clause was inserted in laws governing elections in various cities. In 1908 it

was inserted in the law governing municipal elections in the city of Annapolis. It authorized the registration as voters of all taxpayers of the city assessed for at least $500; all duly naturalized citizens, all male children of naturalized citizens 21 years of age, and "all citizens who prior to Jan. 1, 1868, were entitled to vote in the State of Maryland or any other State of the United States at a State election, and the lawful male descendants of any person who prior to Jan. 1, 1868, were entitled to vote in the State of Maryland or in any other State of the United States at a State election." The constitution of Oklahoma, upon which that Territory was admitted to the Union as a State, gave something very like manhood suffrage. Prior to the election of 1910, however, an amendment was adopted restricting the franchise. The amendment in part was as follows:

"No person shall be registered as an elector of this State or be allowed to vote in any election herein unless he shall be able to read and write any section of the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma; but no person who was on Jan. 1, 1866, or at any time prior thereto, entitled to vote under any form of government, or who at any time resided in some foreign nation and no lineal descendant of such person shall be denied the right to register and vote because of his inability to so read and write sections of such Constitution."

The contentions of the election officers as plaintiffs in error, really setting forth the position of the State, are thus outlined by the chief justice:

"It said the States have the power to fix standards for suffrage and that power was not taken away by the Fifteenth Amendment, but only limited to the extent of the prohibitions which the amendment established. This being true, as the standard fixed does not in terms make any discrimination on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude, since all, whether negro or white, who come within its requirements, enjoy the privilege of voting, there is no ground upon which to rest the contention that the provision violates the Fifteenth Amendment. This, it is insisted, must be the case unless it is intended to expressly deny the State's right to provide a standard for suffrage, or what is equivalent thereto, to assert: (a) That the judgment of the State exercised in the execution of that power is subject to Federal judicial review or to supervision, or (b) that it may be questioned or be brought within the prohibitions of the amendment by attributing to the legislative authority an occult motive to violate the amendment or by assuming that an exercise of the otherwise lawful power may be invalidated because of conclusions concerning its operation in practical execution and resulting discrimination arising therefrom, albeit such discrimination was not expressed in the standard fixed or fairly to be implied, but simply arose from inequalities naturally inhering in those who must come within the standard in order to enjoy the right to vote."

The government insisted, on the other hand, that the "real question involved is the repugnancy of the standard which the amendment makes, based upon the conditions existing on Jan. 1, 1866, because on its face and inherently considering the substance of things, that standard is a mere denial of the restrictions imposed by the prohibitions of the Fifteenth Amendment and by necessary result creates and perpetuates the very conditions which the amendment was intended to destroy."

The chief justice summed up the opinion of the court in these words:

"There seems no escape from the conclusion that to hold that there was even possibility for dispute on the subject would be but to declare that the Fifteenth Amendment not only had the self-executing power which it has been recognized to have from the beginning, but that its provisions were wholly inoperative because susceptible of being rendered inapplicable by mere forms of expression embodying no exercise of judgment and resting upon no discernible reason other than the purpose to disregard the prohibitions of the amendment by creating a standard of voting which on its face was in substance but a revitalization of the conditions which, when they prevailed in the past, had been destroyed by the self-operative force of the amendment.

It