ble for us to undertake the intended co-operation with any reasonable prospect of success.

"The consequences you have well delineated. The succor designed for our benefit will prove a serious misfortune; and instead of rescuing us from the embarrassments we experience, and from the danger with which we are threatened, will in all probability precipitate our ruin. Drained and weakened as we already are, the exertions we shall make, though they may be too imperfect to secure success, will at any rate be such as to leave us in a state of relaxation and debility, from which it will be difficult if not impracticable to recover-the country exhausted the people dispirited-the consequence and reputation of these States in Europe sunk―our friends chagrined and discouraged—our enemies deriving new confidence, new resources.

“We have not, nor ought we to wish, an alternative. The court of France has done so much for us, that we must make a decisive effort on our part. Our situation demands it 'tis expected. We have the means to success without some unforeseen accident, and it only remains to employ them; but the conjuncture requires all our wisdom and all our energy. Such is the present state of this country, that the utmost exertion of its resources, though equal, is not more than equal to the object, and our measures must be so taken as to call them into immediate and full effect.

"There is only one thing,-I should have been happy the committee had thought proper to take up on a larger scale. I mean the supply of men by draft. Instead of completing deficiencies of the quotas assigned by the resolution of Congress of the 9th of February last, it would, in my apprehension, be of the greatest importance, that the respective States should fill their battalions to their

complement of five hundred and four rank and file. Considering the different possible dispositions of the enemy, and the different possible operations on our part, we ought not to have less than twenty thousand continental efficient troops. The whole number of battalions from New Hampshire to Pennsylvania inclusive, if complete would not amount to this force. The total would be twentythree thousand one hundred and eighty-four rank and file, from which the customary deductions being made, there will not remain more than about eighteen thousand fit for the service of the field. To this may be added the remainder of the sixteen regiments, amounting to about one thousand.

"Unless the principal part of the force be composed of men regularly organized, and on the continuance of whose services we can rely, nothing decisive can be attempted. The militia are too precarious a dependence to justify such an attempt, when they form a material part of the plan." This letter was followed by another, also from Hamilton's pen, urging the committee "to call immediately upon the States for specific aids of men, provisions, forage, and the means of transportation."

Estimating the force of the enemy at New York at seventeen thousand five hundred men, a total of forty thousand, including the five thousand French, was pronounced necessary. These, it was advised, should be required with the adequate supplies by the last of June-to be kept up until the first of November. "This brings the business to a point. The States must either give us what we want in the time required, or manifest their inability to do it, and we can take our measures accordingly."

General Greene wrote at this time to Reed, recently chosen president of Pennsylvania: "Let it suffice to say that the army has not four days' provision of meat in the

world, neither have the States nor the continental agents any in prospect, unless it can be had from the State of Pennsylvania. Much fault is found by a southern gentleman with your State, for want of proper exertions to save the army. It seems to be the intention of some here, to fix the greater part of the blame, if any misfortune attends us, upon your State. We cannot hold together many days in the present temper of the army, should there be a want of provisions. The great man is confounded at his situation, but appears to be reserved and silent. I write you in the fullest confidence that you will not let the least hint drop from you of the information I give, as it may prove ruinous to me. I have difficulties enough, God knows, without adding to them."

Hamilton soon after addressed a very earnest letter in Washington's name to Reed, interesting in a twofold aspect, the exhibition of the general's feelings to that officer, and as taking an enlarged, comprehensive view of the resources of the enemy and of those of France and Spain.

Reed supposed an alienation on the part of Washington. Two months before* he wrote to Gates intimating that he might induce a reconciliation between him and the commander-in-chief. "But," he observed, "it is one of those points which cannot well be meddled with in writing, especially with one of so much reserve and caution. I am far from enjoying that share of confidence in a certain quarter which I once possessed. Distance, different pursuits, and a certain coldness or apathy of mind will naturally diminish attachments which had not a common bond of blood, marriage or interest, to keep them together." He consoled him with a comment upon the in

* March 4, 1780. NOTE. -Washington and Reed.

fluence of envy, and with an assurance of the approbation of posterity.

The letter written for Washington by Hamilton, on the contrary, closes with an assurance, which would not have been made, if it had not been felt, "of esteem and regard." The truth had not yet been unveiled.

"I am much obliged to you for your favor of the twenty-third. Nothing could be more necessary than the aid given by your State towards supplying us with provisions. I assure you, every idea you can form of our distresses will fall short of the reality. There is such a combination of circumstances to exhaust the patience of the soldiery, that it begins at length to be worn out, and we see in every line of the army the most serious features of mutiny and sedition. All our departments, all our operations are at a stand, and unless a system very different from that which has for a long time prevailed, be immediately adopted throughout these States, our affairs must soon become desperate beyond the possibility of recovery. If you were on the spot, my dear sir, if you could see what difficulties surround us on every side, how unable we are to administer to the most ordinary calls of the service, you would be convinced that these expressions are not too strong, and that we have every thing to dread. Indeed I have almost ceased to hope. The country in general is in such a state of insensibility, and indifference to its interests, that I dare not flatter myself with any change for the better.

"The committee of Congress in their late address to the several States have given a just picture of our situation. I very much doubt its making the desired impression, and if it does not, I shall consider our lethargy as incurable. The present juncture is so interesting, that if it does not produce correspondent exertions, it will be a proof that

motives of honor, public good, and even self-preservation, have lost their influence upon our minds. This is a decisive moment, one of the most, I will go farther and say, the most important America has seen. The court of France has made a glorious effort for our deliverance; and if we disappoint its intentions by our supineness, we must become contemptible in the eyes of all mankind; nor can we, after that, venture to confide, that our allies will persist in an attempt to establish what it will appear we want inclination or ability to assist them in.

"Every view of our own circumstances ought to determine us to the most vigorous efforts; but there are considerations of another kind that should have equal weight. The combined fleets of France and Spain last year were greatly superior to those of the enemy. The enemy, nevertheless, sustained no material damage; and at the close of the campaign have given a very important blow to our allies. This campaign, the difference between the fleets, from every account I have been able to collect, will be inconsiderable, indeed it is far from clear that there will not be an equality. What are we to expect will be the case if there should be another campaign? In all probability the advantage will be on the side of the English, and then what will become of America? We ought not to deceive ourselves. The maritime resources of Great Britain are more substantial and real than those of France and Spain united. Her commerce is more extensive than that of both her rivals, and it is an axiom that the nation which has the most extensive commerce will always have the most powerful marine. Were this argument less convincing, the fact speaks for itself. Her progress in the course of the last year is an incontestable truth.

"It is true, France in a manner created a fleet in a very