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SENATE.]

National Defence.

Union;" and that the surplus is to be pledged to them, and them only, until they are all completed. They are, certainly, numerous enough, and of sufficient magnitude, to attract our admiration. Forts, on the lakes, ocean, gulf, and inland frontier--armories, and arsenals, sufficient to construct artillery, side-arms, and pistols--ordnance, arms, and munitions of war-increase of the navy, navy yards, dock yards, and steam batteries: these are to be provided for, to the exclusion of other objects of interest which may hereafter be presented. The scheme is sufficiently large. It will answer exceedingly well for purposes of speculation, comment, and applause before the public, but is not very likely to produce much good. Such magnificent schemes generally end in small results. The money necessary to complete the one under consideration must be counted by tens of millions, and the time by scores of years. But while the people cannot doubt that its friends are devoted to their interests, it is to be hoped that those who cannot elevate themselves to its magnitude may not be regarded as less anxious for "the general defence and permanent security of the country." I do not, however, object to the inquiries. They may procure from the Executive information which may be useful when the Senate is called to act upon less extensive and more unpretending plans.

Before I vote for the resolution in its present shape, I wish some explanation of its terms. What is the "surplus revenue?" It is generally understood to be that amount of money which remains in the treasury after all the appropriations have been made and expended. Now, these appropriations are for such objects as are deemed by Congress necessary for the support of the Government, and for the general defence, security, and prosperity, of the country; for the civil and diplomatic list; the army; the navy; the fortifications; for each and every object for which it is the duty of Congress to provide. Does the resolution, then, mean to declare that, after Congress shall have granted whatever is necessary for forts, army, navy, &c., so much of the remainder as is necessary for those same objects shall be pledged to them? They are first to receive all the support which is necessary for them, in the opinion of Congress, and, after that, to receive as much more as shall be necessary for them. Who is to judge what more is necessary, after Congress has applied what they deem necessary? The resolution has something of the aspect of the fortification bill of last year. Congress applied by it what was necessary for them, beyond the estimate of the Executive, and then the bill gave three millions more, if that same Executive should think it necessary.

[JAN. 25, 1836.

merit. They have one merit only, that of not having actually violated the law which commanded them to make the payments; and this is no ordinary merit, I admit, in times like these.

But if I understood the Senator aright, he declared that he had "on purpose" presented this resolution as a mode of resisting the plans proposed by the Senators from Kentucky and South Carolina. The proposition of the Senator from Kentucky would direct a distribution of the proceeds of the public lands among the States; and is founded upon the idea that these proceeds belong of right to the States, and that they are the proper authorities to select the objects on which they shall be expended. That of the Senator from South Carolina proposes that all the surplus revenue, after the ordinary calls of the Government have been satisfied, shall be divided in the same mode. These are, at least, practicable schemes of public usefulness, and I am not willing that their consideration should be put aside by one like that contained in the present resolution. They ought, at least, to be fairly met, fully discussed, and decided on their merits; not defeated by propositions which, with high pretensions, can lead to no useful end, much less by a plan which leaves the whole surplus revenue to be expended by agents of the federal Executive, with all its instruments of corrup tion and extravagance.

But, Mr. President, the argument by which the resolution was sustained is calculated to attract more attention, and deserves to be examined. It seemed to me to consist, principally, in three propositions:

1. We shall probably have war with France. 2. The nation is without defence, and unprepared for war. And,

3. The Senate is to blame for this condition of the country.

This is the chain of argument by which we are to be led to the conclusion that so much of the surplus revenue as may be necessary for the purpose ought to be set apart and applied to the general defence and permanent security of the Union. Let us look at it.

But I am

We shall soon have war. It may be so. not disposed, now, to speculate on its probabilities, nor argue respecting its causes. When the question shall be fairly presented to our consideration, it shall meet from me the anxious deliberation which its nature demands.

For the present I confess my inability to form an opinion whether we shall or shall not have war with France. The rapid changes in our positions, the strange involutions of diplomacy which have been exhibited, put ordinary calculation at defiance, and no one can reach a safe conclusion upon the subject, who is not admitted to a knowledge of the secret designs of the Executives of

the two countries.

It

The mover of the resolution has informed the Senate that it is modelled, "on purpose," after the resolution devoting the revenue to the national debt. But the want of parallel between the cases is quite apparent. It may be that two great and powerful nations, boastThe national debt was not an object of ordinary appro-ing of their civilization, in this age of Christian light, are priation, as are the fortifications, the navy, and other matters enumerated in this resolution. They were then, if they are now, the fit subjects for appropriations; and after they were provided for, the surplus was with great propriety devoted to the extinction of that debt; but if appropriations such as Congress deemed necessary for that debt had been made, it would have seemed strange to those who passed that resolution to have declared that so much more of the surplus as was necessary should be pledged for its payment. That debt is no longer a burden to the nation, and the credit of our relief from it is due to those who wisely devised and put in operation the plan for its extinction; not to those who happened to be in power when the last payments were made, and who, with so much self-complacency and imposition upon the public, have claimed the whole

about to commence a sanguinary and destructive war-
fare, and squander their blood and treasure, about a
debt of $5,000,000; a warfare which, in a single year,
will cost to each nation ten times the amount of the sum
in dispute, and blood for which no money can pay.
may be that ancient alliances and friendship are to be
broken up and forgotten, and substituted by the bitter-
ness of hatred and the malignity of revenge; that the
peace of the civilized world is to be destroyed, and the
progress of free principles jeoparded, by a conflict be-
tween nations who profess the most regard for those
principles. It may be, too, that our own institutions
approach an extraordinary trial. When our constitution
was formed, one great object of its founders was to re-
move the power of producing and declaring war, as far
as possible, from the action of one man-the Chief Ex-

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ecutive Magistrate. They knew, for they had felt, the sufferings, distress, and crimes, which it produces. They had seen, too, in the history of other nations, how often it had resulted from the ignorance, the folly, and the ambition, of princes and rulers; and they resolved to guard themselves and their descendants from such an evil. Hence the provision of the constitution, "Congress shall have power to declare war." But it may yet appear that their caution was vain; that the people and Congress may be driven to it against their interests and judgments; and that the Executive has still the capacity, by the language which he uses, and the mode in which he conducts negotiations, to place us in conditions in which we have no alternative, and in which the best friends of peace may be compelled to yield themselves to sustain the honor and the interests of the country against the arms and the assaults of a foreign nation. We may have war; but if we do, there will be tremendous guilt somewhere. It can have resulted only from the folly or the crimes of those who have conducted the negotiation on the one side or the other, or on both. There is nothing in the cause of dispute which ought to have led to such a termination. I fear that we shall be compelled to trace it to the boastful vanity of one man, the petulance of a second, and the fitful violence of a third; and these met by ill-disciplined national pride, and mistaken notions of national honor. If it do come, it will be no common struggle, and produce no ordinary results. We all know what our own countrymen can and will do when the scabbard shall be thrown away; and we cannot be ignorant of the capacities of modern France, regenerated as she has been by the controlling genius of the last age, and possessing, as she does, a navy inferior in science and discipline to none which has existed in any age of the world; superior in numbers and power to all but one, whose flag is now upon the ocean. For such a struggle there ought to be adequate cause and full preparation.

Are we prepared? The Senator from Missouri informs us, and very correctly, that we are not. But he seemed unwilling to speak of our situation, lest he should give to the enemy a knowledge of our want of defence. He may relieve himself from all fears on that point. Our actual condition is as well known in Paris as in Washington. We have not a fort upon our seaboard, the precise location and strength of which is not as well understood by them as by us. Our navy, both the scattered portions which are at sea and the remainder at our dock yards, has been the subject of their diligent study. Our coast, with all its inlets, bays, and harbors, is familiar to them. The most accurate maps and charts of our whole seaboard, and especially of its most defenceless portion, the Gulf of Mexico, are not only known, but regularly published in the French capital. Our revenue and materials for defence and attack are examined by them with intelligent care. All this is due to their own interests, by those who control the movements of their Government, and this knowledge would be acquired by them, whether peace or war was their object. Our debates, here, will give them no light on such subjects as these. The Senator may safely declare to the nation the truth, and the whole truth, in regard to them; and I unite with him in the declaration that the country is without the necessary and proper defences. Are your fortifications erected, armed, and manned? Is any one of all the entrances into your ports sufficiently defended? What guards have you provided for Pensacola, the Chesapeake, the Delaware, and the other portions of your coast? How is your little army disposed of? Look at Florida, now ravished by a band of Indians, and your Executive, either strangely ignorant of their strength and their intended incursions, or criminally sleeping over its duties and the demands which

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Where is your navy? You have, in actual service, in the Mediterranean, two frigates, one sloop, and one schooner, the ship of the line being on her return. the West Indies, one frigate and three sloops. In the Pacific, one frigate and two schooners. In the East Indies, one sloop and one schooner. On the coast of Brazil, one sloop; and one somewhere on or near the African coast. This is the whole force now employed in the protection of your commerce, which extends to every portion of the globe.

What is the condition of Pensacola and Key West? They are positions of indispensable necessity, in possession of which an enemy may seal hermetically the mouth of the Mississippi, destroy your whole commerce on the Gulf, watch your coast, and be prepared for a descent upon its most unprotected points, at any moment. Why have they been so much neglected? Why have not sufficient preparations been made for the repair and sustenance of your vessels at one or both those places? Has their importance escaped the notice of those whose views are directed to "the general defence and perma nent security of the country?" It was long since predicted by one of our ablest and most valuable naval officers, that the first naval battle in which our country would be engaged, would, in all probability, be in the neighborhood of Key West. Yet what is its condition? Unprotected for the relief of our own navy; fitted for the rendezvous of an enemy. Every thing which relates to the efficiency of the right arm of your defence has been treated with cold indifference; and no man who is attached to it, as I am, can look at its condition without pain and mortification. Sir, cast your eyes where you will, we are unprepared for war. The Senator from Missouri is right.

And why are these things so? In whose hands have been the resources of the country for the last seven years? Who have governed and directed the energies and the treasure of the nation? Your wondrously energetic Executive! To whom, then, is due the security and the glory of our present position? To him and his friends. They have possessed the power to dispose of your treasury as they saw fit. They have so disposed of it. They have had the care of your interests, and they have never called, without success, for a dollar for the defence and security of the country. No obstacles have been thrown in the way by any effort of the opposition. Look back through the period of this adminis tration, and see if you can find an estimate for your navy-your fortifications-for any object of defence, which has been defeated by the opposition. I know of none. The records of this administration exhibit none. They have had all for which they have asked. The appropriations have been made liberally. The last year, for naval purposes, more than $3,600,000; a larger sum than was ever before granted. The average of the appropriations for all such objects has been greater than at any former period. Why is it, then, that we are in our present condition? And who must answer for it? And what, during this period, have been their employments? They have been very busy. They have had employment enough in fighting the bank; talking about a specie currency, taking the treasury out of the hands of Congress; securing offices and jobs and deposites for partisans; sustaining a profligrate administration of the Post Office, whose criminality is now admitted; weakening the popular respect for the Judiciary; and warring against the Senate. And now an Indian war takes them by surprise; and they are endeavoring to rush into con

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flict with a powerful nation, and, by way of preparation for it, assail the Senate, as faithless to their duty. The charge is destitute of plausible justification, but may serve as a cover to their own delinquency.

Mr. President, it gives me no pleasure to refer to such a state of facts. We may be near to war. We shall have war if more prudent counsels do not prevail. You would have had it ere this, but for the Senate. If it come speedily, it will find us unprepared, but not unequal to its exigencies, in the end. France should make no miscalculations on that point. We shall suffer losses, defeats, perhaps, but there is power and energy enough to bear them, and to triumph still. This nation has been yet unconquered, and is unconquerable. With a free country, possessing such resources and such a population as ours, nothing but the folly and weakness of those who direct its means of defence can hazard ultimate success. On the principal theatre of conflict we may, we shall, probably, for a time, be defeated; but on our own shores a hostile foot cannot long remain, and our little neglected navy will do all that may be hoped from human exertion. Even in defeat its still untarnished honor will be secure. While it carries the " flag of the ocean" and "the land," "flag of the free heart's only home," it will bear it aloft in triumph, or, if subdued, still unstained and undisgraced.

But, sir, is the criminality the less with those who, without the most ample cause, shall force us unprepared into such a conflict? Will the sufferings, the losses, the agonies of humanity be unfelt, because we may and shall escape final overthrow? No; execrations, deep and lasting, will be the lot of those upon whose heads shall rest that guilt.

We have been told that the Senate has been criminal on this subject, not in urging the nation into war, but in refusing to prepare for it; and an effort is made to hold us up for the rebuke of the nation. I did not anticipate the course of observation of the Senator upon this point, in discussing the merits of this resolution. I did not perceive the application of the argument to the subject. But I had expected that, at some period of the session, the Senate would, in some way, be put upon its defence. The official herald of the Executive had sounded to the charge; the trumpeters of the phalanx, reckless of the justice of the cause, had aped their leader, and the people were assured that the delinquency was in us. At the opening of the session, the President from his high station announced to the country and the world that we were guilty. It was not to be doubted that some members of the Senate might think as the Executive thought; and, if they did, that they would feel it their duty, in some form, to exhibit the indictment against us. It was as well, perhaps, that it should be done in supporting these resolutions as upon any other subject. I do not regret that the accusation has been made by the Executive, but I meet it, and deny its truth and justice; and beg, while I investigate the facts, that it may be recollected by Senators that this contest has not been sought by us. The investigation has been forced upon

us.

The country is, if possible, to be urged into war; and, if unprepared or unsuccessful, the blame is to be cast upon the Senate. It is one of the movements of the war upon this body, which has been waged with such unrelenting severity.

The President, in his message of the 7th of December last, says: "Much loss and inconvenience have been experienced in consequence of the failure of the bill containing the ordinary appropriations for fortifications, which passed one branch of the national Legislature at the last session, but was lost in the other. The failure was the more regretted, not only because it necessarily interrupted and delayed the progress of a system of national defence, projected immediately after the last

[JAN. 25, 1836.

war, and since steadily pursued, but also because it contained a contingent appropriation, inserted in accordance with the views of the Executive, in aid of this important object, and other branches of the national defence, some portions of which might have been usefully applied during the past year."

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In the importance of the ordinary appropriations for this object I entirely concur. The system of defence demands support. But the allegation here made is, that the contingent appropriation was inserted in accordance with the views of the Executive, and that the bill containing it and the ordinary appropriations was lost in one House, (the Senate,) after it had passed the other, (the House of Representatives.) This allegation has been made by the first Magistrate of the nation, manifestly with a view to cast reproach upon this body; and, sir, it will be believed by thousands. It is made by him, and that is enough for blind credulity. They will inquire no further, and ask no other evidence. No effort made here can reach them, no demonstration exhibited here will meet their eyes. Their oracles will hide the truth from them. But, so far as depends upon me, I will repel the accusation; and if they choose to believe without evidence and against evidence, it shall not be from my silence. The Senate, upon that bill, did its duty, and its whole duty, fully, firmly, fearlessly; and, whenever justice shall be done, will be more than acquitted at the bar of its country.

Is the accusation true?

I ask, in the first place, if the three millions had been granted, ought it to have been expended? And would the situation of the country be now more safe? What is there which would have justified its expenditure previous to the meeting of Congress? War does not exist, cannot be declared but by Congress. To have forced us into it, without our approbation, would have been treason against our institutions and our rights. And if war had been commenced by France, what could the Executive have constitutionally done without assembling Congress? And what would three millions have been in such an emergency? You would have needed ten times that amount before the end of the year. It may be that the Executive thinks otherwise. The present head of the Committee of Ways and Means is reported to have assured the House, at the last session, that "he understood" that one million for the army, and two for the navy, "would be all that would be required by the executive branch of the Government." And he was probably sincere in thinking it enough. When a proposition is made to devote the interest of the nation in the Bank of the United States, amounting to seven millions, to national defence, in order that France might learn therefrom that we had resources for war, independent of taxation, what calculations may not be expected about the means necessary for preparation? (Globe, 2d March.) The passage of the ordinary appropriations for fortifications was important; the grant of the three millions for defence in war was absurd.

The first piece of evidence offered by the Senator from Missouri, by which the guilty purpose of the Senate is to be proved, and its designs, in the rejection of the item of three millions, exhibited, is the treatment bestowed upon the resolutions of that Senator at the last session. Those resolutions are declared to have had the same object as those now under discussion, and I beg the attention of the Senate to them, as they appear on page 167 of our journal. They are twelve in number, and relate to a multiplicity of objects: to the reduction of revenue on dutiable articles-the amount to be received from public lands-the payment of the stock in the bank-the probable expenditures of the Governmentstate of the fortifications-expenditures upon them-expense of armories and arsenals-amount expended on

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naval objects. But they are all inquiries of the Executive for information only. They express no opinion, they declare no principle, they disclose no object. The mover did not explain his purpose, and the Senate was never called upon to express an opinion, or take a vote, in regard to them. When they were offered for consideration, Mr. Poindexter moved to lay them upon the table, and it was so ordered, without debate or vote, so far as I can discover. (Journal, p. 168.) The mover had it in his power to call for their consideration at any time, yet he did not do it. When and how, then, did the Senate express any opinion in regard to them? How was its guilty purpose to defeat the national defence proved by | the treatment of them? How was the Senate to learn the object with which they were offered? Besides, these resolutions were not offered until the 16th day of February, within fifteen days of the end of the session, and were not to be answered until the commencement of the present session of Congress. By the argument, we were now to have information to guide upon a bill to be passed nine months ago. Yet such is a part of the evidence of our criminality, which the Senator spreads before the American people, unexplained and unaccompanied by the resolutions.

The next piece of evidence against the Senate is the loss of the item of $500,000. The history of this item has been fully stated by other members. It was moved in committee to add that sum to the appropriations, not by the Senator from Missouri, but by the Senator from Delaware, [Mr. CLAYTON.] It was reported on the 18th February. (Jour. p. 172.) On suggestion by the chairman of the Committee on Finance, it was withdrawn by the Senator from Missouri himself. There was no debate, and no vote upon it. Is it not, then, somewhat extraordinary that this should be proclaimed as a rejection of the patriotic purposes of the Senator from Missouri, and of the evil intentions of the Senate? I leave others to draw their own inferences about such an allegation.

But these matters are unimportant, compared with the loss of the fortification bill. Such a bill is at all times of magnitude to the public interests, and it is deeply to be deplored if it should be lost (if such a result may be considered possible) from party servility on the one hand, or party hostility on the other. Let us examine the facts, to see what is the truth in relation to it. Its importance will justify some repetition. The President has charged this body, before their constituents and the world, with the loss of the bill; the charge has been repeated by a Senator in his place, and we are exhibited as unwilling to defend the country. Let the whole truth be told, and let the nation understand how their agents have acted, and do justice to their conduct. I need not quote the message at the opening of the last session, (Journal, page 13.) It details our difficulties with France, recommends reprisals as a measure of peace, against which France had no right to complain, and closes by submitting "to Congress to decide whether, after what has taken place, it will still await the further action of the French Chambers, or now adopt such provisional measures as it may deem necessary, and best adapted to protect the rights and maintain the honor of the country. Whatever that decision may be, it will be faithfully enforced by the Executive, as far as he is authorized so to do."

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tion was to be put upon it. The Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. HUBBARD] is entitled to the credit of the discovery, but it comes rather late. He did not make that discovery, so far as I know, during the last session. His own actions, as will appear presently, show a different opinion at that day.

What

3. The measure which it did recommend was reprisals, as a measure solely of peace. And these he recommends to be placed at his discretion, by the passage of a law “authorizing reprisals upon French property, in case provision shall not be made for the payment of the debt at the approaching session of the French Chambers." (Jour. p. 17.) If a law in this form had been passed, it is apparent that the power of peace and war would have been in the hands of the Executive. How he would have used it, may be learned by his "well-settled principle of the international code." He would have used his power, and we should have been at war. would have availed the dictum of books? If French property had been forcibly seized to pay the debt or avenge our wrongs, it would have been repelled. War would have instantly raged. It would have been so, not only with France, but with every modern nation capable of resisting the assaults of an enemy. The seizure of the property of the citizens of France, because the Government would not pay its debt, neither would nor could have been regarded as a measure of peace. But, pretending so to consider it, the President would have used it, and thus Congress would have transferred to him the power of making war.

The recommendation, then, was of a legislative meas. ure, with a view to peace. Although it might, in the hands of the Executive, have produced war, yet he urged it as a peace measure, and did not accompany it with proposals or estimates for increased appropriations.

Such as it was, it met the prompt attention of the Senate. And on the 15th January, (Jour. p. 94,) the Senate, by a vote perfectly unanimous, forty-five members voting, "Resolved, That it is inexpedient, at present, to adopt any legislative measure in regard to the state of affairs between the United States and France."

Thus, by the action of the Senate, all legislative action on the subject was, for the time, closed. And did any one then think that there was a call for war appropria tions? Not one said it; and, if they thought it, they failed in their duty in not calling for them. As a measure of peace, no such appropriations could be required. If no legislative measure was expedient, they could not have been necessary.

Subsequent to this time, but before the three millions were proposed, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the House, which had moved very slowly, did report, and the same decision, as to legislative action, was made there, as I shall show by reference to the journal of that body.

Thus was the whole question of legislative action, on the recommendation of the Executive, put at rest by the concurrent and unanimous action of both Houses of Congress. Who could have dreamed that, after this, a "provisional appropriation" of three millions, to be put at the discretion of the Executive, would have been proposed? But so it was. The President had been thwarted by a unanimous vote of Congress, in getting possession of a discretionary power, which would have

This message contains the opinions, recommendations, and action of the Executive; and it is to be remarked-enabled him to create war if he chose; but discretion 1. That it contains no recommendation of any appro priation for fortifications or arming. The documents accompanying it contain the ordinary and common appropriations for ordinary years, and nothing more.

2. It was not understood by the friends or opponents of the administration as recommending appropriations for a state other than that of peace. No Senator or Representative in his place suggested that such a construcVOL. XII.-17

denied in one form may be sought and obtained in another. The power to use three millions of money, when he should think it necessary, would have answered an equally efficient purpose, and might have led to the gratification of the same wishes and designs. The history of the fortification bill will illustrate this remark. This history I understand, very differently from the Senator from New Hampshire.

SENATE.]

National Defence.

[JAN. 25, 1836.

For the repairs of Fort Marion, and the sea-wall at Pensacola, there was a motion to insert $40,000. The Delegate from Florida, whose intelligent and earnest attention to all the interests of his constituents is so well

I propose to examine that history with some care, and shall be obliged to refer to persons by name, but I beg to be understood as doing it with no personal feeling or object in relation to them. They will be alluded to only because their names appear upon the public jour-known, had, as early as the 10th of December, called nals, and their action had influence upon the fate of the bill.

the attention of the House, by resolution, to this object. (J. pp. 64, 230.) The Legislature of Florida had urged it; and so also had the citizens and corporation of St. Augustine. (Journal, p. 95.) It was important to the "defence and security" of that country; and, if the reports from that region be true, its value may at this moment perhaps be evidenced by the plunder and burning of a city, and the massacre of its inhabitants. Yet this appropriation was also rejected, by a vote of 115 to 67. (Journal, p. 227.)

These efforts to add to the bill having thus signally failed, Mr. Parker moved to strike out $30,000 for Throg's neck. The motion was rejected, 113 to 86. (Journal, p. 246.) And on the 21st of January (Journal, p. 251) the bill passed, precisely as it had been estimated for by the Executive and reported by the com

The first fact to which our attention is called is the amount of the estimates for fortifications, sent at the commencement of the session. In the message and these estimates are found the public, official views of the Executive and the Department of War. (See 1 Executive Documents, No. 5, page 39.) These estimates amount to $439,000 only. This was all that the Executive considered necessary, in the state of the country; and it is remarkable that it is very little more than one half the appropriations for many preceding years-not one half of those of the preceding year. During Mr. Adams's administration, the appropriations had been, in round numbers, these: 1826, $814,000; 1827, $505,000; 1828, $717,000; 1829, $1,013,000-an average, during the four years, of about $762,000. During the pre-mittee. ceding years of General Jackson's administration, they had been, for 1830, $886,000; 1831, $716,000; 1832, $653,000; 1833, $831,000; and in 1834, 890,000-being an average of about $795,000. Yet, in the year 1835, when we are told war was approaching, the amount called for was only $439,000. Did the Executive anticipate war? Did he feel any peculiar necessity for hastening on the defences of the country? Then he did not do his duty in recommending sufficient appropriations. Or was it that a provisional, contingent grant, depending on Executive discretion, was already anticipated and devised?

The estimates were received on the 4th of December, (Journal, p. 35,) and on the 9th, (Journal, p. 51,) referred to the Committee of Ways and Means, of which the present Speaker of the House, a warm and confidential friend of the Executive, was the chairman. No report was made until the 2d of January, (Journal, p. 134,) twenty-three days after the reference, when the bill was reported, containing the precise items, and precise amount of the estimates, thus adding the opinion of the committee that the estimates were large enough. In the mean time, on the 27th of December, (Journal, p. 137,) a message had been received from the Executive respecting our affairs with France, and communicating documents in relation to them. Of this message 10,000 copies were ordered to be printed for distribution. The report of the bill several days after the message proves that, in the opinion of the friends of the Executive, at least of the committee, no change was made in our relations by that message-nothing calling for increased or contingent appropriations. This bill, thus reported or 2d January, one month after Congress was in session, and for not one half of the amount in the preceding year, and but little more than one half of the average of the ten preceding years, was "in accordance with the views of the Executive." No public document, no known motive, explains the smallness of the sum, unless it be found in the subsequent history of the "contingent appropriation," and the desire to place the money at executive discretion.

On the 14th of January the bill was considered in Committee of the Whole House, and on the 15th of January in the House itself. The amendments there offered to it were numerous. Mr. Everett moved to increase the appropriation for Castle island, &c., in Boston harbor, from $8,000 to $75,000. It was resisted by the friends of the Executive, and rejected by a vote of 120 to 87. (Journal, pp. 224-25.)

An amendment was moved by Mr. McKim to add $50,000 for Fort McHenry. It was rejected by 129 to 66.

Now, Mr. President, by whom was the amount of that bill fixed? By the Executive and his friends. By whom was the increase refused? By the Executive and his friends. Who urged additional appropriations for the defence and security" of the country? The opponents of the administration; the political friends of that majority of the Senate who are charged with defeating the appropriations. Look at the recorded yeas and nays upon these questions; read the reports of the debates, you will find an almost exact division of parties in respect to the questions. The names of Mr. Cambreleng, chairman of Foreign Relations; Mr. Polk, chairman of Ways and Means; Mr. Sutherland, Mr. Vanderpoel, and all that class of politicians; all except one of the members from my own State; and on all occasions, I believe, Mr. Henry Hubbard, then a member of the Committee of Ways and Means, and at present a member of the Senate from New Hampshire, whose argument to prove our culpability we have heard.

I ask, was there danger on the 21st January? Why were not the specific appropriations for defence increased? Why resisted by the whole force of party? Was the Executive blind to the danger? Were his friends? If $439,000 were then enough for specific appropriation, where could be the necessity for a discretionary three millions? The course of the Senate, subsequently approved by the House, was known. Discretionary reprisals had been refused. Legislative action had been declared unnecessary. Shall those who thus acted now turn round and charge us with neglect?

The bill came to the Senate on the 21st January; on the 23d it was twice read and referred. (Journal,p.117.) On the 16th February, (Journal, p. 168,) a period one day shorter than it had been in the hands of the House committee, it was reported, and the committee had agreed to the whole bill as it came from the House; and all the items of it were concurred in by the Senate without question. But the committee had done more; they had increased the sum for Castle island to $75,000, and added $100,000 for various objects of defence in Maryland.

On the 22d of February (Journal, p. 185) it was called up, out of its order, on motion of the chairman, Mr. Webster, with a view to expedite its passage. The items from the House and the additions by the committee were agreed to; and, upon motion, three items were added, $80,000 for Fort Delaware, $75,000 for repairs and armament of Fort Mifflin, below Philadelphia, and $100,000 for the armament of the fortifications. The

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