and observed that nothing had resulted to alter the relations of friendship and good understanding between the two countries, the United States minister at once replied in a note, of which he stated the sole object to be, "to point out that, so far from nothing having occurred to disturb the good feeling upon which is based the friendly relations between the United States and Brazil, the whole course of your predecessor in relation to the visits of the pirate Sumter to Maranham, and the present attitude of Brazil toward the piratical vessels belonging to the rebel States and to our own national vessels, is considered by the Government of Washington untenable, unjust, and intolerable." In a dispatch which had already been communicated to the Brazilian govern ment, Mr. Seward had urged that further restrictions should be placed on the stay of confederate cruisers in Brizilian ports. The passage to this effect, which the United States minister again brought to the notice of the Brazilian government, was as follows:

In the mean time it is proper to remark that every maritime power which has recognized the insurgents as a belligerent, except Brazil, has, on the other hand, adopted stringent means to prevent the entrance of piratical vessels into their harbors, except in distress, and has forbidden them remaining there more than twenty-four hours, or receiving supplies which would enable them to renew depredations upon our com

merce.

The United States do not say that such measures on the part of Brazil would be satisfactory, nor can they consent to ask Brazil for less than the absolute exclusion of pirates from her harbors. Yet such measures, if adopted, would bring Brazil upon the same ground in relation to the United States which is occupied by other maritime powers, and thus would mitigate the discontent which you are authorized to express.1 With this request the government of Brazil did not think fit to comply. The regulations issued by it in August, 1861, did not restrict the stay of belligerent vessels in Brazilian ports, unless they came in with prizes. The regulations also permitted the taking in of victuals and naval provisions, indispensable for the continuation of the voyage, without placing any specific limit on such provisions, or fixing any period within which a fresh supply should not be granted. The Brazilian minister for foreign affairs called the attention of the United States minister to the principles of neutrality laid down in these regulations as "being perfectly identical with those which are adopted and followed by other maritime powers."

פור.

In April and May, 1863, the Florida, Georgia, and Alabama visited different ports of Brazil, and remained there for some time coaling and repairing. The Alabama, having made captures within the territorial waters of Brazil, in the neighborhood of the island of Fernando de Noronha, was ordered by the president of Pernambuco, on the 27th of

April, to put to sea within twenty-four hours, and left accord[121] ingly. She re-appeared, however, in the harbor of Bahia on the

11th of May, and remained there fourteen days. These proceedings gave rise to further remonstances on the part of the United States minister, who protested against any of the three vessels being admitted into Brazilian ports, and maintained that the Alabama should have been seized and detained at Bahia. The Brazilian government replied that the course pursued toward these vessels had been right; that they must be received on the same terms as cruisers of the United States; and that the president of Bahia could not do otherwise than receive the Alabama in that port in the absence of positive evidence of her having infringed the neutrality of Brazil. This, it was stated, was not forthcoming at the time, the investigation of the subject being still in progress.

Instructions were, however, issued by the government of Brazil, in. June, 1863, defining the construction to be placed on the regulations of August, 1861, and the precautions to be taken for their observance. With regard to the limitation of supplies to such as were necessary for the continuation of the voyage, it was stated that this provision presupposed that the vessel was bound for some port. Such presupposition would not hold good if the same vessel should seek to enter a port repeatedly, or if, after having procured supplies in one port, she should enter another immediately afterward under the same pretext, except in the case of overruling necessity. Any vessel committing a violation of neutrality was to be at once compelled to leave the waters of Brazil; and the Alabama, having been guilty of acts of this nature, was not again to be received in any port of the empire.

The Florida, against which no such breach of neutrality had been charged, returned to Brazil in August, 1864, and at Bahia was again received as a vessel of war.

It will be seen, then, that the principles on which the regulations of the Brazilian government were framed were the same in substance as those applied by Great Britain. It was considered that confederate vessels must be received on the same footing as those of the United States; that they must be allowed the supplies necessary for the voyage on which they were engaged; that the seizure or detention of such a vessel would be a breach of neutrality; and that, to justify even her dismissal from a Brazilian port, evidence of a violation of Brazilian neutrality committed by her as a belligerent vessel must first be obtained. On these conditions the Sumpter, Florida, Georgia, and Alabama were admitted to Brazilian ports. The last-named vessel having captured and burnt prizes within the waters of Brazil, instructions were issued to exclude her for the future. A similar prohibition was issued against the Shenandoah, not from any doubt as to her status as a ship of war, but on the ground that her commander had violated the seal of the Brazilian consulate. In neither case, however, did any occasion occur for enforcing the prohibition, as the Alabama did not return to the coast of Brazil after she left Bahia, nor did the Shenandoah ever visit a Brizilian port.

3. "The Russian government," it is said by the United States, "ordered that even the flag of men-of-war belonging to the seceded States must not be saluted."1

Russia.

Her Majesty's government itself issued similar orders addressed to all governors of British colonies. These orders were as follows:

[Circular.]

DOWNING STREET, January 11, 1864.

SIR: Her Majesty's government have had occasion to consider whether salutes can properly be exchanged between the forts in Her Majesty's colonies and vessels of war of the Confederate States.

I have to instruct you that, in case the commander of any such vessel should offer you a salute, it will be your duty to decline it; and that if the salute should be fired without having been previously offered, it should not be returned.

In each case the commander of the vessel should be informed that the reason for declining to receive or return such salutes is, that the Confederate States have not been acknowledged by this country otherwise than as belligerents.

I have, &c.,

(Signed)

1 Case of the United States, p. 464.

2 Appendix to British Case, vol. v, p. 129.

NEWCASTLE.

France.

The incident which gave occasion to this is stated in the Case of Great Britain, page 70. 4. The French authorities received the Sumter, Florida, Alabama, and Georgia in French ports on the footing of men-of-war, and allowed them to take in supplies of coals and provisions. The Florida and Georgia were allowed to remain several months at Brest and Cherbourg repairing. When the United States minister at Paris protested against the Florida receivingrepairs of her machinery, [122] on the ground that she was a good *sailer, M. Drouyn de Lhuys

replied that "if she were deprived of her machinery she would be pro tanto disabled, crippled, and liable, like a duck with its wings cut, to be at once caught by the United States steamers. He said it would be no fair answer to say the duck had legs, and could walk or swim.1 He further justified the permission given to her to repair in a government dock, there being no commercial dock at Brest. The Florida having discharged seventy or seventy-five men after she came into Brest, the French government decided not to issue any order prohibiting an accession to her crew while in port, inasmuch as such accession was necessary to her navigation.2

3

Attention has been called in the case of the United States to the treatment of the Rappahannock at Calais, as forming a The Rappahannock. contrast to the reception of confederate vessels in British ports. This vessel, an old dispatch-boat, originally called the Victor, had been sold out of the British Navy as worn out and unserviceable. She appears to have passed from the hands of her purchasers into those of agents of the Confederate States, who, fearing discovery, hurriedly carried her off in condition unfit for sea, and took her into the harbor of Calais as a confederate ship of war, though neither equipped, manned, nor armed. The United States minister at Paris urged that this was an exceptional case, and such in fact it was. Writing to M. Drouyn de L'huys on the 4th December, 1863, he said:

It is quite evident that this vessel occupies a position which differs from either the Florida or Georgia. She has left her port on the other side of the channel voluntarily, without papers, and ran directly across to a neighboring port, within which she hopes to be protected until her equipment is completed, and her offisers and crew ready. On this statement of facts no argument is necessary to show that permission from the French authorities to carry out her purpose would be a violation of neutrality.*

The French government replied that the Rappahannock appeared to have been compelled, by unforeseen circumstances, to take refuge in French waters; that she could not therefore be refused an asylum, but that the facilities accorded to her would be limited strictly to what was required for the equipment and seaworthiness of an ordinary vessel of commerce. The United States minister continued to urge the exceptional nature of the case, and, in deference to his representations, special precautions were taken to prevent any warlike equipment of the vessel. It was decided that she should not be allowed to depart without first obtaining permission, and, in order to guard against any attempt of such a kind, a gun-boat was stationed to watch her. The repairs were proceeded with, and changes were made among the crew, without adding to their number, for some time. Subsequently, however, it was discov ered that her crew had been nearly doubled, and the permission for her

1 British Case, p. 71.

2 Appendix to British Case, vol. vi, p. 136.

3 Case of the United States, pp. 292, 293.

Papers relating to Foreign Affairs, 1863-64, vol. iii, p. 4. Papers relating to Foreign Affairs, 1863-64, vol. iii, pp. 19, 21, 23, 235, 41, 44, 51, 53, 57, 81.

departure was on this account provisionally refused. As she had been quite unfitted for war on her arrival, these measures rendered her practically useless for the confederate service, and her officers determined to abandon the attempt to employ her, and to leave her in the port of Calais.1

The Stonewall.

Attention has also been called to the case of the confederate steamram Stonewall. That vessel was one of six ships built for the confederate government in France under a contract with Captain Bullock, to be paid for out of the proceeds of the confederate loan issued through the agency of Messrs. Erlanger in Paris. According to French law, the permission of the government is required before vessels constructed in French ports can be armed for war, and this permission M. Arman, the builder of the vessels, had procured, on the pretext tbat they were intended for employment in the China seas. When the United States minister laid evidence before the French government of the real purpose for which these vessels were designed, the authorization to arm them was withdrawn, and an assurance was given that they should not be allowed to pass into the hands of the confederate government. M. Arman was, however, allowed to proceed with the construction of them, and they were eventually disposed of to different neutral governments. One of them was sold conditionally to the Danish government, but rejected by the officer appointed by that government to inspect her at Bordeaux, as not coming within the terms of the contract. Permission was obtained to send her to Copenhagan, from whence, the Danish government having confirmed the decision of their officer, she returned to the French coast, shipped a crew, arms, and a supply of coal at the small island of Houat, off St. Nazaire, and proceeded on her voyage as the confederate steamer Olinde or Stonewall. The United [123] States minister at Paris thought, probably with justice, *that

there were grounds for believing that the intention of using her for the confederate service had been formed before she left France, and that the sending her to Copenhagan was a mere pretext; and the French government ordered an investigation into the circumstances; but it expressly disclaimed any responsibility for what had occurred, and declined to interfere to procure the detention of the Stonewall in the Spanish port of Ferrol, to which she had proceeded.

5. The Stonewall arrived at Corunna on the 3d of February, 1865, from whence she removed to the neighboring port of Fer- Spain and Portugal. rol. In January, 1862, when the Sumter arrived in the port of Cadiz, the Spanish government had decided that she must be allowed to make such repairs as were absolutely necessary, and had for that purpose allowed her to be placed in a government dock for two days, notwithstanding the protest of the United States minister. The government came to a similar conclusion in the case of the Stonewall, and she remained at Ferrol refitting for sea till the 24th of March.

The Government of Her Majesty, wrote M. Benavides, could not disregard the voice of humauity in perfect harmony with the laws of neutrality, and does not think they are violated by allowing a vessel only the repairs strictly necessary to navigate without endangering the lives of the crew.

The United States war steamers Niagara and Sacramento had in the meanwhile arrived at Corunna, from whence they kept watch on her movements. From Ferrol they followed her to Lisbon, the commander of the Niagara considering the Stonewall too formidable to cope with at sea in calm weather.3

Appendix to British Case, vol. ii, p. 671.

2 Papers relating to Foreign Affairs, 1865-'66, part ii, p. £24.
3 Ibid., p. 521.

At Lisbon the Portuguese government allowed her to remain twentyfour hours and take in a supply of coal. On this latter point, the foreign minister of Portugal observed, in reply to the representations of the United States minister—

Regarding the supply of coal, against which you insist, allow me to observe that the vessel being a steamer, His Majesty's government could not avoid with good foundation that she should be provided with that article, for the same reason that it could not deny to any sailing-vessel in a dismantled state to provide itself with sails.'

The Stonewall next proceeded to the Spanish island of Teneriffe, and from thence to Havana, where she arrived on the 11th of May, and where, at the close of the civil war, she was surrendered to the Spanish authorities by her commander on the payment of $16,000. By the Spanish government she was handed over to that of the United States. The latter repaid the sum expended in obtaining possession of her.

In the conduct of other powers, when compared with that of Great Britain, there is certainly nothing to justify the United States in preferring claims against the latter for undue partiality to confederate cruisers, while at the same time disavowing any ground of complaint against the former. It may suit the United States to give this assurance for the purposes of the present arbitration, but no such assurance can be given for the future. If the charge against Great Britain is to be held valid in the present instance, it is impossible to say what line of conduct, however scrupulous, however courteous, will protect a neutral power from demands for compensation from one or the other, or even from both of two belligerent parties.

1 Papers relating to Foreign Affairs 1865-'66, part iii, p. 113.