[64] Various complaints of the United States ain. ernment resorting to the colony; that this was objected to by the local authorities, and that the objection led to remonstrances on the part of the consul and of the commander of the United States ship Flambeau, which arrived while the correspondagainst Great Brit. ence was proceeding. It was urged by the latter that both the United States ships James Adger and the confederate ship Nashville had been suffered to coal at Southampton, and that this Restrictions on was a precedent in favor of granting the facilities now asked coaling at Nassau. at Nassau. It was pointed out in reply that the cases were not parallel. Those vessels were several thousand miles distant from their respective homes, and to them consequently coal was an article of real necessity, whereas the Flambeau was within a very short distance of the ports of her own nation-Key West, for instance-where all her necessities could readily have been supplied. In obtaining coal at Nassau, therefore, there could be no other object than that of enabling her to continue what was, in fact, to some extent, a blockade of the port. The commander of the Flambeau replied,' protesting against such a construction being placed on his presence, and declaring that he was strictly enjoined to respect the rights of neutrals. It appears, however, from a letter addressed by the governor to the British commodore at Havana, dated December 12, 1861, that the Flambeau constantly kept her steam up ready for instant movement, and there was a report that she intended to cut out the Gladiator, or to Paris of M. Peace, French consul-general at New York, who was charged with the management of the purchase and shipment of these arms, that four vessels, the City of Buenos Ayres, Concordia, Riga, and Arcadia, were chartered and freighted with arms, by Messrs. Remington & Sons, for the French government, and two others, the Erie and Ontario, by an agent of the French consul-general for the same purpose, thus becoming "transports" in the sense in which the word is used in the case of the United States. No objection was, however, raised to their sailing by the United States Government. The New York Times of the 30th of March, 1871, gives the following statement of the supplies forwarded by these and other vessels: "The steamship St. Laurent sailed yesterday with her last consignment of arms and munitions of war for France. She carried among her cargo 1,676 cases of cartridges, 574 cases of harness, 1,444 cases of rifles, 205 cases of bayonets, and 67 cases of projectiles. The whole cargo was valued at $708,955.50. This makes nineteen cargoes of arms sent to Havre since the war began, the previous shipments being as follows: It appears, from the official report of the Secretary at War, that the sales of ordnance stores by the Government of the United States in the year 1870-71 amounted, in the aggregate, to $10,000,000. 1 Appendix to case of United States, vol. vi, p. 51. seize that vessel immediately after leaving the port. The consul of the United States, in a dispatch to his Government of the following day, stated that "the captain of the Flambeau is watching intently the movements of these rebel steamers." The consul notices that "an English man-of-war has arrived, and several more are telegraphed as in sight," and he does not doubt that every protection will be afforded to the Gladiator, and every means afforded to facilitate her escape. The attorney-general of the colony advised the governor that, though it might be in accordance with the regulations issued by Her Majesty's government to suffer coal to be supplied to an armed vessel of either belligerent, putting into port under ordinary circumstances, and desirons of obtaining a supply of coal in the ordinary mode by purchase in the market, such was not the case of the Flambeau, or of the coal in question. He therefore advised that the restrictions placed on the use of that coal should be continued, and that reference should be made to the home government for instructions. The dispatches reporting these facts were received at the foreign office from the admiralty and colonial office on the 15th and 16th of January, 1862, and the question was at once referred to the law-officers of the Crown. Their opinion was that the governor had acted properly in refusing to allow the proposed coal-depot to be formed at Nassau. The formation or permission of such a depot for a purpose so directly connected with belligerent operations would be inconsistent with the neutrality of Great Britain.3 One of the vessels laden with coal appears to have been sent back at once by the United States consul. The other, the Caleb Stetson, remained in the harbor with the coal on board, and does not seem to have suffered any injury from the serious leak previously reported by the consul, as rendering necessary the transshipment of her cargo to the Flambeau. [65] *Representations on this subject were made by Mr. Adams to Earl Russell on the 24th of February, 1862. Lord Russell replied, on the 25th of March, explaining the governor's proceedings, and Mr. Adams, though apparently dissatisfied, did not pursue the subject. The attempts of the United States to form coal-depots for their cruisers at British ports were not confined to Nassau. They had simultaneously sent vessels laden with coal for the same purpose to Bermuda, (which was likely to prove a convenient station,) consigned in a similar manner to their consul there. The governor, on learning that the conduct of the authorities at Nassau in preventing such a depot had been approved, informed the United States consul that it had been decided not to allow the formation in any British colony, either by the Government of the United States or by that of the so-called Confederate States, of a depot for the use of their respective vessels of war. Orders of the 31st January, 1862, in re The orders of the 31st of January, 1862, issued shortly after the occurrences at Nassau, laid down general rules to be observed in all the ports of the United Kingdom, and of Her Maj-lation to Nassau. esty's colonial possessions, as to the admission of armed ships of either belligerent, the time during which they might be allowed to remain, and the conditions under which they might be suffered to receive coal 1 Appendix to British case, vol. v, p. 27. 2 Appendix to case of United States, p. 47. 3 Appendix to British case, vol. v, p. 31. Appendix to case of the United States, vol. vi, pp. 46, 53. 5 Appendix to case of United States, vol. i, p. 346. Appendix to British case, vol. v, p. 8. and other supplies. These orders at the same time closed the ports and waters of the Bahama Islands to the ships of war and privateers of both belligerents. They will be referred to, as regards their general operation, in a later part of this counter case; and ample materials will be supplied for judging whether they were or were not fairly executed, and whether it was by confederate ships or by ships of the United States that the hospitalities of British ports were the more largely used. In the definition of neutral duties produced in the earlier portion of the case of the United States,1 a definition which purports to lay down "principles" and "doctrines of international law," and to be "in harmony with the views of the best publicists," it is affirmed that "the ports or waters of the neutral are not to be made the base of naval operations by a belligerent." "Ammunition and military stores for cruisers cannot be obtained there; coal cannot be stored there for successive supplies to the same vessel, nor can it be furnished or obtained in such supplies." It might have been reasonably supposed, therefore, that the course pursued by the authorities at Nassau, in the case of the Flambeau and her coal-ships, would have merited the approval of the Government of the United States, instead of being denounced as a violation of neutrality. The restriction in question is not indeed commanded, as the Government of the Unfited States supposes it to be, by any rule of international law, but it may be imposed by any neutral power which thinks fit to do, and was, under the circumstances of the case, clearly proper and convenient. The same observation applies to the orders of the 31st January, 1862. It is undeniably within the competence of a neutral government to close, if it think fit, all its ports, or any selected ports within its dominions, to belligerent ships of war. This has frequently been done. Thus, in 1820, during the war between Spain and the Spanish-American Republies, an act of Congress was passed, on the recommendation of the President, by which it was enacted that no foreign armed ship should enter any other harbor than Portland, Boston, New London, New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk, Smithville, Charleston, or Mobile, unless in case of distress, stress of weather, or pursuit by the enemy. This act was to continue in force for two years. In determining to make such a selection, and in designating particular ports for the purpose, the neutral government has to consult its own judgment only. But where any particular port or place is, from geographical situation or local circumstances, liable to be made use of by both belligerents or either as a station or base for naval operations, it becomes a simple measure of ordinary prudence and precaution. To prevent the Bahama Islands from being used for this purpose was the avowed intention both of the restriction on coaling enforced at Nassau and of the subsequent order. These islands were so near to the American coast that the liberty to resort to them could not be valuable to either belligerent for any other purpose, unless it were to the belligerent whose own harbors were under blockade, and to whom, therefore, the exclusion must necessarily be more unfavorable than to the other.. What, then, is the grievance of the United States? It is, that the United States cruisers were precluded from using the Bahamas for belligerent operations. Nassau was frequently visited by blockade-runners, and was within a moderate distance of Charleston and Savannah; it was, therefore, a convenient station Pages 148, 167, 168, 169. and port of call for cruisers employed to watch and capture blockade-runners. Thus it is explained that "further stay of the [66] United States *vessels of war was useless" when the expe dient was adopted of sending in cargoes in light and speedy vessels. Further stay was useless, because the cruiser waiting in port could not overtake and capture these light and speedy vessels. If ships carrying contraband and other goods to blockaded ports in the Confederate States were suffered to repair to the colony, United States cruisers ought, it is said, to have been suffered to repair thither likewise for the purpose of watching for and making prize of those ships and their cargoes. That the port would in the latter case have been used as a station for hostilities, and a point of departure for naval operations, and that it was not so used in the former case, is a distinction which seems to escape the notice of the Government of the United States. The rigorous definition of the duties of a neutral furnished in the third part of the case of the United States seems to be forgotten in the fourth part. The stringent rules by which the abuse of neutral ports by belligerent vessels was to be prevented have now disappeared, and the measures adopted to guard against that abuse are reckoned among the cases "wherein Great Britain failed to perform her duties as a neutral." [67] * .* PART V, THE SUMTER AND NASHVILLE. PART V. The ville. Having examined the miscellaneous charges preferred against Great Britain, but not falling within the limits of the reference to Sumter and Nash arbitration, such as those which regard the traffic in arms and military supplies, Her Majesty's government now approaches that part of the case in which the Government of the United States at length proceeds to specify the vessels to which its claims relate, the failures of duty which it alleges in respect of them, and the nature of the claims on account of those alleged failures of duty. The wide conceptions of neutral obligation which had been previously presented to the tribunal here assume a concrete form, and are made the basis of actual demands upon a neutral power; and we are thus enabled to understand what those conceptions really mean, to what lengths the Government of the United States is prepared (if we may judge from the case) to carry them, and what is the code of international duty which it proposes to enforce against neutrals, and asks the arbitrators to sanction. There is The first vessels in the list are the Sumter and Nashville. no material dispute as to the facts relating to these two ships. Both of them were fitted out and armed for war in confederate ports, were there commissioned as public ships by the president of the Confederate States, and thence dispatched to cruise under that commission. Up to that time neither of them, so far as appears, had ever been in a British port. In respect, therefore, of the original outfit and equipment of these ships, the United States have found themselves unable to suggest any fault on the part of Great Britain, or to bring any charge against her. is it suggested that either of them obtained men, arms, or other military supplies, or augmented or renewed in any manner her military equip ment within British ports or waters. The Sumter. THE SUMTER. The history of the Sumter has been accurately related in the British case. It will have been observed that she was a steamship, purchased in a confederate port about or soon after the time of the commencement of the war, by the navy department of the government of the Confederate States; that she had received a crew, and was being actively prepared for war before the end of April, 1861, and upward of a fortnight before the date of Her Majesty's proclamation of neutrality; that she put to sea as a commissioned cruiser of the Confederate States on the 30th June, 1861; that she entered in succession, during the period of her cruise, the Spanish port of Cienfuegos, the Dutch port of Saint Anne's, Curaçoa, the Venezuelan port of Puerto Cabello, the British port of Trinidad, the Dutch port of Paramaribo, |