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we have not much to remark, except that M. de Bazancourt, having a romantic incident to relate, is here more anxious than ever to tell the story like a popular romance-writer. He informs us that, on receiving the order to charge, and learning it was imperative, Lord Cardigan bowed his head in token of obedience, and took his place at the head of his brigade. He then threw a look of profound sadness over the splendid squadron whom an inevitable death was about so soon to deci mate, and spurred his horse to a gallop, exclaiming, En avant, le dernier des Cardigans! This is quite worthy of Dumas, and cannot be given in English, because the difficulty of supposing that any English noble. man would make himself so exquisitely absurd as to shout out about himself, Forward, the last of the Cardigans!' is too great for us to bring this trick of dramatic art down to the level of anything like reality. 'Captain Nolan,' M. de Bazancourt continues, was one of the first who fell, carrying with him to his grave the key of the fatal enigma; and then the Russians, stupefied at first by this act of desperate audacity, soon formed in ranks four deep, and men and horses dashed against the living rampart.' But we need not go on; for every one knows the story, and every one who has read Monte Christo knows the style.

The battle of Inkermann is told in a better and fairer manner than any other event of the war. It is not told as a historian would tell it who could have collected all the necessary materials, as far greater precision is requisite before we can allow that the history of the struggle, on the part of the English, is satisfactory. Still, we have nothing to object to as unjust in M. de Bazancourt's narrative. It is unquestionable that the Russians had every reason to suppose that they would win the battle; and that, heroic as was the resistance of our troops, the expectations of the enemy must have been fulfilled, had not Bosquet with his African troops come up exactly at the critical moment. The English were overpowered, when the Zouaves, the Chasseurs, and the Algerines changed the fortune of

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the day. They were, however, most effectually assisted by the two 18pounders which Lord Raglan ordered Colonel Dickson to bring up to oppose the Russian batteries on Shell Hill, and which were managed by that officer with such great judgment and success. We are bound to say that M. de Bazancourt, in this part of his work, speaks of the English as highly as they deserved, and claims for the French no more than every one acquainted with the circumstances of the battle must accord them. We should think it an invidious remark, were it not justified by his usual want of candour; but it is obvious that Inkermann is the occasion on which it was the easiest for a writer to be fair whose work was toute nationale; since the more he spoke of the courage and coolness of the English, the more he enhanced the service rendered by the French in giving assistance at the very moment when that courage and coolness were proving ineffectual.

A French writer would not be likely to enter with any great par ticularity into the history of the winter before Sebastopol. An official silence is imposed on all who would naturally speak of the calamities of war. And although the French army suffered severely, we do not think there is any reason to suppose that it suffered as ours did. It was supported by the immense number of fresh men which the large standing army of France enabled her constantly to throw in; and also by the easy access for supplies afforded by the Bay of Kamiesch. It was unfortunate that, at the time the siege began, the English had a slight numerical superiority, and they therefore undertook the more difficult part of the operations. Had the place fallen on the 17th of October this would have been a very good arrangement; but, as the intended attack of that day was frustrated, the English were not strong enough to do what they had undertaken to do, as there were no reserves of men at home ready to support those in the Crimea. This was the primary cause of the terrible sufferings in our camp during that winter. We gain no new information from M. de Bazancourt as to

the condition of the French, and he seems rather inclined to pass lightly over the matter. He is copious in his stories of the small incidents that diversified the monotony of the French work; and gives the tale of every sortie from or against the French camp. He thinks it necessary, however, to apologise for this, and to defend the minuteness of his chronicle. Would it,' he says, 'have been just to disinherit of all souvenir this part of our subject in order to approach faster than Providence had ordained towards the grand drama which was afterwards to be enacted?' The odd fancy here embodied, that it would be scarcely decent to go faster than Providence, reminds us, that throughout M. de Bazancourt's work, he makes the most extraordinary references to the Deity; and introduces a deus ex machina in the freest manner. Heaven is always arranging for the glory of the French, and is ever coupled with the star of France as a recognised source of success.

Returning spring made possible the renewal of serious operations. The fire was opened from the French and English batteries on the morning of the 9th of April; its effects, however, were scarcely adequate to the_preparations, for although M. de Bazancourt assures us that the results obtained were highly satisfactory, because some ambuscades were destroyed which had caused considerable loss, yet this is scarcely all that might have been expected from the play of five hundred guns. Whatever other fruit the attempt may have had, it at any rate showed more plainly than ever that the siege was a task of great difficulty, and made the allies reflect anxiously on all the other ways of opposing the enemy which seemed open to them. We quite agree with M. de Bazancourt, that it is at this point of the campaign that we most clearly trace the evils of a divided command. But the way in which he puts his opinion is, by saying that Canrobert was hampered by Lord Raglan. The converse is at any rate equally true; Lord Raglan was hampered by Canrobert; and there was one occasionthat of the first expedition to Kertch -on which Lord Raglan had real ground of complaint, for the force,

after sailing according to an agreement made between the two commanders, was recalled because Canrobert received orders for the transport of French troops from Constantinople. It was perhaps the true policy of the allies, supposing a speedy capture of Sebastopol to have been a gain, that they should commence operations in the field, and cut off the supplies of the besieged. But there was a difference of opinion as to what these operations should be; whether the basis of attack should be from the side of Eupatoria, or that of Aloutcha. It is now well known that the Emperor of the French strongly advocated the latter plan, and M. de Bazancourt inserts a long and interesting letter from the Emperor to the French general, in which the advantages of following his system of attack are ably pointed out. But there could not be a better instance than this of the erroneous method on which M. de Bazancourt's book is written; for he professes not to criticise, but only to state facts; and not having any document before him urging the advisability of any other plan of operations, he gives us the Emperor's letter by itself, without any comment except that of a few flattering remarks to the following effect: This plan,' he says, in which are strikingly displayed the powers of a commanding genius, anticipated all contingencies, weighed all resources, and with a searching glance discovered all obstacles in order to displace or overcome them.' To read M. de Bazancourt's account, it might seem as if no possible objection could be raised to the Emperor's plan; that the consensus of military judges pronounced it perfect, and that Lord Raglan had nothing to say against it, but simply opposed it out of obstinacy and pigheadedness. We are told that Lord Raglan had a decided dislike' to the plan of operating on the exterior, and that it was evident Lord Raglan yielded, where he did yield, from weariness of discussion, and not from conviction, and that the consequence was, that at each instant and in every question of detail the tacit opposition of his mind made itself felt.' We do not know how M. de

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Bazancourt comes to think himself warranted in saying that Lord Raglan yielded because he felt bored by talking, for there is no reference given to any authority, French or English, for the statement; but it is very improbable in itself, and we should not believe it without the amplest proof. That Lord Raglan was a man who, because he got tired of discussion, would sacrifice two armies by assenting to what he thought an unwise course, is contradicted by every action of his life.

M. de Bazancourt proceeds to say that Canrobert, finding union impossible, and anxious to give complete authority to one commander, actually offered to Lord Raglan to give up to him, the English general, the supreme command. His lordship, we are told, was for an instant astonished at this proposition; and the reason of his astonishment, which we should have thought extremely natural, is kindly stated by the author to have been, that in this proposition there was a self-denial for the public good often difficult for even the most elevated minds.' Lord Raglan could not, it seems, understand the conduct of a generous man; and besides, 'he trembled at the responsibility.' He might also, perhaps, wonder whether Canrobert had any business to put himself under the orders of his colleague without the permission of his Emperor. But we are told that Lord Raglan accepted the offer. His first order as generalissimo was, that the French troops should undertake to occupy and defend the English trenches. But his tenure of office as supreme commander was a very short one, for Canrobert refused to obey this order, and Lord Raglan descended at once to the position of an equal. We are equally at a loss to believe or to deny this strange story, for we have no means of testing its truth; but it certainly is not wonderful that, if it were true, there should have arisen, as M. de Bazancourt states, considerable coolness between the generals. Lord Raglan could scarcely work in harmony with a man who offered to obey him, and then disputed his first order.

As a punishment, perhaps, for the contumacy of Lord Raglan, the

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English are scarcely mentioned again in M. de Bazancourt's history. Pelissier succeeded Canrobert, and was ordered by the Emperor to act entirely in concurrence with Lord Raglan, and thenceforward the siege was prosecuted vigorously. But M. de Bazancourt devotes himself wholly to the chronicle of the French army, and he is most minute in his descriptions and most grand in his Homeric flights of language. It is of course perfectly true that the much larger force of the French, and the easier nature of the operations assigned to them, gave them a prominence in the latter part of the campaign which we should think it very foolish to deny. But it will scarcely be believed that even a French writer of M. de Bazancourt's stamp could seriously think that the English deserve to have no larger a part in the history of the last three months of the siege, than that which he assigns them. We will extract the whole account given of the two attacks of the English on the Redan; they will not fill up much space.

Here is the account of the 18th of June :

Scarcely, at the given signal, had the English columns shown themselves outside the trenches, when they were received by a terrible fire of grape and musketry, which from the commencement paralysed their attack. Still these heroic columns strove to execute their movement, and to reach the Great Redan, which they were to invade at three points. But even their noble efforts could not overcome the fire that mowed down whole battalions. Already Sir John Campbell, a chief dear to the army, had fallen mortally wounded. Colonels Shadforth and Yea had been killed, and near them many officers and gallant soldiers. And here the account of the 8th of September:

General McMahon maintained himself definitively in the Malakoff. The moment was therefore come, to commence the attack of the Great Redan, confided General to the valour of our allies. Pelissier gave signal to General Simpson, by hoisting the national colours, at a point previously agreed upon. It was not yet two o'clock.

The Light Division formed the head of the column; the troops of the Second Division, designated for the assault, immediately followed. All the dispositions for the attack had been concerted be

tween Lieutenant-General Markham and General Codrington.

The moment the signal was perceived, our allies, eagerly awaiting the combat, advanced under a terrible fire of grape towards the salient part of the Redan, where the artillery had made a breach. The English columns had nearly two hundred yards to traverse. The whole ground was speedily strewn with dead, without the advance of the intrepid column being arrested for a moment. When it had reached the crown of the moat, the ladders were placed; and our allies, climbing the parapet of the Redan, soon penetrated the salient angle. But here, they found before them only a vast space riddled with the balls of the enemy, who took shelter in the distant traverses. For more than an hour the

English, in no way daunted, struggled to maintain themselves against the murderous storm that showered on them from every part; those who arrived scarcely replacing those who fell. It was after the most desperate resistance, after prolonged, useless, and bloody efforts, that they at length decided to evacuate the Redan.

The list of dead was long and mournful.

These are the only occasions in which the English are mentioned, and certainly this is not a large share of a narrative which extends over two hundred octavo pages. M. de Bazancourt's history gets more and more toute nationale as it goes on, and we do not care to follow him through this portion of his book. If he likes to glorify France, he is quite welcome; and France has very solid claims to glory won from the campaign of Sebastopol. Frenchmen, who can

endure his style-and he has many rivals among French historians and novelists in rhetorical clap-trap and frigid conceits-will find it interesting to read this record of the triumphs of the French army, the performances of the different regi ments, and the lives of French officers. But to enter on a subject so purely French is beside our present purpose, which is to show how unfair this chronicle is to England, and how unfortunate it would be were this accepted generally as the account of the war. We must oppose untrue versions of recent history at once, and may then hope that truth will prevail. It is something that already the Moniteur has in a manner repudiated M. de Bazancourt, and that his English translator is forced to seek a cover for the offences of the author in the pretence that he never even proposed to do England justice. We must fairly confess that the French Emperor has, on all possible occasions and in all possible ways, shown himself anxious to carry out the alliance in an honest and loyal spirit, and has never put forward any claim that could wound the susceptibilities of this country. To have really sanctioned M. de Bazancourt's work would have been the one exception to his policy; and we may therefore confidently hope that his sanction was only given, so far as it was given, while the spirit and tendency of M. de Bazancourt's book were not recognised, and that henceforward he will take every opportunity to disclaim all responsi bility for its contents.