Senator PRYOR. Do you mean someone has to come and tell us once again about the type of furniture after all the testimony this committee has heard?

Mr. MUELLENBERG. Not at all.

Senator PRYOR. What do we need to do?

Mr. MUELLENBERG. I am saying that we are looking very systematically at all the records. We have all the complaints, and we are now sending our findings to the Commissioner of the Federal Supply Service. Whether or not, based on the record we put together, he feels suspension is justified, only time will tell.

I am saying that the investigative part is ongoing now and those records are supplied.

Senator PRYOR. Back on October 10, 1979, you were before the committee and Senator Chiles asked some very pertinent questions, and let us just say that I asked some questions. Here was one of the questions I asked of you:

Mr. Muellenberg, what is the procedure today for insuring that companies who are in a contractual agreement or a contractual relationship with GSA are fulfilling their obligation in meeting the specification of the contract? What, today, is the procedure for giving assurance that their end of the bargain is being carried out? Mr. MUELLENBERG. As far as the Inspector General's Office is concerned it seems to me that the initial responsibility assuming that the Government gets what it has paid for in addition to the Government getting the quality contracted for, of necessity rests with the people running the programs, be it Federal Supply Service, in the case of furniture, or whatever else you have. The Inspector General's Office comes in when a complaint is referred to us, or we, through a criminal survey, initiate an investigation of our own.

Have you not initiated an investigation of your own?

Mr. MUELLENBERG. Of Art Metal?

Senator PRYOR. Yes.

Mr. MUELLENBERG. Like I indicated to you, I don't know whether it was initiated on our own. That has been an ongoing controversy at GSA for a long time. Since August 1979 the Inspector General's Office has been in the Art Metal case and only this week we are referring our first findings to the Commissioner of the Federal Supply Service for his evaluation, to see whether or not it will support suspension and/or debarment.

Senator PRYOR. Let me just say, I don't know if there is conspiracy. I don't know whether the White House is calling the shots or GSA. I think Mr. Clinkscales and others have raised questions that we really need to look into and look into very hard, because some serious accusations have in fact been raised. It disturbs me a bit that there may be some sort of a pattern here and I may be imagining things, but we will look as we continue in this investigation. I will just repeat what I said in an earlier hearing, that I think inaction is our greatest sin today in GSA, and I think that you are a totally honest man, Mr. Muellenberg. I don't think that you are aggressive enough.

Mr. MUELLENBERG. Mr. Chairman, we are battling Art Metal in a Federal court about enforcement of subpenas. I would think that is being aggressive.

Senator PRYOR. Mr. Chairman, that is all I have.

Senator CHILES. Mr. Muellenberg, what is Mr. Davia's status? Mr. MUELLENBERG. At no time have I ever indicated to Mr. Davia that I have plans to remove him. I have given him my full support.

I have appeared before you in your capacity as Chairman of Appropriations, and I have fought for the resources of the Audit Division.

The reports he alluded to, involving the region 10 report, the recent report on space in New York, as well as the so-called "Sting Operation' were all done while I was Inspector General. I don't know what I have to do in this job to get the support of those people who have been there along time, and I have been up front with you concerning appropriations and every other way.

Senator CHILES. Do you agree that the auditors-let's take the auditors first-have to feel they are going to be protected and that that is what the Office of Inspector General was about, to give that kind of insulation so that they could make a critical report?

Mr. MUELLENBERG. All I can offer to you is my good word. As long as I am there and an aggressive audit report is written, nobody is going to reach into the ranks of the Audit Branch, be it in Washington or in the field, and either discriminate, interfere with, or in any other way, in an adverse way impact on the audit work. My independence is guaranteed by statute. You can't write a bill that will guarantee the independence of 570 employees in the Inspector General's Office.

Senator CHILES. That's correct.

Mr. MUELLENBERG. That's right.

Senator CHILES. They primarily, of course, are going to have to depend upon the fact that we have guaranteed your independence and that you are going to stand up for them.

Mr. MUELLENBERG. That is true. Mr. Davia's concerns are valid ones. If and when I should decide to leave this position, if in fact an individual from within GSA is nominated by the President, then he still would have to go through confirmation hearings. I know you were aggressive in my confirmation hearings. Such an official would have to give assurances that he will in fact guarantee the independence of the Inspector General's Office. You cannot set up an organization and say, here statutorily is your independence and we are going to take it down to GS-13's and 14's. It is spelled out in the law, and I think it covers the whole organization.

Senator CHILES. Mr. Muellenberg, I think you will probably have a hard time understanding us political types.

Mr. MUELLENBERG. I am beginning to learn.

Senator CHILES. I have been involved in GSA since March of 1978. The scandal surfaced in 1977, and perhaps even earlier I had indicated my impatience.

If I indicate it, Mr. Muellenberg, it's because every time I go home I'm asked, you know, when are you going to get GSA cleaned up, when are you going to get a handle on that.

So, the impatience that Senator Pryor and myself, and all of us reflect in the other committees, is the impatience that we get out there from the people.

Again, I am impatient when a squabble goes on as it did between the GSA inspectors and the FBI people. We finally have some kind of resolution when we set up the task force. I hope we have. I'm impatient when we find Mr. Clinkscales, who has always certainly worn a white hat as far as I'm concerned, he has been one of the good guys, one of the ones that did stand up when a lot of people didn't stand up, and now brings the kind of testimony

that he brings today. Although Mr. Clinkscales says himself that he can't present anything other than his feelings on it. I'm impatient about that, too.

At the same time I recognize that we have charged you with the responsibility, and we have appointed you and the Senate confirmed you.

You are about the only person I can look down the barrel at How in the world will we ever get on top of this thing if we can't put the houses in order so that we can get the machinery going to get it investigated.

Mr. MUELLENBERG. Mr. Chairman, the bottom line to the matter that we are primarily here today for, which is my decision as the Inspector General to make certain management changes. It is simply not workable, if that were to be the end result, that the President of the United States appoints an Inspector General and he is permitted to come to the office, and the existing structure, whatever it may be, however efficient it may be, and the existing structure can not be touched at all. If that is going to be the end result, then you don't need an Inspector General in GSA or any other agency.

Why not accept the structure as it is? The fact of the matter is that if you read the legislative history of the Inspector General's law, there is a need for an Inspector General. There is a need for a multidisciplinary approach. There is a need for a proactive investigative approach.

The abuses we have seen in this city, nobody knows, I don't know whether we don't have the same problem in Chicago or in Miami or Los Angeles. We have to go out and pull together with auditors, investigators and the good lawyers that I have and make a sweep through all these problems. What we will find, God only knows. But, I want to get to a point; whatever that is, that I can sit before you, Mr. Chairman, and say we looked, we looked hard and here are the results, and it will be done in a professional way. What I'm running into is existing organizations who have been here a long time, who are just as bureaucratic as bureaucratic organizations are everywhere else. The bottom line is that the President can appoint you and you can come in there, but don't you make any changes, don't touch anything. Then I don't want the job.

Senator CHILES. I think what we want to see, of course, is that the job be done. I know that's what we want to see. We, of course, as I say, primarily look to you, because you are the Inspector General.

Do you have any further questions?

Senator PRYOR. In Mr. Clinkscales' statement he raised several questions and entitled these questions as items. Page after page of item, and then he would go through the fact situation or an alleged fact situation.

My question is do you know any other comparable situation in the Federal system where there are two $50,000 people, supervising nine employees, or is that unique?

Mr. MUELLENBERG. As I understand it, Administrator Freeman is going to testify later on in the day. Let me put it this way. Not

every position in the Government that pays $50,000 is necessarily related to the number of people that you supervise.

The details of what that position encompasses I am sure Administrator Freeman can explain more fully. It is a small organization which is placed in GSA for housekeeping purposes. So, it's not necessarily in terms of the people that you supervise that the position has to be evaluated on.

Senator CHILES. Thank you, Mr. Muellenberg.

We have a vote in progress now, so we are going to recess for about 10 minutes to vote, and then we will come right back. [Whereupon, a short recess was taken.]

Senator CHILES. Mr. Freeman, will you stand to be sworn. [Whereupon, Rowland G. Freeman III, having been first duly sworn, was called as a witness herein, and was examined and testified as follows:]

Senator CHILES. I understand you have a statement. Why don't you just proceed with that. I'm sorry the hour has gotten so late on us, and I hope we haven't inconvenienced you.

TESTIMONY OF ROWLAND G. FREEMAN III, ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

Mr. FREEMAN. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am pleased to appear here today to address an issue of utmost importance to myself and the General Services Administration, that is the integrity of the Office of Inspector General.

I affirmed my support of GSA's Inspector General at my confirmation hearing on June 21, 1979, and in other appearances last year before various committees of the Congress.

Those early remarks were based upon my knowledge of and experience with the Inspector General concept. Today, after having worked with Mr. Muellenberg for some 7 months, I reaffirm my support of the Inspector General, both the person and the concept.

Mr. Muellenberg, as you well know, is a man of outstanding qualifications, and his integrity is unquestionable. He came to the General Services Administration after a distinguished career as a prosecutor for the Department of Justice.

In those years he led investigations into organized crime, managed strike forces in Detroit and Cleveland, and served as Chief and Deputy Chief of both the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section and the Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section of the Department's Criminal Division.

By way of background, let me summarize my understanding of the role of an Inspector General. The Inspector General has two major responsibilities; uncovering criminal wrongdoing and malfeasance, and providing management audit support to aid in the administration of the agency.

He should have complete independence in following any indication of fraud and malfeasance, regardless of the level that it may touch.

I believe very strongly in the importance of autonomy for the Inspector General. To reinforce that autonomy, I will do everything in my power to see that he gets the administrative support necessary to enable him to perform a very difficult job.

I have not and will not interfere in the work of the Inspector General. I do, however, expect him to keep me informed and to provide me with any information he has which will help me carry out needed management improvements.

The management changes which must result from discovery of fraud and malfeasance-whether in the retail store operations, management of buildings, or whatever-need more attention.

Mr. Muellenberg is an invaluable asset in that respect, and I have encouraged him to get into the management review arena as soon as possible. His audits are of great assistance to me in managing the agency. I do, however, believe it important that the total audit plan be developed after consideration of the needs of the agency and its main components.

My understanding of the relationship between the Inspector General and the Administrator of General Services is based upon some 37 years experience in dealing with the IG concept. Every command I held in my previous positions in the Navy, every position I occupied, had an inspector general review at some stage.

The concept is so sound, it is astounding that it was not adopted in the civilian agencies much sooner. I do, however, recognize that the actions of this committee were instrumental in the passage of the IG Act, and I am grateful for that effort.

That understanding has formed the basis of my relationship with the Inspector General of GSA. I have championed his full independence and provided him whatever administrative assistance and top level management impetus he has needed to get his office established. It is imperative that the Inspector General get the tools and manpower he needs to perform his difficult and demanding job. For this reason I placed his request for additional funding among my top priorities in GSA's fiscal 1981 budget submission to the Office of Management and Budget. I personally supported, at all levels, the additional requests for auditors.

One of the singularly most important elements of good management is matching resources and work requirements. Thus, when Mr. Muellenberg requested that I transfer certain less significant functions from his office to give him and his staff maximum time to concentrate on the IG's primary mission, I responded promptly. These functions, while necessary, were for the most part routine administrative activities which could be more efficiently handled by other offices within GSA.

Administrative actions I have taken at the IG's request include the following:

One. Transfer of the Security Division from the Office of Inspector General to the newly created Office of Human Resources and Development.

The Security Division performs primarily an administrative function, making checks on new employees, or those requiring a higher security clearance.

On a governmentwide scale the Office of Personnel Management, rather than the FBI, performs similar functions. The Security Division had been a part of the investigative arm of the GSA-the old Office of Investigations-for many years. However, it had been located there by tradition, and not by necessity, logic or any thought toward management efficiency.