tion refers to a mere "attending " which is more temporary than "watching." The immunity does not extend to a "watching " purposing to compel a person to do an act.'

2

Section 16 of the 1875 Act declares that nothing in the Act shall apply to seamen or sea apprentices. "Seamen " means persons employed under and subject to the Merchant Shipping Acts, that is every person (except masters and pilots) employed on board any ship. The exemption merely means that seamen cannot be made liable to punishment under the Act,* it does not prevent them from bringing an action." Similar offences, when committed by seamen, are punishable under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, section 236, with a fine of £10.

During the late war, a number of Acts which would have been lawful at common law were made expressly illegal. Thus, under the Munitions of War Acts, it became a criminal offence, in certain circumstances, to strike, and the procurement of strikes by others, resulting in the interference of the supply of material to be used in war, was also made criminal by certain regulations under the Defence of the Realm Acts, but, apart from these temporary statutes, either because of a changed philosophy as to the functions of the State or owing, perhaps, to exigencies which did not exist

1 Per Palles, J., in R. v. Wall and Others (1907) 21 Cox, C.C. 401, at p. 403. 2 R. v. Lynch [1898] 1 Q.B. 61. 3 (a) 57 and 58 Vict., c. 60, s. 742. R. v. Wall (1890), 112 C.C.C. Sess. Paper 880; R. v. Cole, (1891) 13 C.C.C. Sess. Papers 622; R. v. Phillips, ibid. Kennedy v. Cowie [1891] 1 Q.B. 771; Gibson v. Lawson [1891] 2 Q.B. 545; Curran v. Treleaven ibid., 553; R. v. McCarthy [1903] 2 Ir. K.B.D. 146.

5

hitherto, the legislature has recently set out to limit that complete freedom of combination which has so often been demanded, but never completely obtained. Thus the Police Act of 1919, after setting up a kind of statutory federation to represent the interests of the police, goes on in section 2 to make it illegal for a policeman to join a trade union or any association having for its objects the control of the pay, pension or conditions of service of the Police Force, and any person who contravenes the provision forfeits all pension rights and his membership of the Police Force. The Minister of Labour is made the determining authority as to whether the association is a trade union within the meaning of the Act. Another section, section 3, makes it a criminal offence to do an act calculated to cause disaffection among the members of the police, or to do any act calculated to induce any member of a police force to withhold his service; thus so far as the police are concerned, broadly speaking, the position is as it was between the passing of the Combination Acts of 1800 and their repeal.

We must consider shortly the Emergency Powers Act, 1920. It is a statute empowering the Government, under certain circumstances, to make regulations to maintain the social fabric in times of a general strike. The Act provides, in terms, that no regulation shall enforce "industrial conscription," whatever that word may mean, nor shall any regulation make illegal the calling of any strike, striking or the inducing of threats to strike, nor may such regulation create

any new criminal procedure for dealing with offences under them.

We now turn to certain actions, of a tortious type, which have turned upon the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875, of which the leading case is Lyons v. Wilkins. It is true that to some extent this class of case has been affected by section 2 of the Trades Disputes Act, 1906, but how far this section has really altered the law will become clearer hereafter.

In Lyons v. Wilkins' it was held that the picketing of the works of an employer for the purpose of persuading people not to work for him was a watching and besetting with a view wrongfully and illegally to compel persons to abstain from doing a lawful act within the meaning of section 7 of the 1875 Act. The defendants, who were officers of a trade union, ordered a strike against the plaintiff manufacturers and also against "S," a person who made goods for the plaintiff only, and their pickets, by their directions, watched and beset the works of the plaintiff and of "S" for the purpose of persuading workpeople to abstain from working for the plaintiffs.

The Court of Appeal held that this kind of picketing "S," for the indirect purpose of injuring the plaintiffs, was illegal and they granted an injunction to restrain the defendants and their agents from watching or besetting the plaintiffs works, or those of "S," for the purpose of persuading or otherwise preventing persons from working for them except merely to obtain or com

1 [1896] I Ch. 811.

municate information. It had formerly been held in the case of Trollope v. London Building Trades Federation,' that the distribution of a poster edged with black containing the names of members who refused to strike was actionable, as being done for the purpose of compelling an employer to dismiss men in breach of contract; so also in Pink v. Federation of Trades and Labour Unions,' an injunction was granted restraining a circular which falsely alleged that the plaintiffs had boycotted men in their employment and also induced other members not to deal with the plaintiffs. On the other hand, in Peto v. Apperly, the distribution of a notice inviting trade unionists to keep away from a shop during a dispute was held lawful. This was followed in Haile v. Livingstone, reported in the same volume and page, where a trade union secretary appealed for the boycott of a tradesman. This was also held justified as being in their own interests, so also in Jenkins v. Neild, and in Bullcock v. St. Anne's Master Builders' Federation. In both of which cases the question whether the poster was issued to protect the issuers' interests or to injure the plaintiff was treated as a question of fact. All these cases were cited before the Court of Appeal in Lyons v. Wilkins as authorities for the proposition that the legitimate personal interests of the persuader may be a justification, but the Court, relying upon the expressed words of section 7 of the 1875 Act, held that to watch and beset otherwise than merely to obtain

17(1896) 12 T.L.R. 373. 2 (1892) 8 T.L.R. 216, 711. 3 (1891) 35 Sol. J. 792. 4 (1892) 8 T.L.R. 549. 5 (1903) 19 T.L.R. 27.

It

or communicate information was unlawful. will be remembered that this qualification on the illegality of watching others has now been repealed, but it is unlikely that any court in cases where the Trades Disputes Act did not apply would go further than the decision in Lyons v. Wilkins. Lyons v. Wilkins came again before the Court of Appeal for trial as to a perpetual injunction. Judgment was postponed until the decision in the House of Lords in Allen v. Flood had been given, and that case was before the Court of Appeal when they proceeded to consider their judgment. Lord Lindley thought there still remained a clear distinction between persuading and giving information and Lord Justice Chitty also took the view, as did also Lord Justice Vaughan Williams, that Allen v. Flood had no application to the case before the court, and the injunction was therefore continued.

The result of this decision is difficult to understand. The communication of information was held lawful, but persuading was held to be unlawful, but it does not require a psychologist to see that the giving of information itself may have a persuading force and, indeed, the giving of information for any other purpose than to influence the mind of another is extremely unlikely; but it is just this sort of information which the Court of Appeal appear to have held to have been unlawful.

In a recent case of McKusky v. Smith,' the Irish court, following the previous decision of Larkin v.

1 [1899] I Ch. 255. 2 [1913] 2 I.R. 432.