and Steele's case definitely overruled. Mr. Justice Neville considered himself bound by the decision in Steele's case, but the Court of Appeal took a different view. Lord Justice Cozens-Hardy points out in the first place that the Court in Steele's case was much influenced by the omission of any reference of benefits in the definition, but he points out that the 1871 Act itself deals with the provision of benefits in terms; this view he gets from section 4 and the first schedule, but he goes on to say that the definition is a limiting and restrictive one and in his opinion it was not competent to a trade union to add to its objects something so wholly distinct from the objects contemplated by the Trade Union Acts as to entertain a provision to secure political representation. His views, it must be confessed, are based rather on moral and social considerations than on any legal principle, nor do the views which were subsequently expressed in the House of Lords find any very clear enunciation in the judgments of Lord Justice Farwell or Lord Justice Fletcher Moulton.

When, however, we turn to the House of Lords,' we find the matter is argued far more closely on a basis of legal principle. Lord Halsbury says that the Trade Union Act of 1871 is as it were the charter of incorporation, and thinks that the doctrine of ultra vires applies as in the case of a trading corporation, a matter recognized and discussed in the case of Ashbury Railway Co. v. Rich.' What is not within the statute, he says, is prohibited both to a corporation and a company. 1 [1910]A.C. 87. 2 L.R. 7 H.L. 653.

The trade union only exists as a legalized combination having power to enforce its rules within the limitations of the statute whatever those limitations may be. Lord Macnaghten is more analytical. He points out that the doctrine of ultra vires applies with equal force in every case where a society is formed for purposes recognized and defined by Act of Parliament by some statutory privilege, and, he says, that Parliamentary power was only exercised by trade unions after the Act of 1871, though this view is historically incorrect. A trade union is likened to commissioners of sewers who are not incorporated, and so while a trade union is held not to be a corporation, the doctrine of ultra vires is applied to it, and, in the words of Lord Atkinson, the test whether a union has or has not a specific power under the statute depends upon the answer to the question, Does the power merely provide a method of conducting business, or is it a power making the society a thing different from that which is specified in the Act and mentioned by the Act? In Linaker v. Pilcher,' Matthew J. had decided that a trade union could carry on a newspaper, but this is clearly not an ancillary power under the Act of 1871, and must, therefore, be regarded as having been overruled in the case of Osborne.

The position of the unregistered trade union in relation to the doctrine of ultra vires is somewhat difficult, so far as the House of Lords is concerned. Lord Macnaghten appears to limit the ultra vires doctrine to a registered

1 [1901] 84 L.T. 421.

1

trade union, though Lord Halsbury applied it generally. In Wilson v. Scottish Typographical Association, Lord Skerrington says that the doctrine of ultra vires could have no application to a society which had no such constitution such as an unregistered trade union, but, on appeal, the injunction was granted, though not apparently on the ground of ultra vires, but on the ground that a society unregistered could not alter its whole constitution without the consent of all the members. Thus the position of an unregistered trade union remains obscure so far as regards the application of the ultra vires doctrine. In Wilson v. Amalgamated Society of Engineers the Osborne principle was applied to municipal as distinct from Parliamentary representation." There are considerations which were not considered at all in the House of Lords; thus it appears to have been assumed throughout that a trade union is necessarily unlawful at common law, but, curiously enough, in the next year the Court of Appeal decided that the defendant union in Osborne's case was not so unlawful, and in those circumstances it is difficult to see how it could have depended for its legality on the Trade Union Acts in the manner in which the House of Lords assumed that it did. No tribunal, and, so far as I know, no commentator has ever analysed this paradox.

§ 2.-POLITICAL ACTION.

In 1913 a large part of the effect of the judgment in the Osborne case was removed by the Trade Union Act of that year.

1 1 (1911) I S.L.T. 253. 2 [1911] 2 Ch. 324.

The definition of a trade union has been amplified and its powers considerably extended by the Trade Union Act, 1913. A trade union is there. defined, for the purposes of the Trade Union Acts, as any combination, whether temporary or permanent, the principal objects of which are:

(a) The regulation of the relations between workmen and masters; or

(b) Between workmen and workmen; or (c) Between masters and masters; or

(d) The imposing of restrictive conditions on the conduct of any trade or business; or

(e) The provision of benefits to members; all of which are described in the Act as "statutory objects." The statutory addition of object (e) was held by Lord Atkinson in Osborne's case' to be covered by definition (b); object (d) was added by the Act of 1876; the remaining objects were in the original definition of the 1871 Act.

A combination, so long as it is registered under the Trade Union Acts, is deemed to be a trade union whether it has such "statutory " objects under its constitution or not. An unregistered combination certified as a trade union by the Registrar similarly remains a trade union so long as the certificate is in force, but an unregistered and uncertified combination, in order to bring itself within the definition of a trade union, must show that its principal objects are "statutory." Though a combination has under its constitution objects or powers other than statutory objects, still, provided

1 Trade Union Act, 1913, ss. 2 (1). 2[1910] A.C. at p.102.

its principal objects are statutory ones, it is a trade union. A combination with rules ultra vires may nevertheless be a trade union.'

The objects which a trade union may pursue are no longer restricted to the "statutory objects," but extend (subject to special provisions as to the furtherance of political objects) to such other lawful objects as may be authorized by its rules, and a trade union may now apply its funds for any lawful objects or purposes for the time being author

ized under its constitution.'

A trade union, consequently, may carry on a trade or newspaper, objects formerly held to be ultra vires. Such ancillary objects, therefore, are lawful objects for a trade union to pursue, provided that the principal objects of the trade union are statutory ones; though, as in the absence of statutory objects the combination is not a trade union, it is doubtful if, in such case, the doctrine of ultra vires will attach to it at all, but in such a case the combination could not avail itself of the protection of the Trade Union Acts.

$ 3.-POLITICAL OBJECTS.

No trade union may apply its funds directly or indirectly in furtherance of the following political objects.

(a) The payment of any expenses incurred at any time either directly or indirectly by any candidate or prospective candidate for election to Parliament or to any public office; " Public office " means the office of member of any public body

1 Trade Union Act, 1913, s. I (I).