Opinion of the Court-Sweeney, J.

resolves itself into the construction we place upon the statutes above quoted, and as to whether or not the grand jury can be so considered part of the court as to have warranted the court in acting summarily and without citing petitioner to show cause why he should not be punished before entering said order committing him into the custody of the sheriff. From a careful perusal of the authorities, we have examined in the light of our statutes defining contempt and the mode of procedure of adjudging same; and keeping in mind the decisions of this court which hold that statutes relating to contempts and the procedure of punishing same must be strictly construed (Maxwell v. Rives, 11 Nev. 213; Ex parte Sweeney, 18 Nev. 74, 1 Pac. 379), we are of the opinion that, while a grand jury when in session and in attendance on business connected with the court is an adjunct or appendage of the court, yet it is not in legal contemplation such a part of the court as is contemplated in section 3556 as would authorize a judge to summarily punish an offending party for any act before it, without proceeding on affidavit and citing such party to show cause why he should not be punished as it would be authorized to do if the contempt was committed in the immediate view and presence of the court."

It has been declared without qualification by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of New Orleans v. Steamship Co., 20 Wall. 387, 22 L. Ed. 354, that a "contempt of court is a specific criminal offense," and that the judgment therein is a judgment in a criminal case; and numerous cases may be found containing unqualified declarations of similar import. There is, however, a line of authorities which indicate that contempt proceedings are civil and not criminal, but, while the apparent conflict of views cannot in all cases be reconciled, much of the inconsistency disappears if contempts be regarded as civil or criminal according to their nature and effect. This distinction is substantially recognized by Sir William Blackstone in his famous work. See 4 Blackstone's Commentaries, c. 20.

Mr. Rapalje, in his work on Contempts, at section 21, gives the best general definitions relating thereto we have found. He says: "Civil contempts are those quasi contempts which

Opinion of the Court-Sweeney, J.

consist in failing to do something which the contemner is ordered by the court to do for the benefit or advantage of another party to the proceeding before the court, while criminal contempts are all those acts in disrespect of the court or its process, or which obstruct the administration of justice, or tend to bring the court into disrepute. To the former class of contempts belong such acts as the disobedience of an injunction issued at the suit of a private party. Incidentally the court may vindicate its authority, but the individual alone is interested in the enforcement of the order, and usually institutes the contempt proceeding. Formerly the process whereby courts of chancery enforced all their decrees was in form and name an attachment for contempt. To the latter class of contempts belong such acts as misconduct by attorneys or other officers, disobedience of subpenas or other process, disturbance or insolent behavior in the presence or immediate vicinity of the court, and the like." (Phillips v. Walsh, 11 Nev. 178; Welch v. Barber, 52 Conn. 147, 52 Am. Rep. 567; Crook v. People, 16 Ill. 534; Ex parte Hardy, 68 Ala. 303; In re Watson, 3 Lans. 408; Hawley v. Bennett, 4 Paige, 163; Wyatt v. People, 17 Colo. 252, 28 Pac. 961.)

But, irrespective of whether or not the proceedings prior to a judgment in a contempt case be civil or criminal, we believe that unless the contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence of the court, and when we say immediate view and presence of the court we mean in the ocular view of the court, or where the court has direct knowledge of the contempt, that the rights of every defendant should be protected as evidently designed by the authors of our statute when they provided that, when the contempt is not in the immediate view and presence of the court, the charge should be made by affidavit and the contemner given the right to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt, and prove or disprove the charges against him before judgment be passed upon him. This right to defend one's self, either civilly or criminally, in any action which may be instituted wherein his liberty or property is involved, is the sacred privilege of every citizen and of such trans

Argument for Appellant.

cendent importance that it cannot be taken from him even by legislative enactment. In the present case the proceedings disclose that the court failed to act in accordance with the mode required by law in ordering petitioner into custody, and, in so doing, we believe acted without authority of law, and in violation of the rights of petitioner.

The order therefore committing petitioner into the custody of the sheriff is void, and he is ordered released forthwith.

[No. 1713.].

THE PORTEOUS DECORATIVE COMPANY, INCORPORATED, A CORPORATION, APPELLANT, v. DR. GEORGE FEE, RESPONDENT.

1. MECHANICS' LIENS-STATEMENT OF LIEN-SUFFICIENCY. A mechanics' lien claim, stating that it is for "outside work on house and painting of inside blinds, $190," does not substantially comply with Comp. Laws, 3885, requiring the claimant of a mechanics' lien to file a statement setting forth the terms, time given, and conditions of the contract, and is insufficient to support a lien.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of Nevada, Washoe County; John S. Orr, Judge.

Action by Porteous Decorative Company, Incorporated, against Dr. George Fee. From a judgment for defendant, and from an order denying motion for a new trial, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion.

Mack & Shoup, for Appellant:

I. "The right to liens given to mechanics and laborers is introduced into the statutory law of the states by positive statutes. These statutes were at first looked upon by the courts to be in derogation of the common law, and hence they were strictly construed. They have now, however, become an integral part of our law, and their justice and beneficence have become so apparent that it was not intended by the legislature that laborers' lien statements should be

Argument for Appellant.

strangled by technicalities, but, being remedial in their nature, they were to receive a broad and liberal construction." (Maynard v. Ivey, 21 Nev. 241, 244.) Further on in this case, the court in stating the meaning and construction to be placed upon section 3812 of Gen. Stats. Nev., which is exactly the same as the statute under which the lien in the case at bar was made, with the exception that the time in which subcontractors may file liens has been changed from thirty to fifty days, the court uses the following language: "The purpose of section 3812, Gen. Stats. Nev., is to secure to owners and others, who are about to advance money or purchase the property, notice of the amount and nature of the lien to which the property is subject, and in whose favor the lien has accrued, and if that notice is fairly given under the claimant's signature and affidavit, it is a substantial compliance with the statute, which is all the law requires."

II. "It is not necessary to set out the items of account or specify the quantity of materials furnished. (Lonkey v. Wells, 16 Nev. 271.) "If there are no special terms, time, or conditions given, none can be stated, and, in the absence of any such specifications, or proofs to the contrary, the law would presume that none existed, and that the materials were to be paid for on delivery." (Lonkey v. Wells, 16 Nev. 275.) To same effect see Jewell v. McKay, 82 Cal. 144; Hills v. Ohlig, 63 Cal. 104

III. In the case at bar the provision of the statute in reference to stating the terms, time given, and conditions of the contract does not apply, as the only terms, time, and conditions, other than those which were expressed, were such as arise by implication of law and need not be expressed.

IV. In the case at bar the item of $190 for painting and outside work on the house would not need to be entered into and the details explained, for the reason that the whole of said work was done under a special contract price of one lump sum for all the work and materials therein included. It could add nothing by stating the details, as the price agreed upon would control and would be the extent of the lien, and it would make no difference whether the alterations were worth twice the amount or only one-half the amount.

Argument for Respondent.

It is reasonable to suppose that, if particulars of the work or alterations were ever to be required in a statement or lien, it would only be in cases where the various items were to be computed at the completion of the work in order to determine the amount of the claim. The case of Spears v. Lawrence, 38 Pac. 1049, is a case right in point with the case at bar as to the $190 item in the lien. In the said Washington case there was a contract to furnish for a gross sum all material and work necessary to complete the painting of the building in accordance with the contract between the contractor and owner, and the court, in declaring the notice in a claim lien. sufficient which did not go into the details of the contract, used the following language: "The lien notice set out a special contract by Spears and Leonard to furnish the materials and do the necessary work to the full completion of the painting of the building in accordance with the contract between the principal contractor and said Lawrence. And, while it is true that the owner of the building would not be bound by the contract made between his contractor and a subcontractor, if it was shown to be fraudulent or improvident, yet, in the absence of such showing, it must be presumed that the contract is such as would be enforced by the courts. This being so, we think the statement of the contract in the lien notice was sufficient. There was no separate contract for the labor and for the materials, but one gross contract for everything required in the prosecution of that particular work; and, this being so, there could not well be set out a claim under said contract or separate amounts for materials and for labor."

James T. Boyd, J. B. Jones, and A. N. Salisbury, for Respondent:

I. The mechanics' lien statute requires the time and substantial facts to be set forth in the claim of lien. If the material furnished and labor performed were in pursuance of an express contract, the contract should be set out in the lien hæc verba, or at least the facts which show the truth of the transaction must be set forth. This is easy to do, and must be required; otherwise no recovery can be had.