Opinion of the Court-Talbot, C. J. decisions are not uniform, it must be admitted that the trend of the more recent cases is in support of this argument.' *** There is no intention to make the salary of the inspector subject to further legislation to be inferred from anything expressed in the act. It reads: 'Said inspector shall receive an annual salary of two thousand five hundred (2,500) dollars and mileage at ten cents per mile, payable the same as other officers of the state.' And by other acts then and now in force, other state officers are paid in monthly installments at the end of each and every month; the auditor being required upon request to draw warrants upon the state treasurer for such salaries. Nothing is left indefinite and uncertain under these provisions. * * * The object of the constitutional provision inhibiting the payment of money from the state treasury, except by an appropriation made by law, is to prohibit expenditures of the public funds at the mere will and caprice of the crown or those having the funds in custody, without direct legislative sanction therefor; but no such evil need be feared, where, as in this case, the salary of the officer is fixed, together with the time and method of his payment. And we conclude that the act creating the office of state boiler inspector and fixing his salary, when considered in connection with other statutes, designating the time, mode, and manner of payment, constitutes a continuous appropriation for such salary, and that no further legislative sanction is necessary to authorize the proper officers to pay the same. This conclusion is in accordance with several opinions given by the attorneys-general of this state to the auditor at different times, and upon which opinions the salaries of several of the state officers have in the past been paid. (See Report of Attorney-General of Colorado, years 1889 and 1890, pp. 60 and 98; 1891 and 1892, p. 23.) So, likewise, the attorney-general of the State of Indiana has decided the same question in the same way. (See Report and Opinions of Attorney-General of Indiana for 1888, p. 155.) This last opinion was rendered upon this state of facts: The legislature having adjourned without making any appropriations for the salaries of the officers connected with the state government for the year 1888, the Opinion of the Court-Talbot, C. J. question presented was whether or not such salaries should be paid by the auditor and treasurer without further legislation in the nature of special appropriations therefor. In an exhaustive and able opinion, it is held that it was the duty of the auditor to draw warrants for such salaries, and this conclusion was accepted without being questioned in the courts." See Report of Attorney-General of Nevada, 1903-04, p. 18. In State v. Grimes, 7 Wash. 193, 34 Pac. 834, it was said: "But, outside of any light which may be thrown upon the intention of the lawmakers by aid of the title, we are clearly of the opinion that the language employed in the body of the act is amply sufficient to show that the intention of the legislature was to appropriate. They have designated the amount, and have directed that it be paid out of any moneys in the state treasury not otherwise appropriated. This, we think, is sufficient, and the appropriation contemplated by the constitution is as plainly indicated as though the formal words 'there is hereby appropriated' were used. No arbitrary form of expression is dictated by the constitution, and none should be required. Many cases have been adjudicated in states having substantially the same constitutional provision as the one in question, and so far as we have been able to ascertain they have uniformly been determined in favor of the relator's contention. See State of Louisiana v. Bordelon, 6 La. Ann. 68; Humbert v. Dunn, 84 Cal. 59, 24 Pac. 111, and cases cited." In Reynolds v. Taylor, 43 Ala. 427, the petitioner was entitled to a salary of $2,000 as marshal and ex officio librarian, and the legislature had made provision for payment of only $1,000 in the general appropriation bill. The court said: "It is insisted that the application of appellee should be denied, because it is not shown that an appropriation had been made to pay his salary, as marshal, at the sum claimed by him; but that appropriations had been made to pay him $1,000 salary per annum only, and not $2,000, as claimed. We know that the general appropriation acts of 1866 and 1867 appropriated $1,000 only for the payment of the salary of the marshal of the supreme court. This objection is sufficiently answered, by a decision of this court, Opinion of the Court-Talbot, C. J. made more than thirty years ago. In the case of Nichols v. Controller, 4 Stew. & P. (Ala.) 154, it is decided that, in order to authorize the controller to issue his warrant on the treasury, for the amount of a salary, it is not necessary that there should be a special annual appropriation by act of the legislature, where there is a general law fixing the amount of the salary, and prescribing its payment at particular periods." * * * Proll v. Dunn, 80 Cal. 220, 22 Pac. 143: "There is no provision in the constitution providing or prescribing any particular form of words in which an appropriation shall be made, except that it shall be made by law. It is claimed that the act does not specify upon what fund the warrant is to be drawn; and, as the controller is required in every warrant to specify the fund out of which it is payable, therefore that it is insufficient. Several authorities are cited which are claimed to support the proposition that the act itself must specify the fund out of which the money is to be drawn, but we do not think they bear that construction, in the sense in which it is claimed for it here, and, as to the statutes, not one appropriation act in fifty designates the fund out of which the money is to be drawn. The majority of all appropriations are drawn out of a single fund, and that without any designation in the act as to what fund the money shall be drawn from. Neither the constitution nor the code requires that an appropriation act shall specify the fund out of which the appropriation shall be paid, nor is it usual in appropriation acts to do so. If such a specification is required, the wheels of the government ought long since to have stopped, for out of many acts which we have examined, including the general appropriation bills for the current and past years, we find none which make such designation. It has become and is the custom in this state, of very general, but not universal, application, to use the phrase 'appropriated out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated.' But it seems to be mere custom, not founded upon any constitutional or other legislative requirement. And we learn from the argument that the controller interprets that phrase to mean 'out of the general fund.' We * * * Opinion of the Court-Talbot, C. J. * * know of no law which authorizes such an interpretation. On the contrary, it would seem that everything authorized by law to be paid out of the state treasury is payable out of the general fund, if not specially made payable out of some specific fund. * The amount named for the general fund is supposed to be sufficient to meet the aggregate of all the appropriations made for the year except such as have been expressly made payable out of some special fund. * * * Appropriations are made, and can only be made, by the legislature. The constitution has prescribed no set form of words in which it is to be done. All that is required is a clear expression of the legislative will on the subject. * But, says the controller, it has not designated the fund out of which the appropriation is payable. It did not in any of the former years; nor has it designated the fund out of which the salaries of any of the officers of the state, or the expenses of any of the other bureaus or departments of the government, shall be paid. 'It has not said that the money is appropriated out of any moneys in the treasury not otherwise appropriated.' What of it? The legislature can make no appropriation 'except out of the treasury.' The remaining words are not only a form not required by law, but usually a fiction, for at the time of the passage of appropriation bills. there is not usually any money in the treasury in excess of existing appropriations, and whenever the legislature makes a new appropriation, it is to be assumed that it will provide funds to meet the same. As said by Chief Justice Field, in McCauley v. Brooks, 16 Cal. 11: 'Appropriations are made in anticipation of the receipt of the yearly revenues.' 'An appropriation is the act of setting apart, or assigning to a particular use or person, in exclusion of all others; application to a special use or purpose, as of * * * money to carry out some public object.' (Webster's Dict.) 'An appropriation of the money to a specific object would be an authority to the proper officers to pay the money, because the auditor is authorized to draw his warrant upon an appropriation, and the treasurer is authorized to pay such warrant if he has appropriated money in the treasury.' (Ristine v. VOL. XXIX-31 Opinion of the Court-Talbot, C. J. State, 20 Ind. 339.) In this act we have a clear, distinct expression of the legislative will making the appropriation. The words 'out of any moneys in the treasury not otherwise appropriated' are not necessary to the expression of that will, or the making of such appropriation. They are in common use in this state, but nowhere made necessary, and are not always used." Humbert v. Dunn, 84 Cal. 57, 24 Pac. 111: "The question is whether these provisions of the act constitute an 'appropriation' within the meaning of that term as used in section 22, article IV of the constitution, which provides that 'no money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law.' It is true, the usual formula, 'there is hereby appropriated the sum of ...... dollars out of any money in the state treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the payment of salaries,' is not found in the act, but the intention of the legislature to provide for the payment of the salaries of the commissioners as they accrued is clearly manifested in the language used: 'Each member * * * shall receive a salary of two thousand four hundred dollars per annum, payable monthly'—and it is 'to be paid out of any money in the state treasury not otherwise appropriated.' There is nothing in this language indicating an intention to postpone the payment of the salaries of the commissioners until the next session of the legislature. They are to be paid monthly, and out of any money not otherwise appropriated. 'Not otherwise appropriated' when? Clearly at the time when the services are performed and the monthly payments become due. While it is customary to use the words 'there is hereby appropriated the sum,' in bills appropriating money for the payment of salary and other expenses of the government, it is not essential to the validity of an appropriation that those words or any of them, should be used, if the legislature has clearly designated the amount and the fund out of which it is to be paid. *** It is claimed that the act is unconstitutional because it does not specify the amount to be appropriated; that the amount which may be incurred as expenses is uncertain. So far as the traveling expenses are concerned, this contention may be good. We are not called upon to |