Opinion of the Court-Fitzgerald, C. J.

words 'on the 11th day of May, 1904,' the indictment could not be the subject of criticism or assault."

Perhaps the following phraseology might be considered an improvement on the phraseology of the indictment: "The said Paul Lovelace did in the night time of the 11th day of May, 1904, or in the night time of some day thereabouts, to the said 11th day of May, 1904, enter," etc.

"Said Paul Lovelace did, in the night time, on or about the 11th day of May, 1904, * * * enter," etc., *** might perhaps be considered a still better collocation of words, although this is something of a departure from the form suggested in the statute concerning the form of indictments.

That mere grammatical, punctuational (if verbal "free coinage" may be here allowed), rhetorical, or linguistic error does not always vitiate, is fully sustained by decisions of courts and text-writers. The following notably excellent authority is cited to sustain this doctrine: Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure (Cyc.) vol. 6, p. 199, and authorities there mentioned.

While this indictment in the respect mentioned is in truth inartistically drawn, yet, under the statutes and the authorities above stated, we cannot say that it is fatally defective. The sections of the statute above quoted show the legislative intent was that the courts of the state should give interpretations liberal to sustain rather than rigid to overthrow indictments, when, as in this case, substantial rights of defendants are not thereby prejudiced; and, as we have from the authority mentioned seen, even under the common law to overthrow this indictment would seem too rigid an interpretation.

Under the second head the error claimed is stated in the brief of counsel for defendant, as follows:

"On the trial of appellant the deposition of one Ross taken at the preliminary examination was read in evidence, because he broke jail and escaped before the trial, and his presence could not be procured.

"He testified that he and appellant entered the store of Alexander Burrell on the day named in the indictment, stole a lot of amalgam of the value of about $2,400, and buried it

Opinion of the Court-Fitzgerald, C. J.

a short distance from the scene of the crime. Appellant claims there was no testimony corroborative of that of Ross, and that a conviction could not be had."

In this contention counsel is, we think, clearly mistaken. Besides minor points of corroboration not necessary to mention here, the testimony of the witness W. J. Davidson corroborates the testimony of the accomplice, Ross. Davidson testifies that defendant requested him (Davidson) "to help him rob the store at Edgemont"; that is the store that was robbed. Davidson further testifies that the defendant "told me he would have got the amalgam if something had not happened"; the amalgam was the article stolen in the robbery. Davidson further testifies that defendant was trying to dispose of the amalgam, the thing stolen; and asked Davidson this question: "What am I going to do about that damned stuff?"

If this testimony was true, and its truth was a question entirely for the jury, there was corroboration of the testimony of the accomplice, Ross.

Defendant fails in sustaining either of his two points urged in argument for reversal of the judgment.

The judgment is therefore affirmed.

VOL. XXIX-4

Argument for Relator.

[No. 1683.]

THE STATE OF NEVADA, EX REL. NEVADA TITLE GUARANTY AND TRUST COMPANY, A CORPORATION, RELATOR, v. PUDDY GRIMES, AS COUNTY RECORDER IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NYE, STATE OF NEVADA, RESPONDENT.

1. RECORDS-ACCESS TO-RIGHTS OF ABSTRACT COMPANIES. Under sections 2663, 2664, Comp. Laws, providing that every conveyance of real estate, and every instrument of writing setting forth an agreement to convey any real estate, or whereby any real estate may be affected, proved, acknowledged, certified, and recorded in the manner presented, "shall from the time of filing the same with the recorder for record, impart notice to all persons of the contents thereof, and subsequent purchasers and mortgagees shall be deemed to purchase and take with notice," and under other statutes enumerated, as construed in connection with the common law, a corporation organized for the purpose of furnishing abstracts and guaranteeing titles may, free of charge, through its agents and employees, during regular business hours, inspect and make memoranda and copies of all files and records in the office of the county recorder, in so far as they relate to current transactions in which it is authorized or employed to make searches, furnish abstracts, or guarantee titles by persons having, or seeking to acquire, an interest in property; the examination to be made at such times and under such circumstances as will not prevent the recorder or his assistants from discharging their duties, nor interfere with the right of other persons to have access to the records.

2.

SAME-COMPILING ABSTRACT BOOKS. Under the laws mentioned, relator has not the right to copy or inspect all records for the purpose of compiling an independent set of abstract books, covering all the property to which the records relate and for use in equipping an office in opposition to the recorder.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING.

Petition by the State, on the

relation of The Nevada Title Guaranty and Trust Company, for writ of mandamus to Puddy Grimes, County Recorder of the County of Nye.. Denied.

The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion.

George S. Green, Alfred Chartz, and T. A. A. Siegfriedt, for Relator:

I. Moreover, it is well settled in law that, in the absence of a statute declaring the right of access and inspection, public records are no less subject to such inspection. As said in Lum v. McCarty, 39 N. J. Law, 289, by the court,

Argument for Relator.

which was a case very similar to the one at bar, and in which there were provisions of statute declaring the right of public inspection of certain records, and silent as to others, "it is also suggested that the absence of any provision for access by the public to the records of judgments of the circuit court favors the charge (by the clerk) so far as the records of those judgments are concerned. The right of the public to free access to the records carries with it the right to search without charge for the privileges. Nor can a claim on the part of the clerk to fees for a search not made by himself or his assistant in the records of the judgments of the circuit court in his office be justified by the fact that no special provision is made for access by the public to those records. They are no less free to the public by reason of the absence of a provision declaring the right. They are, in fact, public records, and are public property, kept in a public place, at the public expense, for the public benefit."

II. As we have said, the statutes of the State of Nevada are sufficient authority upon which the relator may base its claims to the right of free access and general inspection of all public records in the office of the respondent. However, independent of any statute declaring such right or inspection or requiring such record to be kept, the records of a public officer become such public records as are subject to the free and general inspection by the public. (Brown v. Knapp, 54 Mich. 132; Coleman v. Commonwealth, 25 Grat. Va. 881; State v. Donovan, 10 N. D. 209; State v. Smith, 74 Iowa, 583; State v. Cummins, 76 Iowa, 136; Parsons v. Randolph, 21 Mo. App. 359; Nash v. Lathrop, 142 Mass. 35; Banks v. Manchester, 23 Fed. 143; Myers v. Callahan, 20 Fed. 441; Chase v. Sanborn, 4 Cliff. 306; Little v. Gould, 2 Blatchf. 165; Banks v. West Pub. Co., 27 Fed. 50; Thompson v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 624.) See, also, Burton v. Tuite, 78 Mich. 363, 80 Mich. 218; Lum v. McCarty, 39 N. J. Law, 286; Aitcheson v. Huebner, 90 Mich. 645; Johnson v. Wakulla, 28 Fla. 731, 733; State v. Meeker, 19 Neb. 106; Speilman v. Flynn, 19 Neb. 346.

III. It should be observed that inspection is only restricted to a particular proceeding where it is obtained by rule of the court; otherwise when obtained by mandamus;

Argument for Relator.

and we have been unable to find any case whatsoever, English or American, in which an inspection was denied to any one who had a special interest in the subject-matter of the record, and we challenge counsel for the respondent to find any. The right of abstracters to examine and inspect all the public records was first denied in the case of Webber v. Townley, 43 Mich. 536, which stood as authority for that position for several years, and which was followed by several decisions in other states. The right was denied in that case, notwithstanding that the court said: "The object sought by the relators may be considered of such modern origin as not to have been contemplated or covered by the common-law authorities relating to the inspection of public records." However, in 1889, Webber v. Townley was considered by the same court in Burton v. Tuite, 78 Mich. 363, 80 Mich. 218, and expressly overruled. In that opinion the court said: "I cannot agree with the opinion of the court, or the reasons given for it, in Webber v. Townley, supra. I have a right, if I see fit, to examine the title to my neighbor's property, whether or not I have any interest in it, or intend ever to have. I also have the right to examine any title that I see fit, recorded in the public office, for the purpose of selling such information, if I desire. No one has ever disputed the right of a lawyer to enter the register's office and examine the title of his client to land as recorded, or the title of opponent of his client, and to charge his client for the information so obtained. This is done for private gain, as a part of the lawyer's daily business and by means of which, with others, he earns his bread. Upon what different footing can an abstracter-can Mr. Burtonbe placed within the law, without giving the privilege to one man or class of men that is denied to another?" See authorities therein cited in case of Burton v. Tuite, 78 Mich. 363.

IV. The contention that a seeker after information in the county recorder's office, who makes his searches for himself, and who obtains his information without the aid of the recorder or his assistants, must, nevertheless, pay to the recorder the same fees which the recorder would be entitled