Argument for Respondent. books. (Barstow v. Union Con. M. Co., 10 Nev. 386; State v. C. P. R. R. Co., 10 Nev. 47; Robinson v. Imperial S. M. Co., 5 Nev. 44.) IV. "If two statutes on the same subject are mutually repugnant, the later act without any repealing clause operates, in the absence of express intent to the contrary, as a repeal of the earlier one, on the obvious principle that the enactment of provisions inconsistent with those previously existing manifest a clear intent to abolish the old law." (26 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 2d ed., 723, 725, and authorities therein cited; Thorpe v. Schooling, 7 Nev. 15.) The practice in this state has invariably been to follow the rule prescribed in Comp. Laws, 3117, which expressly defines and sets forth the necessary steps in the commencement of an action. To depart from this rule at this late day would not only inflict hardship upon litigants now in court, but it would be an absolute contravention of the statute and of every opinion of this honorable court heretofore rendered in construing it. Robert L. Hubbard, for Respondent: I. Respondent respectfully submits that the accepted rule throughout the entire United States is that the mere writing, signing, and sealing of a summons by the clerk of a court does not constitute its issuance; that a writ is issued only when it comes to the hands of an officer or other person capable of serving the same. Many of the cases discuss the reasons with great clearness, and all find the basis for their reasoning in the following illustration: Suppose that a claimant could file his complaint and have the clerk write out, sign, and seal a summons and deliver it to him; that he might carry that summons indefinitely without service. The result is obvious. Hence, the rule that the plaintiff must place the suit beyond his own control by placing the writ in the hands of an officer for service. A careful examination of the statutes and decisions of the several states makes it most apparent that the tendency has always been toward a stricter requirement along these lines. In almost every jurisdiction the courts have invariably gone beyond the language of the statutes in construing their meaning. That is to say, Argument for Respondent. when the statute has required that a summons be "issued," the courts have said that "issued" meant "placed in the hands of the officer for service." And it is a noteworthy fact that many courts have gone still further and said that actual service, and nothing short of it, was a requisite to the commencement of a suit, and this, too, when there was no statute making such requirement. We therefore believe that our contention that, if Comp. Laws, 3117, were the only law upon the point in this state, a fair construction of it requires that the writ be placed in the hands of the officer for service in order to constitute the commencement of an action. But it must not be understood that respondent by the presentation of the foregoing contention at all concedes, in the slightest degree, that Comp. Laws, 3117, is at all applicable to the case at bar, for the provisions of Comp. Laws, 3724, and the provisions of the act embracing that section are, as we believe, too clear to admit of doubt that it was enacted expressly for just such cases as the one presented in this litigation. II. Counsel for appellant argues in his brief "that the defendant and respondent. is a foreign corporation and cannot be heard to plead the statute of limitations," and cites three Nevada authorities in support of his position. It will doubtless be a sufficient answer to that contention to say that in each of the cases cited by counsel for appellant those in charge of the litigation took the precaution to present the objection to the district court before urging it before the supreme court. The record will demonstrate the truth of the facts in the case under consideration, and it will be searched in vain for anything to show that appellant asked the district court to consider that question. Had counsel for appellant called that matter to the attention of that court, then respondent would have had an opportunity to meet it, and the matter might have been presented to this honorable court for review. But since it was not presented to that court, it is difficult to see how it may be presented to this court, under the rule of this honorable body as laid down in Moresi v. Smith, 15 Nev. 220; Sias v. Hallock, 14 Nev. 332; Maher v. Swift, 14 Nev. 324; Vietti v. Nesbitt, 24 Nev. 390; McInnis v. McGurn, 24 Nev. 370; Schwartz v. Stock, 26 Nev. 128; Thomas v. Blaisdell, Argument for Respondent. 25 Nev. 223-all in perfect harmony with the rule in all jurisdictions. Robert L. Hubbard, for Respondent, upon motion to dismiss appeal: I. Where an appeal is taken from a judgment and several orders, a complete undertaking on appeal must be executed for each appeal taken. Where an appeal is taken from a judgment and one or more orders, and only one undertaking in the sum of three hundred dollars is executed and filed, such an undertaking is not only insufficient, but is wholly void. The undertaking on appeal must not only be sufficient in amount to equal an aggregate undertaking in such sum as the number of appeals multiplied by the sum of three hundred dollars, but must allude and refer specifically to the several appeals and make the undertaking as severable as the appeals, so that any one of the appeals may be sustained or reversed, and any or all of the other appeals be independently decided, and the liability of the sureties be definitely fixed on each appeal. The notice of appeal must particularly specify the order and judgment appealed from, and where a notice specifies on appeal from an order, ruling, or judgment not made by the district court, because not presented to it, such an appeal is ineffectual for any purpose. (Robinson v. Kind, 56 Pac. 863; Home and Loan Association v. Wilkins, 12 Pac. 799; Corcoran v. Desmond, 11 Pac. 815; Ditch Company v. Batchtold, 41 Pac. 813; Kelly v. Leachman, 51 Pac. 407; Heydenfeldt's Estate, 51 Pac. 543; McCormick v. Belvin, 31 Pac. 16.) "A notice of appeal from a judgment and from all orders made in the cause is only an appeal from a judgment. It does not sufficiently describe any order." Even when an appeal is taken from a judgment, orders necessarily affecting it must also be appealed from in form. (Gates v. Walker, 35 Cal. 289.) II. Counsel for respondent respectfully submits that an insufficient and an invalid undertaking are two different things. We concede that an insufficient undertaking might be supplied by a proper one. But we contend that an invalid one cannot be so supplied. Believing that these Opinion of the Court-Sweeney, J. positions admit of no controversy it becomes of first importance to learn whether the undertaking filed by the appellant is invalid or only insufficient, and we deem it only necessary to call the court's attention to the fact that the undertaking in this case recites three distinct appeals, to wit: (1) From a judgment and order rendered against the plaintiff and in favor of defendant in said action on the 3d day of April, 1907, and from the whole thereof. (2) From an order and judgment sustaining defendant's demurrer as to the want of jurisdiction of said court of the parties to said action. (3) From the order and judgment dismissing said action, made and entered in the minutes of said court the 3d day of April, 1907-and then obligated the sureties as follows: "Now, therefore, in consideration of the premises of such appeal, we, the undersigned, * * * do hereby jointly and severally undertake and promise, on the part of the appellant, that he, the said appellant, will pay all damages and costs which may be awarded against him on the appeal, or a dismissal thereof, not exceeding three hundred dollars," etc. In view of the oft-repeated decisions of this court and the court of California, to say nothing of the unanimity throughout the Union upon this single question, it is impossible to understand how a careful practitioner could bring about the necessity of presenting this question to an appellate court. By the Court, SWEENEY, J.: This is an action founded upon an adverse claim filed by the appellant in the United States Land Office at Carson City, Nevada, against respondent's application for a United States mineral patent. The record discloses that the adverse was filed on the 26th day of September, 1906, and that a complaint was filed in the First Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, in and for the County of Esmeralda, on the 26th day of October, 1906. Upon the same day a summons in due form was made out by the clerk of said court. Upon the 12th of November, 1906, the said summons was placed in the hands of the sheriff of Ormsby County, Nevada, and was on said date served on the resident agent of defendant at Carson City. On November 28, 1906, the defendant Opinion of the Court-Sweeney, J. appeared in said action and filed a general demurrer to the sufficiency of said complaint; and, before hearing on said demurrer, on January 9, 1907, the defendant filed its answer. On March 19, 1907, Vermilyea, Edmonds & Stanley, defendant's attorneys, withdrew from the case, and thereafter Robert L. Hubbard, Esq., was substituted therefor. On March 26, 1907, defendant, through its attorney, Robert L. Hubbard, Esq., filed another general demurrer to the sufficiency of the complaint, and on the same date filed a separate special demurrer, which reads as follows: "Comes now the defendant and demurs to the jurisdiction of the court, and, for ground of demurrer, states: First-The court has no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of this action, because (a) it appears from the face of the files in this action that plaintiff's suit was not commenced in this court within thirty days after the filing of plaintiff's adverse claim which forms the basis of this action in the land office at Carson City, Nevada." It appears, also, that the answer filed by the defendant on January 9th contains the following allegation: "Further answering, said complaint alleges that plaintiff's adverse claim in this proceeding was filed in the land office at Carson City, Nevada, on the 26th day of September, 1906, and that this action, nor any other action, was commenced in this or any other court within thirty days thereafter to determine the right of possession to said mining claims, and that the said adverse claim of defendant is under and by virtue of the provision of section 2326 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (U. S. Comp. Stats. 1901, p. 1430) barred and waived." Upon the hearing of the special demurrer to the jurisdiction of the court, the court held that the action was not instituted within the thirty days required by section 2326 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which provides that an adverse action must be commenced in a court of competent jurisdiction within thirty days after the filing of the adverse claim in the United States Land Office, and that, therefore, the court had no jurisdiction of the action, and the same was accordingly dismissed. From the order and |