The reader will now, perhaps, understand us, when we say that the ability of free trade is the criterion of industrial prosperity; that the power of declaring a free commerce with foreigners is one and the same with the power of producing better and cheaper commodities than are produred by any other nation.

We are therefore ready to admit that a free trade is the normal and natural condition of commerce in America, because the normal and natural condition of the American people is to be the first and the most powerful and skillful of industrial producers; that the time will come when it will be necessary for America to open her ports and invite the competition of foreigners we do verily believe, because of the prodigious natural advantages which she has over other countries, and the certainty which we feel that these advantages will be cherished and carried to their utmost use by the establishment of PROTECTION as a part of the permanent policy of our government. When that time comes we shall give a scornful permission to foreigners to compete freely with ourselves-a permission which they will take good care not to use.

The title of the present article was "Political Paradoxes": the paradox of the free traders, that a free trade is the natural, and the best, condition of a people, is perhaps the most important that can at present occupy the attention of the logical inquirer, because the consequences of the fallacy which it conceals are the most disWe have now the following analysis of this dangerous paradox:

astrous.

1st. The industry of a nation needs no

2nd. Its trade will be best when it needs no protection, i.e. when it can supply the markets of the world with the best and cheapest commodities.

3d" Free trade is," therefore, "the best,"-i.e., when trade is at the best it needs no protection.

Our so called "free trade" party have made an unhappy application of the paradox, that "free trade is the best," and that too in contravention of the laws of nature and of business. It is a maxim of common sense that the substance should be thought of before the form. The glory of manhood is its freedom, the pleasure of wealth is the credit that it brings; but infancy must be cherished and protected before the man can go free and self dependant; and the substance of wealth must be accumulated, or the credit cannot be sustained. Freedom and strength cannot be conferred upon a young commercial people by destroying their armaments, or abolishing their tariffs.

Unprotected manhood, like unprotected industry is, indeed, "the best ;" but it is necessary to protect unripe youth, lest in hastily conferring freedom we leave unfulfilled the most sacred of all duties, the duty of guardianship. The paradox that misleads the free traders is so foolish, and its fallacy so obvious, however, we are lead to suspect something more in their advocacy than a strict adherence to theory. We are compelled by long observation to attribute the movements of free trade legislation to a taint of John Bullism, showing itself in an imitation of the fashions and the ways of thinking of the English, more than to any other cause.

"Necessity, the

It seems to be necessary to establish the Right to Govern upon some more stable foundation than tradition; for, though each believer is satisfied with the scripture of his own sect, dangerous dissensions arise between different sects, and between constructions of the same written traditions.

No less uncertain and dangerous an au

Tyrant's Plea."

thority for the Right to Govern, is the consent of a majority: since the minority are not bound thereby, unless there be a previous agreement that the thing at issue shall be determined by that method.

We shall assume, therefore, that necessity, and that alone, is the true foundation of the Right to Govern.

It is absolutely necessary (in a moral sense) to exist. For every practical purpose it is safe to say so, since the first object of man's endeavor is the preservation of his own life and the lives of those whom he looks upon as parts of himself. Affection, patriotism, and self-interest, reason with themselves alike, that it is necessary to make all things bend to the happy existence of the beloved object.

Many things are looked upon as necessary by men, but existence as the prime necessity. The existence of men in cities and in every civilized condition, is acknowledged to rest upon property and security. The Right to Govern is consequently derived from two kinds of necessity that of safety and that of possession: the enjoyment of one's own, and security of life and limb: and we hold, by consequence, that the right to govern is inherent in every individual, equally with the duty of obedience. Though it be true, therefore, that "necessity is the tyrant's plea," it is no less the plea of all government.

Security and possession are the means of social existence.

Security and possession are, therefore, necessary. Again:

Security and possession are necessary to social existence.

Government, of some kind, is the only means of security and possession. Government is, therefore, necessary to social existence.

The position of a tyrant is such that to maintain it, is the same with defending his own life. He is identified with his function. To preserve his own liberty and life he must destroy that of others. Hence the paradox, "Necessity the tyrant's plea." But his necessity is by no means that of the people he governs. Their necessity is to be rid of him upon any terms, since with all men the first necessity is that of exist

ence.

vernment.

3. The best government will consequently have the least governing to do; and, therefore,

By the same reason the best clergymen are those who give the least instruction to the children of the people; because a virtuous and free people will give so much instruction to their children at home, and will be at so much pains to maintain the best clergymen; these latter will have less to do in proportion as the youth whom they instruct are better-and hence the paradox :

Demagogical newspapers and orators frequently assert that "the will of the people has been manifested" by such and such a

vote. Now, whichever way an election is decided, it is still a manifestation of the "will" or opinion of the majority; and this

majority is of equal authority on all occasions, and for all opinions. The orator of Vermont is struck with awe by the manifestation of the popular will in favor of a tariff: his brother orator, of New Hampshire, is equally overcome by the same vox populi against it. Which, then, is the more "awful" of the two-Vermont or New Hampshire?

And yet, paltry as it is, this fear, pretended or real, of the majority of the voices, requires a great deal of moral courage to meet it. The deception lies hid in a popular paradox, which requires a logical analysis to detect its falsity.

A convention of people assembled to constitute a state, are there in a representative capacity. Each represents not only his own necessities, but those of his children and dependants, whoever they may be. Representation, it thus appears, is founded in necessity, and is the natural method of constituting a state.

This convention agree upon a chairman or president, who represents the unity of the assembly, and his being there, and the power with which he is invested, are significant of the fact, that the convention intends to abide by its own decisions: that is to say, that whatever method of ascertaining the best opinion may be adopted, it will be adhered to.

They will now adopt a form of procedure. Let us suppose that the major part of the assembly are in favor of a two-thirds rule, i. e., that no law shall be established unless supported by a majority of twothirds. The reason for agreeing upon such a rule, is the same which brought the convention together, and appointed a chairman over them, namely, necessity; the necessity and circumstances of the time, which command the establishment of a constitutional government. By the same necessity the children and dependants of each member of the convention submit to be represented by him: they cannot help it their necessity is a law to them and to their representatives: their will, or opinion, has nothing to do with the matter. we see, at its very birth, the validity of the right to govern rests in necessity.

Thus

Two-thirds of the assembly declare that the laws shall be established by the agreement of two-thirds. Now, as it is idle for the remaining third to fight against two

The constitution being established, there will be an appointment of offices and functions. The constitution will give some of these to be elected by popular majorities, others it will confer upon the courts or the executive, or upon the legislature. The people, however, are as much bound by one species of appointment as by another; they must obey the sheriff elected by the ward, in his functions, and the judge appointed by the senate in his and thus it appears, that not the "will of the people," but the grand necessity of a form of government is the true basis of the right to govern, as well as of the duty of obedience.

The constable does not derive his right to seize the thief, from the opinion of the people in his ward, but from the constitution or the statute book. The representative does not derive his right to vote upon the passage of laws from the existing majority in his district, but from the constitution which creates his function; and we have seen that the foundations of the constitution are laid in necessity, and by no means, or in any sense, in the opinion of majorities.

The judge, during a session of the court, is master of the court room; not because he was elected to be so, but because necessity defines the function. Justice cannot otherwise be administered.

If a man is attacked in the street, he does not wait to take the opinions of the standers by, to know whether he may defend himself; necessity dictates law to him, and he executes it to the best of his ability.

The current paradox, "the will of the majority is law," has its origin in a confusion of mind. It is agreed, perhaps, that a law shall not be valid until the majority, or until a certain proportion of opinion is found to be favorable to it. Whether two-thirds, or only a majority of one, agree

to it, provided that be the test, the law is still good. The necessity of obeying it, and the right of enforcing it, rest primarily upon the original idea of the necessity of government, whatever be its form, method or derivation. The will of the majority is law, therefore, only when it is

agreed it shall be, and things cannot be otherwise arranged. A government which is not established on necessity, and which cannot defend itself to death, and against all opposition, is neither a respectable, nor a well founded government, and must soon fall.

A law-making representative has a double duty to perform, namely, his duty to his country, and his duty to his constituents.

The division of a people into districts, each electing their representative, is doubtless with a view to the complete representation of the various and opposing interests of different sections.

It is certainly proper that the legislator should serve his constituents fairly and fully, in the laws which he aids in establishing. If it were not proper and necessary for the law-maker or delegate to serve his constituents, the contest at his election would be very idle; for of two men of equal abilities, one may be chosen by a large majority, merely because he favors a larger interest. Either, then, he must serve that interest, or his constituents are duped, and he is a cheat.

We have instances of representatives, soon after an election, announcing to their constituents that they intend to vote just as they please; that they gave no pledges, and will not be bound by any. This, however, is a danger to which constituents will always be subject, namely, the danger of being duped. Opinion is free, and cannot be regulated by law. The majority of to-day is often the minority of tomorrow. The law, therefore, meddles not in the matter; for, as the election of a candidate turns social preference, it is for the electors to incur the risk.

There is a code of political honor tacitly recognized and acted upon, and of which the founders of the constitution must have presupposed the existence; but they could not endow constituencies with discrimination, and they are, therefore, liable to be duped and betrayed by dishonorable delegates and false representatives.

Whether a representative, elected in

good faith, is bound to continue to serve his constituency after it has fallen into a minority, is a delicate question, to be decided by the circumstances of the case. To continue to vote obstinately our way, after a change in one's own opinion, and a change in one's constituents, would perhaps be esteemed a proof of more spirit than wisdom. To decide in such cases, requires a combination of prudence and honor, so that neither shall be violated.

The position of a representative consulting his constituents on some minor point of little importance, is a truly ridiculous one. Their correspondence is, of course, limited to some three or four leading persons, who are presumed to be the political

aristocracy.' These persons have it all their own way, and are, practically speaking, the constituency. Let us now enquire how far such a conduct agrees with the representative theory.

Previous to the election of this representative, it was an event of great uncertainty who would be chosen. The representative office or agency existed, with limits prescribed by the constitution, and the people of the district were called upon to nominate a man, who, upon being so nominated, should occupy the office. The person named, represents, in the eye of the law, not the majority, or constituency, but the whole district. To affirm otherwise would be to disfranchise and outlaw the minority. The minority, though they do not elect him, yet acknowledge the legality and capacity of his election, by voting on the occasion. The effect of a vote is only as if one should say, 'A is the best man,' or B is the best man." The majority of opinion, being known, is presumed to be right, and to stand for the good sense and prevailing interest of the district.

The name being given in, the function of the voter expires. His franchise extends only to his "having an opinion" of as much weight as another's, in choosing a fit person to fill a certain office. His vote is given on the fitness only. If there were no constitution, nor any general representative government, all this voting would be to no purpose. The representatives, on assembling, would have no powers to act under unless their constituencies had specially conferred upon them those of revolution, or of convention.

And now the constitution takes effect. The man named by the majority as fit, is by the constitution made capable, and becomes an incumbent of an office from which his constituents have no power to oust him. Once elected, he represents his entire district, minority and majority, and nothing short of a legally ascertained majority at the proper time, can throw him. out of his place. If there is any regular and lawful method of ascertaining how he ought to vote on a particular peint, it must be by assembling the entire district, majority and minority, and putting the question. The minority may possibly have become a majority, and then our modest consultor will be obliged to vote against his original constituents.

But the law provides no such remedy. The representative is not bound by law to vote in any particular direction, or even to vote at all. In the greater number of instances, he is guided by the opinions of three or four, or perhaps a dozen men, in his district, who are supposed to be influential and popular, and who stand for the strongest interest. He will and may consult them, and by a private or open compact he may be in honor bound to do so; but he does not legally represent them, more than he represents the minority in his district, or any one citizen in it who has, or has not, voted for him.

If it were true that the law-making power is conferred upon the representative by those who create the majority in his district, then it is also true that the entire system is an ingenious deception. But the supposition is idle. I am represented whether I vote or not. Sickness does not deprive me of my liberties; a broken limb des not disfranchise me, I am at liberty to vote or not as I please, and I may

bind myself by an honorable compact with any person to vote for him, provided he will engage to sustain a certain policy. The voter at the polls, like the voter in the Senate or the House, is free, and cannot be restrained from voting as he will, except by considerations of a private and social character. The national interest of every man, woman, and child in his district is in charge of the representative. Of course, the liberty and rights of the alien and the minor, of the child and the woman, are as much a part of Republican freedom as those of the voter. A voter is said to be "made a freeman" by being legally admitted to the polls,-a ridiculous phrase! He is no more than permitted to exercise a function of choosing, a function fixed, nay, invented by law,—and who ever heard of any persons having an increase of liberty, by being permitted to do this or that? In a word, we hold that the liberty of the representative and the liberty of the voter rest upon the same f undation, and that one is restricted like the other only by compacts of honor. These compacts may. indeed, be binding and imperative, but they are none the less free of the law.

The above arguments may be arranged in a logical order, as follows:

1. The representative is bound by a principle of duty, to take care of every interest of his district, whether of aliens, women, minors, or citizens. To deny this were to disfranchise the minority, and to deprive the non-voting population of the benefits of representative (or free) government.

2. He is also bound by a principle of honor, to keep his pledges to the majority by whose opinion he was elected.

3. This principle of honor, or of the observance of a compact, cannot be made to infringe upon the duty of the representative, and in giving his pledges to those who aided in electing him, (or in creating his majority,) he is not supposed to bind himself to commit an act of treachery to his country or to his district. No such compact can be made, and, if made, is not valid.

4. If any elector or voter exacts a pledge from the candidate, he is himself a party to that pledge, and if he changes his own opinion, he of necessity releases his representative. We see no reason, therefore,