CHAPTER XXII

ORGANIZED LABOR AND ORGANIZED CAPITAL

Organization of Capital a Justification of Trade Unionism. Capital Follows the Lead of Labor. Principles, Purposes, and Tactics those of Labor Unions. The General Strike and the General Lockout. The Sympathetic Strike and the Sympathetic Lockout. Disciplining the "Non-Union Employer." Internal Dissension in Organizations of Employers. Less Loyal than Workingmen. Labor Unions not Opposed to Unions of Employers. "The Recognition of the Union" of Employers. Advantage of Concerted Action on both Sides. Employers' Associations Unincorporated. Hostile Employers' Associations and the "Un-American Institution of Trade Unionism." Insurance against Strikes. Peace between Organized Labor and Organized Capital.

PERH

ERHAPS the fullest recognition of the power and necessity of trade unions is furnished by the organization of employers. Just as labor was obliged to organize in order to secure fair terms from capital, so employers have found it advantageous to form themselves into associations in order to adjust their relations with their workmen.

In the matter of organization workingmen took the initiative and trade unions originated before associations of employers. In fact, the trade unions were largely instrumental in calling employers' associations into being. This earlier formation of trade unions was due to the greater feeling of solidarity and brotherhood among wage earners, and the unorganized employers found themselves at a disadvantage in their dealings with their organized workmen. The first associations of employers, like the first associations of workingmen, were temporary in character and intended to meet special emergencies. Gradually, however, employers learned a lesson from their workmen, and groups or associations of manufacturers and other employers became a fixed institution. Many of these associations enforced discipline by securing from each member a deposit of funds and by fining some for disobedience to their rules and indemnifying others for

losses incurred in strikes declared against them. In many other ways the associations of employers pursued tactics which had been a feature of trade union policy. In the case of a threatened dispute between one of their members and his workmen, the associations of employers investigated it and decided upon the justice and wisdom of his position and whether or not they would support him in his contest. In other cases, where an attack was made upon a single firm, all other members of the association were ordered to lock out their employees, whether or not there were grievances against these employees. Instead of the system of picketing and boycotting adopted by workingmen, the associations of employers occasionally resorted to the blacklist, sending notices broadcast for the purpose of preventing the employment of striking or locked-out workmen; and while employers now frequently criticise union men for applying opprobrious epithets to nonunionists who, during a strike, have entered the field and taken away their means of livelihood, the jealousy and hatred aroused among employers when a concern turns traitor resolves itself into curses as loud and as deep.

In one respect associations of employers are stronger than trade unions. The former have the advantage of greater wealth and therefore greater power of resistance, and by reason of their restricted numbers, can act with more secrecy than organizations of workingmen. Notwithstanding these advantages, however, the associations of employers, when they are not a trust or a monopoly, have invariably proved to be weaker than associations. of workingmen. They have had the same or even greater power of disciplining the non-union or “scab” employer by expulsion or otherwise, and they have been able to use the power of ostracism to reënforce pecuniary penalties, but in spite of this, these associations have frequently broken down or been entirely debilitated by internal dissensions and trade jealousies. Whatever employers may say about the irresponsibility and unreliability of workmen and trade unions, it cannot be denied that the superior strength of trade unions, even without funds, over associations of employers with all manner of financial backing, is due to the fact that the workingmen show better

faith and more honor in their dealings with one another than do employers in their associations.

Unions should not adopt an antagonistic policy towards organizations of employers, unless such organizations show themselves distinctly and unmistakably hostile to labor. It is, of course, natural that where trade. unionists are assailed they should endeavor, as far as possible, to limit the power and avert the blows of their assailants; but in a general way the trade union, in the matter of friendliness to employers' associations, sets an example to the employers which the latter could advantageously follow. There are many employers who refuse to deal with trade unions because they render labor more formidable and, possibly, more exacting, even though they realize that the effect of trade unionism is also to make the men more reasonable and more conservative. Trade unions recognize that an association of employers is better able to combat them than a number of individual competing employers; but they also recognize that the association is, as a rule, more responsible, more conservative and better disposed than the individual employers of whom it is composed. The incentive to oppress labor is less strong and less direct. It is an undoubted fact that many an employer would be willing to do things in his own shop or mine which he would hesitate to submit as a proposed plan of action to the members of his association. In many cases, organizations of employers can, by the very fact of their association, make concessions to their workmen which none of the individual employers could separately have made. It frequently occurs that no one employer will raise wages because of the competition of other employers, whereas if all are united into a single organization, it is possible for them to make this concession simultaneously.

In stating that trade unionists should not adopt an antagonistic attitude toward organizations of employers, it is not meant that they should not take such means of defense against aggressive organizations as they may deem fit and proper. Where an association of employers is formed which has for its object the rooting out or crushing of trade unionism, the unions

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would be perfectly justified in meeting attack with attack. If an organization specifically urges that "employers' associations set about the task of pulling up root and branch the un-American institution of trade unionism as at present conducted," it may fairly be said that it does not invite and will not receive the hearty cooperation of trade unionists. I do not believe that any such association, even if formed with an avowedly hostile policy toward unions, will, in the long run, do any thing but good for the trade union movement. An association of employers that does not recognize the essential merits and advantages of trade unions, but seeks to destroy or injure them, will sooner or later be confronted with the absolute undesirability and impossibility of the attainment of its aims and will either change its attitude. or cease to exist. Some of these organizations, instituted originally for the purpose of "fighting labor," have been persuaded by the logic of circumstances into adopting at first a tolerant and, finally, a distinctly friendly attitude.

In many cases the hostility of associations, as of individual employers, is concealed under the guise of a plan or program apparently for their own protection, but really directed against labor organizations. For some time past, there has been considerable talk in capitalistic circles of a system of strike insurance by which employers could be insured against, and compensated for, the losses occasioned by strikes. This is, of course, merely an extension of the general idea of insurance. The plan has been recommended by a number of newspapers, including several insurance journals, and according to the public press it appears that a company has already been organized for the purpose of insuring employers against strikes.

Three arguments may be urged in opposition to such a plan: first, that it is impracticable; second, that it would fail to fulfill its purpose; and finally,

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1 Quoted from the Annual Report of the President of the National Association of Manufacturers of the United States of America, April, 1903. Its President, Mr. D. M. Farry, goes on to say that the attack should be made not against "unions in themselves" but against modern trade unionism.

that it would probably lead to unfairness and to evils worse than those which it sought to remedy. A company of this nature would have to be mutual, since if it were a company for profit, it would be perfectly possible for adverse unions to destroy it if they so desired. Whether it were mutual or not, however, there would always be dissension, as between employers in various trades. A hardware store does not desire to assume the same risk against fire as a manufacturer of chemicals or the owner of a powder mill; and the stove manufacturers, who have had hardly a strike for twenty years, would not be willing to insure against strikes on the same basis as the building contractors. There would be constant internal trouble with regard to the fixing of assessments and premiums and the determination of both the physical and moral risks. As in fire insurance, many risks are refused, because the proprietor is believed to be willing to burn down his own place, so it would always be necessary to exclude from strike insurance men who would wish to have strikes and be compensated for them. Many men who would not commit arson would willingly incite strikes at their own works, and it would be precisely those industries and precisely those employers who were most fractious and strike loving who would most desire insurance. When one imagines the effect of such a strike as the anthracite suspension of 1902 upon an insurance company of this character, however large its capital, the utter impracticability of the plan will be realized. At the first call for assessments the membership of the company would rapidly disappear. Moreover, such an organization, if hostile to labor, would necessarily be secret, since otherwise its members could be punished by strikes or possibly ruined by boycotts. Even if such an insurance company were practicable, it would not work for social equity, because it would tend to support strong rather than just employers.

Trade unions are not averse to an insurance of employers of one trade by employers in the same trade, since in this development they see nothing but an association of employers banded together for mutual defense and