houses, or engaging in baseball games and other sports. The breaker boys, many of them for the first time in their lives, enjoyed an uninterrupted holiday, and play took the place of work. From the very start, a number of miners felt the pinch of want, but their needs were relieved by the generosity of their neighbors, and the spirit of brotherliness and reciprocal help for a long time prevented any suffering.

In 1901 the engineers, firemen, and pumpmen had desired to strike ́owing to the excessive hours which they were obliged to work. These men were employed for twelve hours a day, and on alternate Sundays, when the shift changed, they were compelled to work uninterruptedly for twenty-four hours. The United Mine Workers of America had promised that if they postponed their strike, the organization would assist them, and accordingly, in the early part of June, the engineers, firemen, and pumpmen were called out upon strike.

Much unjust criticism has been directed against the officials of the Mine Workers, and especially against myself, for calling out the steam men. We were accused of attempting to "hold up" the operators, and it was claimed that the steam men, in striking, deserted their posts of duty and engaged in a sympathetic strike with the miners. The truth, however, is that the pumpmen, engineers, and firemen were called out in their own interests absolutely, by their own request, and for the sole purpose of removing grievances against which they alone complained and against which some of them had inaugurated an independent but unsuccessful strike the year before. The position which they held was not a post of duty, but a post of contract. The obligation of the steam men to the companies was not like the relation of soldiers to the army in which they enlist or sailors to the navy of which they form a part, but was merely a contractual relation which might be terminated at the will of either party, there being no agreement between the steam men and the operators, obligating them to work for any given period. Had the operators desired to reduce wages, they would have locked out the steam men without compunction, and the right to strike should have been

frankly conceded to the steam men when they desired to better their conditions. It was realized that to call out these men suddenly and without sufficient notice to the companies, would mean the destruction of many valuable properties by the flooding of the mines. Consequently, the steam men were not called out for some time, ten days warning being given to the operators in order that no calamity might ensue. The steam men were ordered to strike only in case their own deniands were not granted, and no provision was made that the demands of the miners themselves should be conceded before the steam men returned to work.

By

As the strike progressed, the public evinced a keen interest in its outcome, and attempts were made at intermediation by various public-spirited citizens. Marcus A. Hanna, United States Senator from Ohio, was especially active in this direction. In the course of several months no stone was left unturned to bring the operators to a fitting sense of their responsibilities to the public, but in these endeavors, Senator Hanna, as well as the National Civic Federation, which was also active, failed completely. the early part of June the price of coal began to rise and consumers began to complain. Under the direction of President Roosevelt, Carroll D. Wright, United States Commissioner of Labor, went to New York where statements as to the causes and the status of the strike were made to him by the railway presidents and myself. The report of Commissioner Wright justified in part the demands of the men, but was not made public until much later, and no action was ever taken upon it.

When the strike was declared, on the 15th of May, many of the anthracite mineworkers believed that help would be forthcoming from their brothers in the bituminous fields. About 150,000 men and boys in the anthracite regions had been thrown idle by the strike, and these, together with the miners of West Virginia, who were also on strike, constituted one-half of the membership of the national union. It was therefore hoped by many of the anthracite workers that the bituminous men might be called out in order, by means of a general suspension of mining throughout the country,

to force the hand of the operators. The President of the United Mine Workers of America is compelled, according to the constitution, to call a special convention upon the demand of any five district organizations. When, therefore, I received requests from five districts, I issued a call for a national convention of all mineworkers to meet in Indianapolis upon the 17th of July.

By the time of the convocation of the Indianapolis convention, distress had already begun to show itself in the anthracite region. Many of the men, who, two months before, had entered the strike in high hopes, had long since been reduced to their last penny and had pawned or sold all their small valuables. Many of the strikers, especially among the foreign element, had gone to other parts of the country, or to Europe, but large numbers still remained, and these now began to feel the pangs of hunger. But the question uppermost in the minds of the men was the winning of the strike and the manner of assistance they should receive from the soft coal men. The Lituminous miners were in full sympathy with the sufferings of their brothers in Pennsylvania and were willing to make any sacrifices in order to aid them. Some of the delegates argued that a complete suspension of all miners throughout the country would mean speedy victory for the anthracite men, since the railroads would be obliged to surrender as a result of the lack of fuel. The men in the soft coal fields would undoubtedly have struck in sympathy but for one deterring fact.

This fact was the existence of a contract between them and the bituminous operators. For several years the miners and operators had met in joint convention, agreed upon a scale of wages, and fixed conditions of employment, the contracts so made being binding for the period of one year. To strike in July, 1902, the soft coal miners would have been obliged to break contracts which did not terminate before April, 1903. It was argued, as in the steel strike of 1901, that where the life of the union was at stake, no agreement should be regarded, since the duty of self-preservation takes precedence over the sanctity of any contract. It was further held that a mere suspension of work without a demand for a change in wages or con

ditions would not be a strike in the technical sense of the word, since by the contract the men were obliged to work only at a certain rate of pay, but not for any particular number of days. It was also represented that the attack of the operators upon the anthracite miners was but the beginning of a concerted effort to disrupt the entire organization of mineworkers and that, if the anthracite men lost their strike, it would be but a short time before the bituminous miners would also be crushed. The miners, however, did not pay the slightest attention to what they regarded as quibbles, but insisted. absolutely upon the maintenance of their agreements. Even the anthracite delegates adopted this view, believing that it was the part of honor for the soft coal men to stand by their contracts, though as a result the union might be shattered and destroyed. In my speech before the convention I took the same stand and urged the men not to break their agreements. The honor of trade unionism, based on the willingness of organized workingmen to make sacrifices in order to maintain the absolute integrity of their contracts, was at stake, and the friends of organized labor looked anxiously to Indianapolis for signal proof that workingmen consider their contracts sacred. By a unanimous vote the convention, consisting both of anthracite and bituminous delegates, decided that the existing agreements should be kept inviolate and that no strike should be declared in violation of the annual contracts, no matter how strong the temptation or how pressing the need.

CHAPTER XLIV

THE INTERVENTION OF THE PRESIDENT

The Bituminous Miners Provide the Sinews of War. Over Two and One-half Million Dollars Contributed. Delay and Discontent. The Critical Period. The Shenandoah Riot. The Campaign of Vilification. Exaggerated Accounts of Violence. The Coal and Iron Police. Sympathy of the Public. Contributions to the Strike Fund. The Price of Coal Rises. Suffering of the Poor. The Operators Still have "Nothing to Arbitrate." The Lengthening of the Contest. The Irresistible Force and the Immovable Body. The Intervention of the President. The Third of October. The Operators still Unyielding. The Calling out of the Pennsylvania National Guard. The Surrender of the Operators. The End of the Strike.

THE

HE Indianapolis convention did not result in a suspension of work by the soft coal miners, but action was taken that proved of greater benefit. The delegates voted unanimously against a sympathetic strike, but voted with equal unanimity to extend moral and financial support to the anthracite mineworkers until such time as victory should be achieved, or the mine owners should agree to submit the matters in dispute to the arbitrament of an impartial tribunal.

By this action the various members of the United Mine Workers of America in the bituminous coal fields pledged themselves to subscribe weekly either one dollar or ten per cent. of their weekly earnings to a fund to be used for the assistance of the anthracite strikers; and the officers of the organization agreed to pay thirty-five per cent. of their salaries for the same purpose. In this manner, during a period of sixteen weeks the enormous sum of $2,645.324.42 was collected, and there can be no doubt that the contributions would have continued at an increasing rate, had the termination of hostilities been delayed. The bituminous miners alone paid into the relief fund an average of from $7.00 to $16.00 per man, and at no time was there any disposition to withhold from the anthracite mine