art of drawing may teach either by precepts or by real models, that is, living subjects, or by ideal models conceived by the sculptor or painter.

What has been said in this chapter will suffice to explain the nature of political precepts or maxims, and the relation which they bear to scientific theorems. In the following chapter, we shall investigate the application of maxims in actual practice, and shall afterwards proceed to the consideration of real and ideal models.

163

CHAPTER XX.

ON THE APPLICATION OF POLITICAL THEORIES

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AND MAXIMS IN PRACTICE.

S we have already seen, political theory, containing the condensed results of a wide experience, and formed by proper deductive processes from an induction of facts, merely expresses general truths. It lays down propositions respecting matter of fact, past or present; but it prescribes or enjoins nothing. In order to give to theory a monitory effect, in order to transmute a general truth into a rule of action, the theorems of science must be converted into the precepts of an art.

Now, in the case of politics, this conversion has not been systematically made. The science and art have in general been combined in the same treatise; and rules of action are often conveyed rather by implication than in a distinctly preceptive form. Moreover, many political inquiries have been limited to the determination of general facts, and the results have never been examined with a view of casting them into the form of maxims. Hence, in considering the application of maxims to practice, we shall be unable to confine ourselves strictly to rules reduced into a monitory form; we must include all general propositions intended to have a didactic or doctrinal use; and we must assume that the reduction of the theorem into a maxim is sometimes made by the practitioner himself, at the time when he is called upon to deliberate and act.

We have remarked in the previous chapter, (') that the antithesis of theory and practice is not identical with the antithesis of science and art. Theory and science may, indeed, be considered as identical: but there is a wide difference between art and practice. By an art, we now understand a system of rules

(1) § 5, p. 155.

of conduct founded on scientific principles: by practice we mean the actual cases and occurrences to which the rules of the art are intended to be applied. Art is intermediate between science and practice; but both science and art are conversant about generals, whereas practice is made up of singulars. On the other hand, science takes no note of practice; whereas art thinks only of the practical application of its rules.

When, therefore, we speak of the application of theory to practice, we must not overlook the fact that there is a stage between the two, which, though it may not receive much attention, is a necessary part of the process. Before theory can be applied to a practical case, the theoretical truth must be converted into a general maxim. Whether the practical politician finds the maxim ready made to his hand, or is compelled to perform the conversion for himself, the change of form must be effected before the practical conclusion can be drawn. It is important to bear in mind this intermediate stage, for it will probably be found that much of the censure which is cast upon political theorists, and much of the distrust with which the practical application of political theories is regarded, is owing, not to any defect in the theory itself, but to the defective manner in which general maxims have been derived from the theory, either by speculative writers in their closet, or by men of action in the hurry and excitement of business. With respect to the practical result, it is indifferent whether the error is produced by a false theory or by an unsound maxim deduced from a true theory. Practical error is equally the result in the individual case. But for the amendment of our practice in future, it is very material to detect the true cause of the error; and hence it concerns us to know whether the defect is in the theory, or in the rule of conduct constructed from the theory; whether it is in the science or the art. For example, if any rule in the art of navigation for determining the ship's place at sea by an observation of one of the heavenly bodies, were to prove erroneous, it would be important to ascertain whether the error arose from some defect in the astronomical theory upon which the rule was

founded, or whether the astronomical law was correctly laid down, but the process founded on it was defective.

§ 2 Whenever, therefore, any case arises in which the politician seeks to guide himself by a general proposition, he must first consider whether there is any maxim ready for his use; if not, he must perform for himself the preliminary process of converting the theory into a preceptive form. This latter process, on account of the irregular cultivation of the art of politics, he will, in a large number of instances, be compelled to perform himself.

As soon as he is in possession of the maxim, however obtained, which he considers suited to his case, he will have constructed a syllogism: the major premise of which is the general maxim, and the minor premise is the particular case; from which the practical conclusion follows. The following may serve as an example of the complete operation:

General Maxim.

When a customs duty is so high that it produces extensive smuggling, it ought to be reduced.

Particular Case.

The existing customs duty in country A, upon tobacco, or brandy, or hardware, &c. [as the case may be], leads to extensive smuggling.

Practical Conclusion.

Therefore the duty in question ought to be reduced.

When the application of political theorems or maxims to practice has been reduced into this form, the difficulty of the case has been overcome. The sagacity and judgment of the practician is shown in constructing the syllogism. When it is once constructed, its logical force is apparent to every one. The difficulty consists in bringing together the premises. The minor premise must be formed by an intelligent observation and selection of material facts, and it must then be placed under a maxim, the universality of which must be corrected so as to suit it to the circumstances of the given case. It is the subsumption

of the minor under the major premise which really constitutes the originality, or invention, of the argument.

§ 3 Now, in preparing a proposition for application to practice, in order to form his general maxim, the politician must, in the first place, consider what is the manner in which universal propositions require to be modified with reference to actual cases.

Every political theorem or maxim may require circumscription, with reference to an actual case, on either or both of the two following grounds: 1, There may be internal variations. of the phenomena in the subject itself; or, 2, their natural or spontaneous operation may be disturbed by external causes. We have already had occasion to advert to both these reasons for limiting the extent of theoretical propositions in politics;(2) but the present is the proper place for a full inquiry into them.

It rarely happens in politics that a cause, even uncounteracted, operates universally in the same direction; it rarely happens that any affirmation can be made as to men's actions, which is independent of the casual varieties of individual character and disposition. It may perhaps be laid down universally that punishment tends to deter, and reward to encourage; that a duty upon a commodity tends to raise its price; that the issue of an inconvertible paper money tends to raise the prices of commodities; or that wrongs inflicted on foreign nations tend to provoke retaliation. In these and other instances the natural tendency, or nisus, of the cause is nearly constant in one direction; though (as we shall see presently) that tendency or nisus may be overcome by external resistance. But in the subject-matter of many, perhaps of most, political aphorisms, there is a variation through a long series of degrees; the majority of instances occurring about the middle of the scale, while the minority are scattered over the intervals towards both extremes, growing rarer as they recede from the middle. In a subject such as this, a general affirmation may be constructed which represents its prevailing and ordinary character, and which, though not universally true,

(2) Above, ch. ix. § 19; ch. xiii. § 4; ch. xv. §§ 8, 9.