is applicable to the majority of instances. A characteristic obtained by this method is analogous to a numerical average of a number of unequal magnitudes. (3) Now, when from a proposition thus established we make a general maxim, in order to apply it to a particular case, we must consider whether the case in question is one of those which form the nucleus of the subject, or is one of the extreme and rare cases which are grouped around it. For if it be in the latter position, the application of the maxim to it, without correction, will inevitably lead to practical error. Suppose, for example, that we seek to apply to a given absolute monarch, or to a given popular assembly, maxims of conduct founded on the following propositions : Absolute monarchs prefer bad men to good. Popular assemblies prefer flatterers to honest advisers. Now, these propositions may have been generalized from a wide induction, and this induction may be supported by many collateral reasons, showing that the circumstances in which an absolute monarch or a popular assembly is necessarily or naturally placed, are likely to produce the preference in question. Yet, the peculiar character of a given absolute monarch, or popular assembly, may be such as to lead them to have no strong preference either way, or even to prefer good men and honest advisers to bad men and flatterers. It is remarked by Tacitus, as a general truth, that the next successor to an existing ruler, whether by inheritance or otherwise, is regarded by him with suspicion and hatred.() A similar remark has been sometimes made in modern times. Yet, even if we admit that this proposition represents the ordinary state of things, it is highly probable that cases will occur in which an existing ruler may regard his presumptive successor with favour and affection, may rejoice in (3) See above, ch. xv. § 10. (4) Otho believed himself to be an object of jealousy and dislike to Galba, as being his probable successor. Suspectum semper invisumque dominantibus, qui proximus destinaretur.'-Hist. i. 22. At the death of Germanicus, the Roman people said: Displicere regnantibus civilia filiorum ingenia.'-Ann. ii. 82. Compare the popular belief at the death of Augustus, that he chose Tiberius as his successor in order to cause the people to regret his loss.-Ann. i. 10. See also Plutarch, Demetr. 3. his good qualities, and may select him on account of his popu Before, therefore, a practical propositions is applied to a larity and fitness for the station. (5) maxim founded on either of these particular case, it is necessary to examine the nature of that case, and to observe whether the character of the principal persons concerned agrees with the average and ordinary character represented in the inductive proposition. Without this precaution, we incur the danger of applying the rule to the exception, and of acting on a maxim, the ground of which is accidentally absent. General propositions of this sort may be considered as presumptive truths, which are more likely to be applicable than not to be applicable to a given subject. Hence we may start, in our analysis of the subject, from the presumption, and examine whether it does not apply: we may call on the specific instance to show cause why it should not come under the general rule. If this inquiry should lead to the result that the case is not exceptional, we may proceed, without further hesitation, to frame a practical maxim out of the theoretical proposition. If, on the other hand, a negative result should be obtained, and the case should appear to be exceptional, we must abstain from acting upon a general presumption which is founded only upon a preponderance of cases, and is false in the actual instance. General aphorisms of this sort resemble that class of legal presumptions which are not conclusive, and which admit of proof to the contrary; but until that proof is afforded, hold good in the individual case. Thus it may be a presumption of law that a man is innocent until he is proved to be guilty, according to the maxim, 'Quilibet præsumitur bonus, donec probetur contrarium.' It may be a presumption of law that possession is primá facie evidence of property. But these presumptions have only (5) 'Nec tellus eadem parit omnia. Vitibus illa Ovid, De Art. Am. i. 757-60. a provisional validity; they are susceptible of refutation; and they are only applied to a given case until they are rebutted by special proof. The propositions respecting forms of government are, for the most part, presumptions of this nature. They represent, not the invariable tendency of a uniform cause, which would always act if unresisted, but the average and predominant character of the subject. We must, therefore, be careful to examine the subject, and observe its individual peculiarities, before we bring it under a practical maxim, formed out of the general theorem. For instance, in reasoning upon the probable operation of despotism in any individual case, we must not omit to note the character of the absolute monarch, and the established practice of his government; without this precaution, we might confound the probable acts of a Tiberius or Nero with those of a Titus or Antoninus Pius; or those of a Nadir Shah with those of a Joseph II. or Frederick the Great. The same precaution is necessary in estimating the probable acts of an aristocratic or democratic government in a given case. General presumptions, though they may assist the judgment, cannot supersede the necessity of investigating the facts of each case. General presumptions as to the operation of political forms and institutions may be falsified in either one of two ways. When the average and predominant operation of the form or institution is good, it may be frustrated by the badness of those who use it. They may, from their moral defects, convert wholesome food into poison. Thus a popularly elected legislative body may be described as being in general a beneficent institution; yet, in a particular case, its operation may be so perverted by the factiousness, violence, corruption, or timidity of its members, as to render it productive of more evil than good. Other institutions of a refined nature, which work well in a highly civilized community, may, in a less civilized country, be found to fail, on account of the want of skill, intelligence, patience, and habits of sustained attention and mutual forbearance in the persons upon whom their execution depends. They are like tools of a refined make in the hands of a clumsy or ignorant artisan. Again, the average and predominant operation of the form or institution may be bad, but its defects may be supplied by the moderation, good sense, or skill, of those who use it. Thus Aristotle says: 'Some oligarchies continue to exist, not because the form of government is stable, but because those in power bear themselves well, both towards the other members of the governing body, and those who are not members of it. As to the latter, in not wronging them, and in admitting into the governing body such as are of an aspiring disposition; in not wounding the ambitious in their feelings of honour, and not affecting the multitude in their purse as to the former, in treating them on terms of equality.'() Again, he remarks, elsewhere: 'It has often happened that the constitution according to law is not popular, but that, from the character and practice of the ruling persons, it is administered in a popular manner; and in other cases, that the constitution has been according to law of a popular tendency, but in its working and conduct is rather oligarchical.'(7) Bodin, likewise, in his treatise, De Republicá, observes that a few nobles may either administer the state according to popular principles, or may govern it in an aristocratic spirit.() The probable operation of any institution or law can only be determined by considering how persons of an average character will act when they are placed under its influence. If, however, the persons in question deviate, either wholly or to a great extent, from this average character, the generalization will fail with respect to them. The presumption, though true generally, may be overruled by special evidence to the contrary. Hence it is most important to bear in mind the nature of such presumptive theorems, and not to confound a provisional and primá facie (6) Polit. v. 8. (7) Ib. iv. 5. (8) ii. 2, p. 295. The following remark of Montesquieu is too absolute, but it recognises the fact, that the evil tendency of laws may be remedied by the goodness of the persons who administer them: Il y a peu de lois qui ne soient bonnes, lorsque l'état n'a point perdu ses principes; et comme disoit Epicure, en parlant des richesses, ce n'est point la liqueur qui est corrompue, c'est le vase.'-Esprit des Lois, viii. 11. with a conclusive and absolute proposition. Such presumptions apply in the first instance to an individual case, and throw on the inquirer the burden of proof that the fact is otherwise; but they do not conclude the question. To suppose that they have a greater force would be equivalent to reading the legal maxim as to guilt without its final clause, 'Quilibet præsumitur bonus, donec probetur contrarium,' and therefore acting on an inflexible and uniform maxim, that every man is innocent. § 4 We now pass to the second reason, stated above, for the circumscription of a universal political theorem or maxim, with reference to the circumstances of an actual case: viz., that the natural or spontaneous operation of the phenomenon may be disturbed by external causes. The instances which we have already examined, are where, from a peculiarity of character, the persons conducting the affairs of a government are not likely to act according to general presumptions derived from average experience. In these instances therefore, the cause is not set in motion; there is no attempt at action, no unsuccessful endeavour, which an antagonist influence counteracts. The instances which we are about to consider, are of two sorts: viz., where a political cause is either counteracted or aggravated by some external agency. A cause acting freely may be disturbed in either of these ways. Its natural influence may either be arrested or retarded; or it may be stimulated and increased. We will first examine the former of these disturbing influences. Where a cause is set in' motion,' and acts constantly in one direction with a steady and uniform nisus, its operation may sometimes be suppressed by an overwhelming opposition, sometimes repressed and weakened, though not quite overborne, by impeding and retarding forces. Thus the fear of punishment is a cause constantly acting in the same direction. Its tendency is always to deter; but this tendency may be counteracted in each actual case by a variety of circumstances which sometimes weaken and sometimes nullify its operation. Freedom of trade tends constantly to facilitate supply, and thus to produce cheap |