be misapplied. The rules of the art of arithmetic are sound and scientific, but they do not guarantee the unskilful or careless accountant against errors of computation.

Hence we see that the practical man who applies a theory, and then complains of its falsity, may be himself the author of the error which he condemns. His application may be made without a proper allowance for the generality of scientific expression, and for the necessity of taking account of the facts neglected in the theory, but present in the actual case. The maxim has been deduced from the theoretic principle without due limitation and correction, and the result obtained by the combination of such maxim with the particular case is consequently erroneous. But this error must be imputed to the framer of the practical syllogism, and of the maxim, which serves as its major premise— not to the theorist, who merely laid down an abstract truth.

203

CHAPTER XXI.

ON PRACTICAL EXAMPLES, AND REAL MODELS, IN POLITICS.

§ 1 WE have already remarked, that the art of politics may

convey its lessons, not only by general maxims or

precepts, but also by selecting certain models, and holding them up for imitation. These models-like the models in a school of design-may be either real or ideal: they may be either actually existing objects, or they may be ideal works conceived and executed by an artist.

In either sort of models-whether they be real or ideal the subject recommended for imitation is individual; but it is generalized in the imitation, by being proposed as a type, which many persons endeavour to copy. In this way, a single object, used as a model, obtains the force of a general precept. Identical copies of the same original are multiplied, instead of numerous cases being brought under the same rule.

Before, therefore, we can complete our survey of the art of politics, we must investigate that mode of political reasoning, which consists in the imitation of real and ideal models for practical purposes, and attempt to ascertain the conditions for its proper conduct. For the present, we shall confine ourselves to

the former class.

§ 2 The field of politics, like other departments of human knowledge, has been the subject of much unsound theory. Where the space was so vast, the facts to be ascertained so numerous, the survey so comprehensive, the passions and the interests involved so powerful and active, it was inevitable that many rash and unsuccessful attempts at theory would be made, before scientific truth could be determined. All the methods for the investigation of causation in politics, and for the establishment of general truths, which have been indicated in this treatise, have been violated by different theorists. It was not to

be expected, when every branch of human science, as well physical as mental, has been tainted with unsound speculation-when there have been false theories in astronomy, mechanics, optics, hydrostatics, chemistry, physiology and medicine, not less than in metaphysics and ethics, that politics alone should escape.

The wildness of many political theories, together with the absence of due caution in their conversion into maxims of conduct, and in their practical application, has created a fear and distrust of all scientific generalities, (') and has induced practical politicians to resort in preference to the direct argument from experience. Hence, the persons engaged in political action, and in the contemporary political discussion, fall generally into two classes, the former consisting of those who hold some body of doctrine or theoretical principles, or rationale, with respect to the measures which they promote (called by the French, doctrinaires), the latter proclaiming no set of theoretical principles, but professing to be guided exclusively by experience, and calling themselves practical men. These two classes correspond with the two sects of the Dogmatici or Rationales, and the Empirici, in the ancient schools of medicine.(2) The Dogmatici did not reject the lessons of experience, though they held that modes of treatment must be founded on some intelligent design;(3) but

(1) ́In all matters of taste and criticism (says Mr. Payne Knight), general rules appear to me to be, like general theories in government and politics, never safe but where they are useless; that is, in cases previously proved by experience. A rule implies a general negation; and so limited and uncertain is human knowledge, in all subjects of this kind, that it never can reach every possible case, nor make any general assertion which will not be liable to many exceptions.'-On the Principles of Taste, part ii. ch. 2, § 109, 110.

(2) Concerning these two sects, see Celsus de Med. præf. ad lib. i. Compare Sprengel, Geschichte der Arzneikunde, vol. i. p. 428, 610. Gregory, in his Conspectus Medicinæ Theoretica, generalizes the distinction: 'Medici vero est, cognitâ naturâ et causâ morbi, judicare quid mutationis requiratur, ut morbus in sanitatem mutetur. Hæc quidem est medicina rationalis sive Dogmatica. Est et altera, Empirica nimirum, quæ, missis hujusmodi ambagibus, sola remedia quærit et profert certâ et definitâ vi prædita ad certos morbos delendos.'- 72. See above, ch. vi. § 10.

(3) Neque vero inficiantur experimenta quoque esse necessaria; sed ne ad hæc quidem aditum fieri potuisse, nisi ab aliquâ ratione, contendunt.' -Celsus, ib.

they maintained that a knowledge of the causes of disease, and of the bodily functions, was necessary for the art of medicine. The Empirici, on the other hand, repudiated all inquiry into the causes of disease which were not apparent upon the surface; they professed to be guided solely by the experience of modes of treatment which had been made the subject of actual trial and experiment, and they sought no other guide for medical practice than the success or failure of former remedies. Hence they excluded anatomy, physiology, and pathology from their course of medical studies,(*) confining themselves to an empirical treatment of therapeutics. This view of medical science has descended to modern times since the renovation of medicine, there has, on account of the abuse of theory, been often a tendency to a close and servile adherence to the results of mere experience, and the medical art has run the risk of degenerating into a mere study of materia medica and remedies, (5) a tendency which

:

(4) Dr. Greenhill, in his article on the Empirici, in Dr. Smith's Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Antiquities, remarks that their rejection of anatomy, physiology, and pathology as useless studies would of course (at least in the opinion of modern physicians), prevent their ever attaining any higher rank than that of clever experimentalists, though it must not be denied that materia medica is indebted to them for many valuable drugs.' (5) Non est dissimulandum, theoria medica scriptores hominum patientiâ multum abusos esse, et sibi aliisque nuper et olim miris ineptiis imposuisse. Hinc factum est, non prorsus sine rationis specie, ut multis, cum medicorum, tum aliorum hominum, persuasum sit, omnem theoriam medicam prorsus vanam et futilem esse, et non modo non prodesse, sed revera multum nocere, animum nempe a verâ notitiâ, quæ solâ, ut volunt, experientiâ discatur, fictâ scientiâ avocando. Parum certe

medici profecerunt hactenus, et parum, ni fallor, profecturi sunt in posterum, qui, nullâ adhibitâ ratiocinatione, solâ experientiâ semet occupaverint. Plurimas res novas hoc modo facile didicisse potuerint, sed sibí aliisque pariter inutiles, nec unquam scientiam medicam provecturas; scilicet quarum rationem, et ad usum medicum accommodationem, ignotas esse oporteret. . . . . Aliud vero vitium, ab hoc omnino diversum, et ex diverso prorsus fonte derivatum, medicinam nunc corrumpit, graviusque, ut opinor, periculum minitatur. Rejectâ auctoritate, rejectâ fere omni ratiocinatione atque doctrinâ, medici tandem artem salutiferam augere et locupletare susceperunt, solis observationibus et experimentis quorum nullum esset dubium. Hinc credula fides, et insana admiratio medicamentorum, quotquot vel ipse deceptus, vel alios decipere cupiens, quisquam in medium proferret, summisque laudibus tolleret, et audacter assereret certo certis morbis remedio fuisse.'-Conspect. Med. Theoret. introd. pp. xvii. xxv. xxxix.; ed. 10, 1836.

With every advance in pathological science will the art of therapeutics lose its merely empirical character, and become more and more rational; that is, the rules laid down for the treatment of disease will be less and

has, doubtless, been promoted by a misconception of the Baconian precepts respecting experience. Bacon, however, in placing science on the basis of experience, intended not to narrow, but to strengthen its foundation. He wished not to diminish the extent of the edifice, but to build it on the solid rock. Accordingly, he points out distinctly the error of those who rely on a mere accumulation of particulars, and grope their way by a blind empiricism. The following is his aphorism on the respective errors of the doctrinal and empirical schools: Qui tractaverunt scientias, aut Empirici aut Dogmatici fuerunt. Empirici, formica more, congerunt tantum, et utuntur: Rationales, aranearum more, telas ex se conficiunt: apis vero ratio media est, quæ materiam ex floribus horti et agri elicit; sed tamen eam propriâ facultate vertit et digerit.'(")

Bacon's meaning is not the less clearly conveyed, for being couched in the figurative comparison of the ant, the spider, and the bee. Under the image of the ant, he condemns the mere collection of facts, applied nakedly and directly by the observer: under the image of the spider, he condemns the speculator, who spins cobweb theories out of his own brain, without checking them by the evidence of facts, and confronting them with the results of experience. By the example of the bee, he recommends that mixed process, which consists first in the discriminating selection of facts, and next in the conversion and elaboration of these facts into a systematic doctrine.

The feeling of the multitude towards superior knowledge and

less founded upon the results of a limited experience as to the efficacy of particular remedies in removing certain abnormal phenomena; and will have reference more and more to the nature of the morbid action which is indicated by the symptoms.'-Carpenter's Human Physiology, p. 3.

(6) Nov. Org. i. 95. The same passage, with a few trifling verbal variations, occurs in the Cogitata et Visa, vol. x. p. 499, and in the Redargutio Philosophiarum, vol. xi. p. 474-5. In the Apophthegms, No. 21, it appears in this form: He likewise often used this comparison: the Empirical philosophers are like to pismires-they only lay up, and use their store. The Rationalists are like to spiders-they spin all out of their own bowels. But give me a philosopher, who, like the bee, hath a middle faculty, gathering from abroad, but digesting that which is gathered by his own virtue.'-vol. i. p. 415.