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institutions and manners apparently real, the writer is able covertly to make recommendations, without delivering any express opinion. A similar advantage belonged to that class of compositions (such as the Lettres Persanes) in which an Oriental traveller describes the government and manners of Europe. These indirect ways of conveying suggestions, and of insinuating blame and praise, are, however, useless in countries where the press is free for the expression of opinion on political subjects, and in which the public is tolerant of political heresies.

Although some bold and original thinkers have shown a fondness for this class of compositions, yet the formation of ideal states seems to be characteristic of the infancy, rather than of the maturity of the human mind. Precocious children, gifted with an active fancy, often amuse themselves with these creations, and produce imaginary sketches of ideal countries with a fertility which seems scarcely to belong to so early an age. (158)

§ 29 We have inquired in a previous chapter how far universal propositions can be laid down with respect to the best form of government, and whether it can be said absolutely that monarchy, or aristocracy, or democracy, is the best constitution

pour y débiter adroitement, et sans aucun risque, un nouveau systême de gouvernement politique et de religion naturelle.' The free-thinking character of this work is adverted to in Morhof's Polyhistor, vol. i. p. 74; ed. 1747. He places it among the libri damnati. See, likewise, the remarks of Bayle, Dict. art. 'Sadeur': Ce tour là seroit assez bien imaginé pour tromper la vigilance des censeurs de livres, et pour prévenir les difficultés du privilège,' &c.

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(158) M. Mignet, in his Historical Notice of the Life and Works of M. de Sismondi, gives the following account of his early attempts at ideal legislation: He was of the same country which had produced Rousseau, and he came into the world at the moment of revolutions. Thus, when scarcely ten years old, the natural disposition for imitation in children had for its object the gravest subjects, and he amused himself in founding a little ideal republic with his young friends, among whom was the brother of Benjamin Constant. This was in 1783, and the amusements and sports of children already announced the future labours of men and fathers. Assembled in a little grove, where they had raised a monument to Rousseau, the little republicans had decreed, as was fit, that in their republic everybody should be virtuous and happy. Sismondi, without any ceremony, was ordained its Solon, and established this doctrine, at the end of a discourse of fourteen pages.-Essays from the Works of M. de Sismondi (London, 1847), p. 3.

for every community.(159) But between such propositions as these, and the model of a perfect state, there is the same difference as between abstract propositions respecting virtue, and the wise man of the Stoics-the one (to use Kant's language) is the idea, the other is the ideal.(160) The ideal of the perfect state can never be embodied in a description, without involving postulates destructive of its applicability to every real community which can ever exist. This impossibility is owing to the large scale upon which the problem is tried. In some cases, a difference of degree is as important as a difference of kind; and to these an ideal state belongs. When we have to deal with the whole sum of human interests, opinions, feelings, habits, and wants, as comprehended within the wide circle of the state, we incur the blame of barren and jejune abstraction, we make a mere shadowy and unsubstantial figure, in proposing an ideal model for imitation. We abstract from our imaginary commonwealth, until we reduce it to a mere skeleton, without the flesh, muscles, nerves, vessels, and organs, which constitute a living body.(161) But if we limit ourselves to a single function or operation of the state-if we take some definite subject of legislation, some single branch of administration or judicature, we no longer encounter the same difficulties; we may then be able to frame an ideal model, which can be usefully applied in practice, and which does not involve suppositions inconsistent with the reality of the case before us.

The progressive tendency of mankind, the habit of dissatisfaction with the present, the disposition to improve the actual

(159) Above, ch. xv. § 5 and 6.

(160) Tugend und mit ihr menschliche weisheit in ihrer ganzen reinigkeit, sind ideen. Aber der weise (des Stoikers) ist ein ideal, d. i. ein mensch der blos in gedanken existirt, der aber mit der idee der weisheit völlig congruiret. So wie die idee die regel giebt, so dient das ideal in solchem falle zum urbilde der durchgängigen bestimmung des nachbildes, und wir haben kein anderes richtmaass unserer handlungen, als das verhalten dieses göttlichen menschen in uns, womit wir uns vergleichen, beurtheilen, und dadurch uns bessern, obgleich es niemals erreichen können.' -Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, theil ii. abtheil. ii. b. ii. 3, abschn. 1.

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(161) For the more public part of government, which is laws, I think good to note only one deficiency; which is, that all those which have

condition of things, and to seek for an advance of civilization, is perpetually raising the question, whether something which is proposed would not be better than that which exists—whether what we have is the best possible.

Now, in attempting to solve the problem of the ideal best, we must first consider whether its data involve conditions dependent on laws of social phenomena and of external nature, or on matters of exclusively human contrivance. Nothing is easier than for us, in imagination, to reconstitute the order of the world, and to frame an ideal best, by altering the conditions of human existence. The idea of a golden age when man's body is as free from disease as his mind is free from sin-when the earth produces its fruits spontaneously—when there are no ploughs or ships-no gold or iron-no guile, no rivalry, no wars-is, as we know from experience, easily formed. By this ideal, the evil is extracted from human life, and a residuum of unmixed happiness—a maximum state of bliss-is left behind. (162) But in order to form this best possible state of things, we reverse the fundamental laws of human nature, and place ourselves in a fairy land of our own creation. After having virtually recognised the dualistic doctrine of the origin of evil, we blot out the maleficent Ahriman, and leave the influence of Ormuzd to operate uncontrolled. Such ideals may have a poetical charm, but they are devoid of all philosophical value. They are a coinage which may have an esthetical, but never a scientific currency. Evil, which is a part of the conditions of human existence, may be mitigated and reduced to a lower term, but cannot be extirpated. Man can diminish hunger, cold, and disease; he cannot extinguish them. He may lengthen the duration of life, but he cannot

written of laws, have written either as philosophers or as lawyers, and none as statesmen. As for the philosophers, they make imaginary laws for imaginary commonwealths; and their discourses are as the stars, which give little light because they are so high.'-Advancement of Learning, vol. ii. p. 295. The passage is less full in the Treatise de Augmentis, vol. ix. p. 82.

(162) In the happy valley of Rasselas, all the diversities of the world were brought together, the blessings of nature were collected, and its evils extracted and excluded.'-C. i.

abolish death. All ideals, therefore, which suppose a violation of the laws of human nature-which alter the foundation of societyare a mere sport of the imagination, undeserving of a moment's serious attention. Yet Plato says that the perfect state is an imitation of the reign of Saturn, and Fenelon describes Minerva as teaching Telemachus, that the glory of a virtuous king is to renew the golden age. (16)

On the other hand, when the matter under consideration is a positive institution, devised and established by man—as a representative system, judicial procedure, revenue-laws, police, military discipline, education, and the like an ideal may be framed which is better than the existing state, and which is within the limits of human power. What man has made, he can unmake-he can alter his own handiwork. Political institutions in this respect, as in others, are analogous to the works of the useful arts: these admit of being improved indefinitely by new inventions, conforming with the laws of nature.

Can it, however, be said that anything is best absolutely, either in politics or in the useful arts? Is there a best form of government, a best system of taxation or judicature, a best plan of military or naval discipline? Is there a best plough, a best knife, a best carriage, a best house, a best ship? Is it the business of any art or system to construct an ideal model of the best possible form of anything?

There is no doubt that it is practicable to establish degrees of goodness with reference to the ordinary and average circumstances in which the subject is placed. Thus, if we take the ordinary case of a ship-we may say that a ship of a certain build is better fitted to sail across the ocean than a ship of a certain other build. So, if we take the ordinary case of a court of justice, we may say that a court of a certain constitution is better fitted to try causes than a court of a certain other constitution. But when we come to actual practice, we find that best is a re

VOL. II.

(163) Above, § 21.

X

lative, not an absolute term. It implies the fitness of means to ends, and unless the end is given specifically, the means cannot be determined. That which is best under one set of circumstances is not necessarily the best under a different set; that which is the best ship for one purpose, may not be the best for another-a construction which is excellent for a river or a lake may be unfitted for the open sea, and the converse. A constitution of a court of justice, which may be excellent for one species of jurisdiction, may be unsuited to another.

It is the business of every art to consider what-under the average circumstances proper to be taken as the hypothetical conditions of an abstract problem-are the means best fitted for the attainment of its end. Thus, arithmetic teaches how to compute best; logic, how to reason best; rhetoric, how to persuade best; the art of education, how to teach best; architecture, how to construct the best houses; ship-building, how to construct the best ships; horsemanship, how to ride best; music, how to sing and play best; dancing, how to dance best; painting, how to paint best. (164) But when the time comes for applying these technical rules in practice, then there is a necessity for judgment; for precepts as to the best possible mode of doing anything are never absolute-there is, for this purpose, no inflexible exceptionless rule, no universal ideal model. The maxim merely raises a presumption in its favour, but circumstances may so differentiate the practical case as to render it inapplicable.

Thus, an ideal house may be better than an actual house, but circumstances of expense, comfort, health, or time, may render it prudent for a man to retain his actual house unaltered, or to make only slight alterations in it, rather than to pull it down to the ground, and replace it by a new house, built according to an ideal model of the best possible. In like manner, it may be advisable to acquiesce in an imperfect political institution, rather

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(164) Quoniam de oratore nobis disputandum est, de summo oratore dicam necesse est. Vis enim et natura rei nisi perfecta ante oculos ponitur, qualis et quanta sit intelligi non potest.'-Cic. de Orat. iii. 22.

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