than replace it by a new institution, framed on a model of ideal excellence. Expense, and other similar considerations, may be of weight; besides which, there is this important element in the practical problem of politics, which is wanting in the case of a house, that whereas the materials of a house are insentient, and therefore make no resistance to the change, the persons who are affected by the substitution of one political institution for another, and who are the necessary instruments for effecting the change, have habits and feelings, and therefore preferences and antipathies on the subject, and may, by their volition, frustrate the success of the measure.

§ 30 It may be observed, finally, that the problem of the best form of government is essentially constructive. Whether it be treated by supposing a perfect state as an individual model, or by a description couched in general terms, it supposes an ideal constitution, framed by the invention of the writer. On the other hand a positive, not a constructive, problem may be proposed, by taking governments which have, or have had, a real existence, and comparing their respective goodness. Hence, it may be possible to determine whether monarchies, or aristocracies, or democracies, as they have actually existed, have been most beneficial in their operation. Those, however, who speak of the problem of the best form of government, for the most part appear to mean, not the best which has ever existed, but the best which can be contrived and be conceived to exist.

Some political speculators-adopting the opinion expressed in the well-known lines of Pope-hold that forms of government are indifferent, and that no real security is to be derived from them. Unless this opinion be so qualified as to become nearly unmeaning, it may be treated as a paradox, unsupported by experience. The recent progress of political philosophy has, however, certainly tended to shake the exclusive importance attached by the earlier speculators to political forms, and to show that some of the most important political influences pervade all civilized communities, whether under a monarchical, an aristo

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cratic, or a democratic regimen. (165) The influence of forms of government may have been exaggerated, though it may still be important.

Another class of writers undertake to pronounce summarily which is the best form of government, by an appeal to experience. (166) Spinoza decides, on this ground, that absolute monarchy is the best government, (17) and Puffendorf says that the majority of writers have arrived at the same conclusion.(16) Calvin gives the preference to the aristocratic form, (169) while others have preferred the democratic. Some writers, again, have laid it down that there is no absolutely perfect constitution, (170) and that the best form of government cannot be determined.(17) The divergence of solutions of this problem has been

(165) See the remarks of M. C. Comte (Traité de Législation, liv. i. c. 15), who says that, in order to investigate the laws which cause the prosperity or decline of societies, it is unnecessary to inquire whether a law is democratic, aristocratic, or monarchical; and, consequently, that he need not take any notice of the different forms of government.-Tom. i. p. 286.

(166) See Conring, Diss. xx. De Optimâ Republicâ;' Op. vol. iii. p. 823: Burlamaqui, Principles of Politic Law, part ii. c. 2.

(167) Tract. Pol. c. 6, § 7.

(168) Puffendorf, vii. 5, § 22. In Plato, Politicus, c. 41, it is said that monarchy, combined with good laws, is the best government.

(169) Inst. iv. 20, 8.

(170) Zachariä, vol. iii. p. 28.

(171) Puffendorf (ib.) considers the problem as indeterminate, and refers to the words of Marcellus Eprius, in Tac. Hist. iv. 8: Se meminisse temporum quibus natus sit, quam civitatis formam patres avique instituerint; ulteriora mirari, præsentia sequi; bonos imperatores voto expetere, qualescunque tolerare.' It is also treated as doubtful in Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. ii. 3.

Sir W. Temple likewise holds that the best form of government can not be determined.-Works, vol. ii. p. 50, 8vo. Burlamaqui concludes his discussion of the question, which is the best form of government, in the following words: If it should still be asked which government is best, I would answer,that all good governments are not equally proper for all nations; and that, in this point, we must have a regard to the humour and character of the people, and to the extent of the states.'-Principles of Pol. Law, part ii. ch. 2, § 46. Several books, in which the problem of the best form of government is discussed, are enumerated in Krug, Philos. Handwörterbuch, art. Staats Verfassung.'

great; but whenever it should hereafter be treated, the distinction between the historical and the constructive problems should be carefully borne in mind, and the inquirer should clearly inform his reader whether he merely attempts, by giving a general expression to past facts, to compare the advantages of different forms of government, or undertakes to form an ideal government better than all others.

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CHAPTER XXIII.

ON POLITICAL CONDUCT.

§ 1 IN the preceding chapters we have investigated the distinction between the science and art of politics.

We

have shown that the art of politics lays down general maxims and rules to be applied in practice, and we have further analyzed the process by which general maxims are applied to actual cases. It now remains for us to examine more fully the subject of political practice and for this purpose we will begin with an inquiry into the nature of political conduct.

All political conduct is resolvable into a series of political acts-a political act being an act done by a person in a political capacity, that is to say, in some capacity directly affecting the state. Now it will be found that in every political act, the practical problem consists in the proper choice between several alternative courses of action. In all cases where a person is called upon to act in a political capacity, he is presented with an option between different lines of conduct; and it is by the wise exercise of his power of selection that the problem presented to him is to be rightly solved.

The alternatives of action thus presented to a person are sometimes confined within definite, and it may be narrow limits. They may, for example, be dictated to him by law, or by a usage equivalent to law; or they may be imposed by an overwhelming necessity, or offered by a negotiating party. At other times, they depend only upon the circumstances and character of the subject-matter, and may, to a considerable extent, be framed according to the views and inclinations of the agent. For the proper elucidation of the subject, it will be necessary to consider each of these cases separately.

§ 2 The principal end of all legal regulations is to limit human action, and to impose certain restraints upon conduct.

This purpose is accomplished by presenting to the agent some painful alternative if he does not shape his course in accordance with the law. The law, therefore, principally manifests its operation in determining the daily conduct of each member of the community in his private capacity. It is not, however, confined within these bounds-for it extends also to many acts done in a public capacity. Whenever any act is done in execution of an existing law, or when the proceedings of deliberative assemblies, courts of justice, or other legally-organized bodies, are conducted according to legal or customary rules, the choice of the agent is limited within certain prescribed alternatives. In all action which is to be carried on in conformity with law, the legal provisions prescribe certain paths, along one of which our journey must be taken. Thus, it is the object of the rules of pleading to raise a certain issue for the decision of the court; it is the object of the regulations for the proceedings of deliberative bodies that a member should propose a certain question, which can be decided in the affirmative or negative; and all the steps taken by the contending parties must be made in conformity with the fulfilment of these conditions.

The alternatives presented to the politician may, again, be limited, not by law, but by a moral necessity. Such, for example, are the terms prescribed by a victorious enemy; or in peaceful negotiation, where the parties are on an equality, the terms of a treaty may be tendered as an ultimatum by one party, and the other party must either accept or refuse them. Similar negotiations may take place within a state, between members of the legislature, or of the government, or a particular executive department, and the representatives of a body, or party, or persons having a common interest in some matter. In a case of this sort, offers may be made which practically limit the choice to certain prescribed alternatives.

In times of dangerous insurrection and internal commotionof famine, invasion, or any other great national calamity or defeat-a government may find its freedom of action narrowed