Moscow during the winter; or, 3, to make a winter retreat towards France. He might not be able to judge with certainty which of the three courses Napoleon would prefer; but it was sufficient for his purpose to leave the enemy to chuse one of them, and when the step was taken to act accordingly.

$9 The choice between alternative lines of conduct, which we have been considering, involves the question of free will and necessity and it is therefore incumbent upon us, before we conclude the present chapter, to advert to this subject.

The nature of the will, with respect to the freedom of its determinations, may be the subject of metaphysical science. It may be treated simply with reference to psychological grounds, of which mode of treatment, the essay of Brown upon cause and effect affords an example. Again, it may form a part of ethical science, and may be considered in connexion with the subject of moral responsibility. Lastly, it may be made a theological question, and be viewed in reference to the predestination of human actions by Divine providence.

Now, whichever of these points of view the inquirer may adopt, they equally lie beyond the confines of political science and political practice. All political discussion, whether speculative or practical, constantly assumes that man is a self-moving agent, that he determines his own will, that he has the power of chusing or rejecting any given course of conduct, and that he is responsible for his own acts. All the proceedings of a government rest upon the same assumption. They imply that men's conduct can be influenced by punishment and reward; that punishment will deter, and reward encourage. All deliberation likewise assumes, that the choice between alternative courses of action is free-that we are not impelled to any one course by an overruling necessity, and that our conduct does not follow in the track prescribed by a blind fatality.

The argumentative difficulties connected with the subject of human volition belong rather to metaphysical than to political, or even to ethical inquiry.(7) Like many other questions which

(17) See Mill, System of Logic, b. vi. c. 2 (Of Liberty and Necessity').

involve merely a description or statement of facts with respect to the operations of the mind, the nature of the will admits of wide divergences of opinion. But the controversies thus arising do not, in general, give birth to equally wide divergences of practice they confound and perplex the understanding, rather than mislead men's practical judgment. They are like a logical puzzle, which we may be unable to solve, but which does not influence our belief,-or like the tricks of a conjuror, which we cannot explain by natural causes, but which we nevertheless do not believe to be supernatural.

If there be any inaccuracy of language connected with the subject of the will, which may be considered as likely to lead to practical error in politics and jurisprudence, it is that which describes as involuntary a voluntary act, accompanied with pain. Moreover, the question of liberty, considered with reference to government, is of primary importance in political discussion. Liberty is a word with which a variety of stimulating associations are connected; it is of constant occurrence in practical politics; and some speculators have regarded it as the end of all political government. For these reasons, it will be fitting that we should inquire what is the nature of political liberty or freedom, and what is meant when it is said that political liberty is abridged or restrained.

§ 10 A man is said to be free when there is nothing which hinders him from doing or forbearing what he desires to do or forbear. That which hinders a man from doing what he desires to do, is called restraint: that which hinders a man from forbearing what he desires to forbear is called constraint, or force. Restraint, is when there is an obstacle which the physical power, or the will, cannot overcome, as, when a man is bound hand and foot, he is restrained from exercising his will to move; when a man is imprisoned, he is restrained from exercising his will to go out of prison. Force, is when there is a power which overcomes the desire of inaction, and renders motion necessary, as when a man is dragged or carried to prison. In the one case, the exertion of the will is frustrated when the agent desires to exert it;

in the other, its want is supplied when the agent refuses to exert it. (18)

Liberty, therefore, in its primitive sense, implies three things: 1, power or capacity of action or forbearance; 2, absence of an obstacle which the will cannot overcome, when there is a desire to act; 3, absence of superior power compelling bodily motion, when there is a desire to abstain from action. The word liberty is used in this strict acceptation when it denotes the absence of imprisonment, in the sense of being at large. Thus, we say that a captive has regained his liberty when he escapes from the place of his confinement; for we signify by it the absence of physical restraint. This is the original and appropriate meaning of liberty; and, according to this use of the term, a man is said not to have his liberty, or not to be free, when either force or restraint is actually applied to him. But, in a metaphorical sense, it is used when pain, to be inflicted by the application of force or restraint, is threatened, if a certain act is not done or forborne, the force or restraint being employed, not to compel the agent to do or forbear the act, but to inflict pain upon him for not doing or forbearing it. In this case, an agent is said not to have the liberty, or not to be free, to do or forbear the act, although there is no physical impediment which prevents him from doing it, nor any force which prevents him from forbearing it, his choice being determined by a painful motive, viz. by the fear of suffering greater pain if he does what he desires than if he does not. Thus, it would be said that a man had not the liberty of going into a certain field, if, the gate being left open, he was liable to a heavy penalty for walking in it, for although there is no physical impediment which prevents him from entering it, yet, if he enters it, he will suffer pain, inflicted by force or restraint. According to the strict sense of liberty, a man would only be deprived of the liberty of entering a field if it were surrounded by an impenetrable fence, or if the only accessible approach were strongly guarded by armed men.

Be

(18) On this subject, see Tucker's Light of Nature, vol. iv. p. 140. Compare Godwin's Political Justice, b. 4, c. 7.

tween these two cases, there is the same difference as between an army being unable to gain a post after many fruitless attempts, and their abstaining to attack it from the fear of being defeated by superior numbers. In like manner, a man is said not to have his liberty to remain at home, if he is commanded by the government to serve in the army or navy, in which case no force is used to carry him, nor restraint to keep him from home, but an infliction of pain is threatened if he does not serve as he is commanded. If a man is gagged, his liberty of speech is taken from him in the original sense of the word; if he is threatened with death in case he speaks, it is taken away in the secondary and more usual sense. A man in prison has not his liberty in the first sense-a prisoner on parole has not his liberty in the second.

In every case, therefore, where a person is determined by the fear of punishment, either to do an act which he desires to leave undone, or to abstain from an act which he wishes to do, he is said not to be a free agent, and to be deprived of his liberty. In strictness of speech, no command can restrain from an act or force to an act, and consequently no command can take away liberty; (19) but as a command operates by the fear of its sanction, and as the will is determined contrary to the agent's wish by a painful motive, which bears an analogy to restraint or force, a command is said to restrain, and to force, and to take away liberty.

It follows that liberty, in its primary and proper sense, signifies a power of acting without being restrained, or a power of forbearing without being forced; and that, in its secondary and derivative sense, it signifies a power of doing or forbearing cer

(19) Chorus. Where the heart joins not, outward acts defile not.
'Sams. Where outward force constrains, the sentence holds.

But who constrains me to the temple of Dagon,
Not dragging? The Philistian lords command-
Commands are no constraints. If I obey them,
I do it freely, venturing to displease

God for the fear of man, and man prefer.'

Samson Agonistes, v. 1368-74.

In these verses, Milton describes the nature of constraint, and of the

freedom of the will, with metaphysical precision.

tain acts, without apprehending an infliction of pain, by means of restraint or force, as a punishment for those acts or forbearances. Political liberty, therefore, is merely an exemption from political duties, and is a purely negative term. But inasmuch as this exemption from duties would be unavailing, unless it were accompanied with the possession of legal rights, the term liberty is often used as a compendious expression to denote both the negative and positive facts-the exemption from legal duty, and the rights which guarantee that exemption, and render it effectual. It is in this sense that we speak of the 'liberties of an Englishman.'

Properly speaking, whatever a person does without the actual application of compulsive physical force, he does voluntarily. In the eye of the metaphysician, the man who pays a fine under the sentence of a court, or who walks to the scaffold, performs a voluntary act. But in popular language, a man is not a free agent, whose will is pressed against his inclination by a painful motive. In order to constitute free agency, the ordinary usage of words demands that the desire and the will should concur. Hence, a person who has to chuse between two painful alternatives-for example, to be shipwrecked, or to throw his goods overboard-is said to act involuntarily. And for a like reason, a person who is precluded from a certain course by the fear of legal sanctions, is said to be deprived of his political liberty.

These remarks will suffice to elucidate the nature of political liberty, so far as it concerns the question of political conduct. As all conduct, whether political or not, has a prospective bearing, and is made upon certain anticipations of coming events, we will next attempt to ascertain how far the politician, both scientific and practical, is capable of determining the future.