at note 2, is inapposite for the same reason. It is immaterial whether the state judgments were obtained before or after the effective date of the Extension Act. The effort of the appellant is to enjoin future proceedings for eviction after the acquisition by the landlord appellees through valid judgments of what the district court characterized as "vested rights." Federal regulation of future action based upon rights previously acquired by the person regulated is not prohibited by the Constitution. So long as the Constitution authorizes the subsequently enacted legislation, the fact that its provisions limit or interfere with previously acquired rights does not condemn it. Immunity from federal regulation is not gained through forehanded contracts. Were it otherwise the paramount powers of Congress could be nullified by "prophetic discernment." The rights acquired by judgments have no different standing." The protection of housing accommodations in defense-areas through the price control acts may be accomplished by the appellant notwithstanding these prior judgments. The preliminary injunctions should have been granted.

99 11

Only a word need be said as to the contention that § 265 of the Judicial Code forbids an injunction against the execution of state judgments by state officers.13 A contention

gency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, or the Stabilization Act of 1942, as ainended, or of any regulation, order, price schedule, or requirement under either of such Acts: ..."

11 Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 391; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467; Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Co. v. Schubert, 224 U. S. 603; Calhoun v. Massie, 253 U. S. 170; Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 294 U. S. 240, 303-11; Guaranty Trust Co. v. Henwood, 307 U. S. 247, 259.

12 Wright v. Union Central Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 502, 509; Paramino Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 309 U. S. 370.

13 Judicial Code § 265:

"The writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a State, except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy."

FRANKFURTER, J., dissenting.

331 U.S.

was made before this Court in similar cases last term that § 265 forbade a federal injunction to stay such proceedings in any court of a state. The argument was not accepted. We thought that § 205 (a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 created an exception to § 265." No specific mention was made in these opinions as to whether state officers who were parties in the case could be enjoined. However, we do not see any ground, under § 265 of the Judicial Code, to differentiate as to stays against a sheriff or a constable or stays against the parties to the litigation. We think the District Court had power to stay the sheriff and constable.

Judgment reversed.

MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, dissenting.

In considering the scope of our appellate jurisdiction, great weight should be given to the strong policy of the Congress, ever since the Judiciary Act of 1891, to keep the docket of this Court within manageable proportions for the wise disposition of causes by the ultimate judicial tribunal. That consideration applies also to the few Acts, passed since the creation of the circuit courts of appeals, which allow cases to come here directly from the district court where issues of great public importance, such as the constitutionality of legislation, are at stake.

In Dahnke-Walker Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, this Court gave an expansive content to review, as a matter of right, of State court judgments where is drawn in question "the validity of a statute." Our jurisdiction was held to cover review of a finding of unconstitutionality in the application of a statute to a particular situation, though the statute is otherwise left in full force and effect. While, for the reasons set forth in the dissent of Mr. Justice

14 Porter v. Lee, 328 U. S. 246; Porter v. Dicken, 328 U. S. 252; Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503, 510.

100

FRANKFURTER, J., dissenting.

Brandeis, I have never been reconciled to the soundness of that decision, I accept it. But I do not feel obliged to extend its scope beyond its requirements.

There is an important difference between review of State court decisions and decisions of the district courts. The latter are subject to review as a matter of course by the circuit courts of appeals. They are not dependent on review by grace through certiorari, as would be comparable State decisions except for the Dahnke-Walker doctrine. I do not feel myself required by the Act of August 24, 1937, to hold that direct appeal lies to this Court whenever a district court finds unconstitutional an application of a statute to the circumstances of a particular case. It is one thing not to allow final determination of the fate of a federal statute to be delayed until a decision of a district court can go through a circuit court of appeals and then reach this Court. It is quite another thing to bring here directly from a district court every decision indicating unconstitutionality in application, no matter how restricted its incidence. Of course this does not mean that direct review of district court decisions by this Court would be available only for cases that involve "the constitutionality as a whole" of a challenged statute. The Act of 1937 refers explicitly to invalidation "in whole or in part." Although this is made explicit in § 3 of the Act, the scope of direct review here, on the score of unconstitutionality, ought not to be different under different sections of this Act. A direct appeal is called for only when a district court strikes down, in whole or in part, that which Congress has unequivocally written. It is unwarranted when all that is in issue is whether the allowable scope of what Congress has written excludes a particular situation.

The immediate case gives point to these general observations. The incidents of a judgment are not the same

FRANKFURTER, J., dissenting.

331 U.S.

in all the States. The effect of this Act upon judgments in the different States may thus involve consideration of the procedure of a particular State. These are hardly questions of the kind which led to the authorization, by the Act of August 24, 1937, of direct review where a district court's decision "is against the constitutionality of any Act of Congress." 50 Stat. 751, 752.

Nor should it be decisive of this Court's exceptional jurisdiction on direct appeal from the district courts that the Government is the litigant. Like other litigants the Government at times attaches importance to a particular case out of all proportion to the more comprehensive factors that should control this Court's jurisdiction. We cannot be blind to the fact that review here is sometimes pressed in response to commendable administrative earnestness which fails, however, to take fully into account the demands of this Court's business. Moreover, it was not the interest of the Government as such which moved Congress to grant direct appeals from the district courts. By the Judiciary Act of 1925 Congress narrowly confined direct review here of district court decisions regardless of the character of the litigant, and the extension of such review by the Act of 1937 should be strictly confined.

I would dismiss this appeal and remand the case to the Circuit Court of Appeals. See Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. Oklahoma Packing Co., 292 U. S. 386, 392, and Phillips v. United States, 312 U. S. 246, 254.

Syllabus.

FLEMING, TEMPORARY CONTROLS ADMINISTRATOR, v. MOHAWK WRECKING & LUMBER CO. ET AL.

NO. 583.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.*

Argued April 1, 1947-Decided April 28, 1947.

1. The President's Executive Order No. 9809, issued under § 1 of the First War Powers Act of 1941 after the cessation of hostilities but before the termination of a technical state of war, validly consolidated the Office of Price Administration and three other agencies into the Office of Temporary Controls. Pp. 113-119.

(a) The war powers are adequate to deal with problems of law enforcement which arise during the period of hostilities but do not cease with them. P. 116.

(b) Section 1 of the First War Powers Act, authorizing the President to redistribute functions among executive agencies, authorizes the creation of a new agency and the consolidation within it of functions and powers previously exercised by one or more other agencies. P. 116.

(c) The authority conferred upon the President by § 1 of the First War Powers Act was not limited to the transfer of functions from agencies existing when the Act became law. P. 117.

(d) An incumbent of an office "existing by law," within the meaning of § 2, at the time of the passage of the First War Powers Act who has once been confirmed by the Senate need not be confirmed again in order to exercise powers transferred to him by the President from another officer appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. P. 118.

2. Under Rule 25 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Temporary Controls Administrator was properly substituted for the Price Administrator in pending enforcement proceedings after the lifting of most price controls-there being "substantial need" for continuing and maintaining enforcement proceedings previously

*Together with No. 512, Raley et al., trading as Raley's Food Store, v. Fleming, Temporary Controls Administrator, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.