DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA.-Cheque payable to donor-Validity.-C. made a donatio mortis causâ of an unendorsed cheque payable to C. or order: Held, a valid donatio mortis causâ, there being no difference between such a cheque and an inland bill of exchange or promissory note. (Chitty J., July 30, 1884.) Clement v. Cheeseman, 27 Ch. D. 631; 54 L. J., Ch. 158; 33 W. R. 40. EASEMENT.-Light-Rebuilding-Ancient lights-Intention to abandon—Enlargement— Iujunction—Damages.—A building containing ancient lights was pulled down, a record being made at the time of the position of the ancient lights. It was afterwards rebuilt, the windows comprising in some cases the whole, in others portions of the area of the old windows, but materially altered and enlarged: Held, that there had been no abandonment of the ancient lights by the owners, and the Court, in an action by them to restrain the erection of a large building opposite which would have darkened such ancient lights, granted upon the balance of convenience an injunction in preference to taking an undertaking from the defendants to pull down if required to do Per Cotton L.J. A new window replacing an ancient light to be entitled to continuance of the right to light must include substantially the area of the old light; it is not enough for it to be coincident with a portion of it. (C. A., May 1, 1884.) Newson v. Pender, 27 Ch. D. 43.

EDUCATION.-School Board-Taking land compulsorily-Collateral arrangement for exchange-Statutory powers.-A School Board served on R. a notice to treat for the purchase of land belonging to him for the erection of a school, having at the time of the notice accepted (subject to the approval of the Education Department) an offer by B. to exchange part of the land so to be acquired from R. for a piece of B.'s. B. had undertaken to make a road out of the piece given him by the Board in exchange, and to dedicate it to the public; and this scheme would be very beneficial to the new school: Held, on an application by R. for an injunction, that the Board were acting bonâ fide, and within their statutory powers. (Chitty J., Aug. 11, 1884). Rolls v. London School Board, 27 Ch. D. 639; 33 W. R. 129; 51 L. T. R. 567. ELECTION.-Gift of stock belonging to Wife-Legacy to Wife-Equity against Wife's representatives.—A husband by his will gave his wife a legacy of 3000l. and bequeathed the residue of his estate, comprising inter alia all his money in the public funds standing in his name jointly with his wife, to trustees upon trust to pay the income to his wife for life, and afterwards for his brothers and sisters absolutely. A sum of 7000l. was standing at the testator's death in his name jointly with his wife: Held, that though his wife was absolutely entitled by right of survivorship to the 7000l., she must be put to her election, and if she claimed the 7000l. surrender the legacy of 3000l. to compensate the disappointed residuary legatees. The same equity arising out of the doctrine of election would apply to the wife's legal personal representation. (Kay J., June 28, 1884.) Carpenter: Carpenter v. Disney, 51 L. T. R. 773

Married Woman-Compensation-Restraint on anticipation.-No question of election arises in the case of a married woman where the property which ought to be sequestrated to make compensation under the doctrine of election is property which she is restrained from anticipating. (Chitty J., July 14, 1884). Re Wheatley, Smith v. Spence, 27 Ch. D. 606; 54 L. J., Ch. 201.

Married Woman-Compensation-Restraint on alienation-Doctrine of election.—A married woman will be put to her election though the only property available to make compensation to the person disappointed by her election is property which she is restrained from alienating. Under the doctrine of election the Court sequesters the interest of the refractory donee: it does not call upon the donee to assign it. (Kay J., Nov. 19, 1884.) Re Vardon's Trust, 28 Ch. D. 124; 54 L. J., Ch. 244; 33 W. R. 297; 51 L. T. R. 884. EVIDENCE.-Hearsay-Infant defendant—Declaration by deceased father-Pedigree.—In an action for goods sold and delivered, defendant pleaded infancy: Held, that an affidavit made in a Chancery suit to which the plaintiff was not a party, by the defendant's deceased father, as to defendant's age, was inadmissible, the question at issue not being one of pedigree, so as to take it out of the rule excluding hearsay evidence.

EVIDENCE (continued).

(C. A., Aug. 11, 1884.) Haines v. Guthrie, 13 Q. B. D. 818; 53 L. J., Q. B. 521; 33 W. R. 99; 51 L. T. R. 645.

Solicitor and Client-Communications between-Fraudulent design—Privilege.— Communications made by a client to his solicitor in furtherance of any criminal or fraudulent purpose are not privileged though the solicitor was ignorant of the purpose in view. In determining whether the evidence ought to be received or rejected, the Court must consider in each particular case whether the facts make it probable that the communications were for a criminal or fraudulent purpose or not. (C. C. R., Nov. 20, 1884.) Reg. v. Cox and Railton, 14 Q. B. D. 153; 54 L. J., M. C. 41. EXECUTOR - Administration action-Costs-How borne-Realty descending by forfeitureRealty specifically devised.—Real estate devised but descending to the testator's heir-atlaw by reason of a forfeiture is not applicable as descended real estate for payment of the costs of administration in priority to freeholds and leaseholds specifically devised and bequeathed. (Pearson J., Dec. 1, 1884.) Hurst v. Hurst, 28 Ch. D. 159.

Administration action-Deficient estate—Annuities—Apportionment—Legacy DutyCosts-Legatee's action.-A testator's estate was insufficient to pay in full two annuities given by him. One annuity was not liable to legacy duty, the other was given free of duty: Held, that the right mode of apportioning the annuities was to deduct from the whole fund available for their payment the legacy duty payable on the annuity liable to duty, as abated, and then to apportion the fund between the annuitants, as in Heath v. Nugent (29 Beav. 226). A legatee plaintiff in an administration action is entitled to costs as between solicitor and client out of the estate, though it is insufficient for payment of legacies in full. (Pearson J., Aug. 8, 1884.) Re Wilkins, Wilkins v. Rotherham, 27 Ch. D. 703; 33 W. R. 42.

Administration action-Voluntary Settlement-Payment into Court-Costs-Creditors. The trustee of a voluntary settlement, which was void against creditors, on the settlor's death paid the fund, amounting to 580l., into Court. In a beneficiary's action for administration the debts were found to be 504l.: Held, that the clear balance of 761. had been properly ordered to be paid to the trustee, though it left the creditors only a dividend after payment of the costs of the action. (V.C. B., Aug. 4, 1884.) Re Turner, Turner v. Turner, 51 L. T. R. 497.

Administration of Assets-Unregistered Judgment-Priority-Devisee-Right of retainer.-An unregistered judgment creditor has no priority in the administration of assets over simple contract creditors under 23 & 24 Vic. c. 38. s. 3. A devisee or heir-at-law who is also a simple contract creditor has no right of retainer out of the proceeds of sale of the real estate, such proceeds being made equitable assets by 3 and 4 Will. IV. c. 104. Secus if he is a specialty creditor and the heirs are bound. (C. A., July 25, 1884.) Re Illidge, Davidson v. Illidge, 27 Ch. D. 478; 53 L. J., Ch. 991; 33 W. R. 18; 51 L. T. R. 523. Administration of Assets-Domiciled Foreigner-English Creditor-Foreign Creditor -Priority.-English creditors of a deceased domiciled foreigner are not entitled to be paid out of the English assets in priority to foreign creditors. (Pearson, Dec. 8, 1884.) Re Klæbe, Kannrenther v. Geiselbrecht, 28 Ch. D. 175; 54 L. J., Ch. 297.

Administrator de son tort-Share in Company-Beneficial interest-Transfer-Cause of Action.-B. an administrator was entitled as sole next of kin of A. his intestate to a share in a gas company, he died without dealing with the share, and his administratrix sold the share without taking out admininistration de bonis non to the estate of A. All A.'s debts were paid: Held, that B.'s estate being entitled to the beneficial interest in the share no action could lie at the suit of a person who had taken out administration de bonis non to A.'s estate against the bank for permitting a transfer of the share. (North J., Nov. 28, 1884.) Clark v. South Metropolitan Gas Co., 54 L. J., Ch. 259; 33 W. R. 160.

Devastavit Lâches of Creditor-Misleading Executors.-C., a creditor of a deceased farmer, forbore for ten years to press the executors for payment. The executors under the trusts of the will carried on the farm, and lost nearly all the assets: Held, on the evidence, that C. had not misled the executors either by conduct or express authority, VOL. I. X

EXECUTOR (continued).

and that the executors were liable for a devastavit. Mere lâches does not deprive a creditor of his right to sue for a devastavit. (Chitty J., July 30, 1884.) Re Birch, Roe v. Birch, 27 Ch. D. 622; 33 W. R. 72.

Retainer-Administration Judgment-Debt of Record-Specialty Debt.-A creditor in an administration action obtained an order for payment of his debt by the executor. After the order the executor, who was also a mortgagee under a mortgage made by the testator, claimed to retain the mortgage debt out of the assets: Held, that as a specialty creditor, he was not entitled to do so, so as to give himself priority over the judgment creditor. (V.C. B., June 21, 1884). Re Hubback, International Marine Hydropathic Co. v. Hames, 51 L. T. R. 189.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE.-Omitting to impeach-Lâches-Statute of Limitations.—A creditor allowed a deed fraudulent under 13 Eliz. c. 5 to remain unimpeached for ten years, and afterwards brought an action to set it aside: Held, that lâches could not be imputed to him, for no lapse of time short of that fixed by the Statute of Limitations would bar his legal right to set aside the deed. Secus if the deed were impeached on equitable grounds. (C. A., July 28, 1884.) Re Maddever, Three Towns Banking Co. v. Maddever, 27 Ch. D. 523; 53 L. J., Ch. 998. GIFT.-Transfer of Stock into Joint Names-Intention of Benefiting-Resulting TrustIrrevocable Gift.-A widow of eighty-six transferred 6,000l. Consols into the joint names of herself and B. her godson, but without B.'s knowledge. There was evidence to show that she had made the transfer with a view of benefiting B. She afterwards married again and required B. to retransfer the stock: Held, upon the evidence, that there was no resulting trust for the widow, but an irrevocable gift by her, and that B. was not compellable to retransfer. (Pearson J., July 1, 1884.) Standing v. Bowring, 27 Ch. D. 341; 54 L. J., Ch. 10; 51 L. T. R. 591; 33 W. R. 79. HIGHWAY.-Repair—Extraordinary Traffic-Stone Wagons-Agricultural Road.-The S. highway board brought stone for the repair of their roads from a hill quarry opened in 1882 down an agricultural road repairable by the T. board. The road was a steep one and necessitated the wheels of the wagons being chained in the descent, which tore up the road and had greatly increased the cost of repairs since 1882: Held, that there was evidence to justify the justices in finding the traffic to be 'extraordinary traffic' within s. 23 of the Highways and Locomotives Amendment Act, 1878, and that the T. board were entitled to recover from the S. board the extra expenses occasioned thereby. (Nov. 28, 1884.) Tunbridge Highway District Board v. Sevenoaks Highway District Board, 33 W. R. 306.

Repair-Highway in Borough-County Authority-Contribution—' County.'—The highway authority of a borough claimed, under sect. 13 of the Highways and Locomotives Amendment Act, 1878, from the county authority, one half of the expenses of maintaining a disturnpiked road passing through the borough: Held, that though the word 'county' by the Highway Act, 1862, excludes boroughs for the purposes of that act, 'county' must in sect. 13 of the Highways and Locomotives Act be treated as a geographical description, and that the county authority was liable to contribute. (C. A., Dec. 8, 1884.) Corporation of Owen Darwen v. J. J. of Lancaster, 54 L. J., M. C. 51; L. T. R. 739.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.-Alimony-Inalienability-Lunacy of Husband.-A husband who had been ordered under a decree for a judicial separation to pay 60l. a year to his wife as alimony became lunatic, and the Lords Justices in Lunacy made an allowance of that amount to the wife out of the lunatic's estate. The wife assigned the annuity, and the assignee presented a petition for payment of the dividends to him: Held, that whether considered as alimony or an allowance by the Lord Justices in Lunacy, the annuity was equally inalienable by anticipation. (C. A., July 14, 1884.) Re Robinson, 27 Ch. D. 160; 53 L. J., Ch. 986.

Divorce-Adultery of Petitioner-Respondent guilty of Rape-Discretion of Court.— A wife petitioned for dissolution of her marriage by reason of her husband having been convicted of rape and committed various acts of cruelty. Adultery had been proved

HUSBAND AND WIFE-(continued).

against the wife in a previous suit for dissolution by the husband, but the husband had afterwards cohabited with her: Held, that the Court had jurisdiction to grant a decree nisi notwithstanding the wife's previous misconduct. (July 8, 1884.) Collins v. Collins, 9 P. D. 231; 53 L. J., P. D. & A. 116; 33 W. R. 170.

Divorce-Decree Nisi-Rescission-Reconciliation.-Decree nisi for dissolution of marriage made on the petition of the wife, rescinded at the instance of the petitioner, upon evidence that she and her husband were reconciled, and that he had notice of the application. (June 17, 1884.) Troward v. Troward, 32 W. R. 864.

Divorce-Desertion-From when dating-Adultery.-A husband absented himself from his wife on the plea of business from 1880, visiting her only at long intervals. In 1884 the wife discovered that he had been living during the time with another woman: Held, that the wife was not entitled to a dissolution on the ground of the husband's adultery and desertion for two years. Semble the desertion commenced from the time when the wife discovered the adultery. (Aug. 9, 1884.) Farmer v. Farmer, 9 P. D. 245; 53 L. J., P. D. & A. 113; 33 W. R. 169.

Judicial separation-Order for, by Justices-Aggravated Assault.-Where justices had made an order for a judicial separation under 41 Vict. c. 19. s. 4, on the ground of an aggravated assault by the husband, the Court on appeal refused to discharge the order because, in addition to ordering a weekly payment by the husband, the justices had inflicted a nominal penalty as for a common assault. (Butt J., Nov. 11, 1885) Wood v. Wood, 33 W. R. 323.

Marriage settlement—Antenuptial parole agreement—Bankruptcy of Husband—Statute of Frauds-Wife's equity to a settlement.-An intended husband before the marriage, which was anterior to the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, verbally agreed that a sum of money standing to the credit of the intended wife at a bank, should belong to her for her separate use, but no transfer to trustees was made. For some years after the marriage the wife continued to receive the interest. The husband afterwards filed a liquidation petition. Held, that the settlement being void under the Statute of Frauds for want of writing, the trustee was entitled to the money subject to the wife's equity to a settlement, if any. (Nov. 24, 1884.) Re Whitehead, Ex parte Routh, 33 W. R. 230.

Marriage settlement-Nullity of Marriage-Transfer of settled property.—Where a wife's property had been settled on her marriage and the marriage had been annulled on the ground of the husband's impotency, the Court ordered the trustees of the settlement to re-transfer the property to the wife free from the trusts. (Dec. 16, 1884.) Addington v. Mellor, 33 W. R. 232.

Married woman—Marriage before Act-Reversionary interest falling into possession after Act-Married Women's Property Act.-A married woman became entitled before the commencement of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, to a vested reversionary interest in a fund which fell into possession after the commencement of the Act: Held, that she was entitled under sect. 5 of the Act to such interest as separate property. (Chitty J., July 12, 1884.) Baynton v. Collins, 27 Ch. D. 604; 53 L. J., Ch. 1112; 33 W. R. 41.

Married woman— -Tort-Right to sue alone-Married Women's Property Act.—A married woman may by virtue of the Married Women's Property Act 1882, s. I. subs. 2, bring an action for tort without joining her husband though the tort was committed before the commencement of the Act. (C. A., July 31, 1884.) Weldon v. Winslow, 13 Q. B. D. 784; 53 L. J. 528; 51 L. T. R. 643.

Separate property-Authority by husband to third party to enter upon-Trespass— Slander-Special damage.-Where a wife is in sole possession of a house which is her separate property, the husband, even if he can by virtue of his marital rights enter the house himself, cannot delegate the right to do so to a third person. Annoyance or loss of reputation is not a special damage sufficient to render actionable, words not actionable per se. (C. A., Dec. 18, 1884.) Weldon v. De Bathe, 14 Q. B. D. 339; 54 L. J., Q. B. 113; 33 W. R. 328.

HUSBAND AND WIFE-(continued.)

Separate property-Contract'—Reference by consent-Married Women's Property Act, 1882. In an action brought before the commencement of the Married Women's Property Act, by a creditor against a married woman, the married woman after the commencement of the Act consented to an order of reference and to be bound by the award: Held, that reference by such consent constituted a contract within sect. 1. (3) of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, charging under sect. I (4) any separate property which she had at or after the date of the order. Sect. 1. cls. (3) (4) are not retrospective. (Chitty J., August 8, 1884.) Conolan v. Zealand, 27 Ch. D. 632.

Separate Property-Restraint on anticipation-Mortgage.-Real estate was settled upon trust to pay the rents and annual proceeds to W., a married woman, for her separate use, her receipts for the said rents and annual proceeds to be given after the same shall become due to be good and effectual discharges:' Held, that the provision constituted a restraint on anticipation, and that a mortgagee of W.'s life interest took nothing. (Kay J., July 24, 1884.) Re Smith, Chapman v. Wood, 51 L. T. R. 501. Separation Deed-Custody of Children-Access by Wife-Husband's right to remove Children.-By the terms of a separation deed the husband, who was an officer in the British army, was to retain the custody of the children, covenanting to allow the wife 'full and free access' to the children. Held, that such covenant did not debar the husband from taking the children to Egypt, to which place his regiment had been ordered. (Pearson J., Nov. 26, 1884.) Hunt v. Hunt, 33 W. R. 157.

Separation Deed-Molestation—Adultery-Right to recover Annuity.—Adultery, though followed by the birth of a child, is not 'molestation' by a wife so as to disentitle her to recover an annuity payable to her under a separation deed. Molestation means some act done by the wife with the purpose of annoying the husband. A dum casta clause is not to be inserted by implication in a separation deed on grounds of public policy. (A., Nov. 18, 1884.) Fearson v. Aylesford, 54 L. J., Q. B. 33; 33 W. R. 331.

Wife's Property Separate examination-Married Women's Property Act-Property acquired before-Settled Estates Act.-A woman married before the commencement of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, must still be separately examined on a petition under the Settled Estates Act, 1877, if her interest in the property to which the petition relates was acquired before the commencement of the Married Women's Property Act. (Pearson J., Dec. 6, 1884.) Re Harris' Settled Estates, 28 Ch. D. 171; 54 L. J., Ch. 208; 51 L. T. R. 855. INFANT.-Advancement-Contingent Interest-Application to Charge.-Where an infant was entitled to a legacy contingently on his attaining 21, the income to be paid to his father for maintenance, and the amount of maintenance being inadequate, the father had advanced a sum of 200l. for the outfit of the infant: the Court refused to charge the amount so advanced on the infant's contingent interest. In such a case the proper course is to apply for an order, as in Re Arbuckle (14 L. T. R. 538). (Kay J., July 31, 1884.) Re Tanner, 53 L. J., Ch. 1108; 51 L. T. R. 507.

Education-Direction of Court-Deceased Protestant Father-Catholic Mother out of Jurisdiction-Brutum fulmen.—Where infant children of a deceased Protestant father were residing out of the jurisdiction under charge of their mother, who was a Roman Catholic and one of the testamentary guardians, but had property within the jurisdiction, the Court in an action by the other guardians to have them made wards of the Court made an order declaring that they ought to be brought up in the Protestant faith. (Pearson J., Oct. 29, 1884.) Re Montagu, Re Wroughton, Montague v. Festing, 28 Ch. D. 82; 33 W. R. 322.

Ward of Court-Taking out of Jurisdiction-Leave-Security for Production.Where the mother of a ward of Court who was also sole guardian was desirous of taking the ward to reside with her in Jamaica, the Court gave her leave to do so upon a co-guardian resident in England being appointed and both guardians undertaking to produce the ward when required. In granting leave to remove a ward out of the jurisdiction the Court is guided by what is most for the interest of the ward.