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by a court of equity under our statute on the application of any shareholder. When the sole purpose is that of the appoint. ment of a receiver, based on the disaffection of such stockholders, without any adequate cause for so doing, and it is not necessary to do so in this case, there should be some object in the appointment of a receiver, based upon valid grounds for so doing, though that object may only be, in so far as the power of the court is concerned, to wrest the management and property of the corporation from the hands of designing, wicked, incompetent, and irresponsible officers in charge of its affairs, who are squandering or converting the funds, and refusing an accounting by such officers, and placing the property and management of the affairs of the corporation in the hands of a receiver, and holding it in abeyance until the management is changed, or proper security given by the officers for the funds of the corporation. The court having the power at any time, in its discretion, when it will subserve the interest of the parties, to discharge the receiver, and restore the property and affairs of the corporation to its duly-constituted management, and whenever such a state of affairs exists, as that the corporation has proper officers qualified, and the funds of the corporation and their proper application secured, it wil be the duty of the court to restore the property and affairs of the corporation to its duly-constituted management, for it is a remedy given only as an expediency to parties who are otherwise without a remedy. If such parties have an adequate remedy other than the appointment of a receiver, then the right to a receiver would not exist, though the remedy be through the means prescribed for the management of the corporation by its constitution and laws. If officers prove false, and set about to bankrupt a corporation, the end sought by them may be reached before any change in the management can be accomplished; and, unless a court of equity interfere to wrest from their management the affairs and property of the corporation, the share holders may be without remedy. It is upon this theory which we have announced that we think this proceeding for the appointment of a receiver can be maintained, though, as we have suggested, the prayer of the petition would indicate that the pleader might have had in mind the dissolution of the partnership. Yet the petition states the facts, and upon the facts stated its sufficiency must be judged, and its suffi. ciency or insufficiency will not be determined by the prayer. While the facts alleged may not be technically sufficient to warrant the appointment of a receiver, had the complaint been verified, and had the appointment rested upon it alone, but the complaint is not verified; and we think it is sufficient to give the court jurisdiction, and to call into action the power of the court in that behalf, and states a cause, and shows an emergency, for the appointment of a receiver. The general a verments of the complaint may be supported by affidavits or oral testimony. The averments of the complaint may be general, and these supported by such evidence, giving in de

In

tail the facts in harmony with the averments of the complaint, all of which will be taken into consideration by the court in determining whether or not such an exigency exists as warrants the appointment of a receiver. The averments of the complaint in this case are broad enough to authorize the introduction of evidence showing an emergency for the appointment of a receiver. The evidence in this case is not in the record, and it will be presumed that the action of the court was sustained by the evidence. As we have before said, the complaint in such a proceeding will not be judged by any harsh or technical rule. In some of the decisions (Steele v. Aspy, 128 Ind. 367, 27 N. E. Rep. 739) it is beld that pleadings and demurrers which are the ordinary way of testing the technical sufficiency of pleadings are not relevant in such an application, but the application must be sufficient to justify the appointment. It must state, in general, some cause, at least, for the appointment. some instances, when the appointment of a receiver is ancillary to a pending action, the application will be heard, and the appointment made on a motion to that effect. The complaint in this case alleges as a fact that the corporation is insolvent. In addition thereto, it shows that the total assets of the corporation amount to $1,000,000, and that officers of the corporation have taken from the corporation some $750,000 of such assets and converted them to their own use, placing them in a bank in the state of Pennsylvania, under their control, without security and without any responsibility save the money so deposited; that the money due the corporation from branches in the various states is only se cured by the indemnity of such irresponsible bank; that the officer whose duty it is to call a meeting of the board of managers fails to do so, and that it is he who is so misappropriating the funds of the corporation, and refuses to allow the proceedings of their meetings to be published as required; that a very large sum, $1,325,000, will fall due on certificates within about six months from the date of the filing of the petition,-setting out in detail, as we have shown in the statement of the case, a condition of affairs of the corporation hazarding the usefulness of the corporation, endangering its perpetuity; and that it is in imminent danger of insolvency,-charging, in terms, two of the causes for the appointment of a receiver, as provided by the fifth subdivision of section 1222, supra, of the statute.

We are not unmindful of the rule that the legal relations into which members of a corporation enter require them to seek redress for supposed wrongs done them as shareholders from its officers, and from the corporation itself, before applying toa court of equity for redress, but this rule is subject to an exception when it appears that such application would be unavailing to protect their rights. This exception may exist, says the court in Dunphy v. Association, 146 Mass. 495, 16 N. E. Rep. 426, "when the directors themselves are the wrongdoers, or are in fraudulent combination with them, or when the corporation is controlled by them, or when it is neces

sary that action should be taken speedily | verted to their own use. In the American to leave time for a corporate meeting of and English Encyclopedia of Law, (volstockholders." This decision, we think, ume 20, p. 272,) it is said: "When the diwell and properly defines the rule. A rectors or officers of a corporation are stockholder or shareholder is bound to mismanaging the business, and jeopardizseek redress by application to the direct-ing the rights of the stockholders and credors or the corporation itself, before ap-itors, the court may appoint a receiver, plying to a court of equity, when that is feasible, and will afford to him an adequate remedy; and he can only apply to a court of equity in the first instance when an emergency exists for so doing, and it is made to appear that an application to the directors or the corporation would be impracticable. We think that we may very properly enlarge on this doctrine by saying that when relief by injunction will afford a proper remedy, by staying the illegal acts of the corporate officers until relief can be had for supposed wrongs through an application to the directors or managing body, or to the corporation, through the means provided by the constitution and laws of the corporation, the court will not wrest the management of the corporate affairs from its legally-constituted officers, and turn its property, and the management of its affairs, over to a receiver. But in this the officers in charge of the affairs of the corporation, and who are charged with gross acts of maladministration of its affairs, are nonresidents of the state. They are charged with already taking $750,000 of its funds from its treasury, and depositing them in an insolvent bank outside of the state, controlled by them, and using the same for their own benefit, giving no security for its payment or use; that the only security for the money held by the officers of the local branches existing in the several states is the guaranty of this insolvent bank. Money is constantly being paid to the officers of these local branches, and coming into the treasury of the corporation. To preserve the usefulness of, and perpetuate the beneficence of, the corporation, and preserve the interests of the shareholders, the business must be continued, the dues collected, and the beneficiaries paid; and it is manifest that any relief that could be obtained by means of an injunction would not be an adequate remedy, or meet the emergency existing, while a receiver, if one be appointed, would supersede the officers; shareholders could pay the money; it would be secure; and the business conducted until a remedy could be had through the organization itself, by the displacement of incompetent or dishonest officials, and filling their places by competent and honest ones, and requiring the officers of local branches to give other and responsible surety. The showing in the complaint presents the case where the officers charged with maladministration are in a position to take from the corporation daily funds of the corporation, and during the delay necessary to the meeting of the managing board or shareholders, and before a displacement of the alleged dishonest officials through the process provided by the laws of the corporation could be had, many thousand dollars more might come into their hands, or be taken from the treasury by them, and squandered or con

upon the application of a stockholder. " See authorities cited in support of the text. In Pike Co. v. Hammons, 129 Ind. 368, 27 N. E. Rep. 487, the action was by the stockholders of a gravel road company against the officers of the corporation to compel an accounting, and to obtain the appointment of a receiver. The court held the action would lie, and that no application for relief to the directors or corporation was necessary before bringing the action. It was held in that case that the court had the power to appoint a receiver under the seventh clause of section 1222, Rev. St. 1881, providing that a receiver may be appointed “in such other cases as may be provided by law, or when, in the discretion of the court, or the judge thereof in vacation, it may be necessary to secure ample justice to the parties.' The court said: "Indeed, it was a case eminently proper for the exercise of such power. Those who own the majority of the stock in the corporation, and were able, by reason of that fact, to control the road, seem to have been derelict in the matter of repairs; thus endangering the rights of the other interested parties, and rendering the property nonproductive. Under these circumstances, it was the duty of the court, when asked to do so, to take such steps as would secure to the minority stockholders their rights in the property; and we know of no means by which this could be accomplished, except by the appointment of a receiver." In the same case the court says, "By their complaint the appellees sought nothing further than an accounting, and the appointment of a receiver, and they were not entitled to more than they sought;" the court holding that under the issues joined on the complaint it was error to order a sale of the road of the corporation. The relief sought in that case differs but little from that sought in this, or obtainable in this. The result in this action must be an accounting by the officers for the money received by them, belonging to the corporation, and the paying of it over to the receiver, and the appointment of a receiver; and the decision is in harmony with, and supports, the views we have herein announced, as to the rights of parties to the appointment of receivers under our statute. The appellees had a right to have the funds protected and preserved, and applied to their proper use, and the corporation perpetuated. The complaint states a good cause for the appointment of a receiver, and the presumption is that the proof made under it fully sustained the action of the court in the appointment of a receiver. There are some minor questions discussed, which we have considered, and in which there is no error, and we deem it unnecessary to discuss them. The conclusion we have reached leads to an affirmance of the judg ment.

END OF VOLUME 33

INDEX.

ABATEMENT AND REVIVAL.
Plea in abatement, see "Pleading," 7, 8.
Action pending in another state.

1. Where an insurance company and its creditor both reside in New York, where the debt was contracted, the pendency, in another state, of an attachment suit against the creditor, which was commenced by garnishing the company in the foreign state, is no defense to an action on the debt in New York, in the absence of an appearance by him in the attachment suit or personal service of process on him in the foreign state-Douglass v. Phenix Ins. Co. of Brooklyn, (N. Y. App.) 33 N. E. 938. Death of party-Substitution.

2. An affidavit on which is based the order of revival of a suit in the name of a personal representative, showing where decedent died, that plaintiff was appointed executrix, the will admitted to probate, and letters testamentary granted to plaintiff, is not controverted by an affidavit by defendant, denying that he has any information or knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the facts in the affidavit for the motion. 17 N. Y. S. 24, affirmed.-Simmons v. Craig, (N. Y. App.) 33 N. E. 76.

8. An action was commenced in 1879 against the trustees of an insurance company. In 1882 one of the defendants died, and in 1883 letters testamentary were issued to his executor. In 1891 plaintiff moved to sever the action, and to revive the same against his executor. Held, that such motion was properly granted, in that, if the action be considered an action at law, no mere lapse of time would absolutely defeat au application for a continuation of such action in the name of the representative of the deceased party, and, if it be treated as an equitable action, the 10-years limitation applied. 18 N. Y. S. 662, affirmed. — Mason v. Sanford, (N. Y. App.) 33 N. E. 546.

4. It was further ground for sustaining the motion that the action was an equitable one, and that it could not be determined from the pleadings that the relief sought could be obtained in an action at law, since the court would not assume that fact, and for that reason hold that the motion should have been denied on the ground of the lapse of six years. 18 N. Y. S. 662, affirmed.-Mason v. Sanford, (N. Y. App.) 33 N. E. 546.

Action prematurely brought.

5. A plea in abatement is the proper mode of raising the question that an action on a note is prematurely brought, when such fact does not appear on the face of the note; but, when there is coupled with the plea matters which show that it can only be sustained by proof of facts necessitating a reformation of the instrument, the pleading will be insufficient, unless it contains a prayer for reformation.-Scott v. Norris, (Ind. App.) 33 N. E. 227.

Indictment.

ABORTION.

1. A count of the indictment, alleging that defendant did use "a certain instrument, the name of which, and a more particular description of which, are to said jurors unknown," is sufficient. Commonwealth v. Thompson, (Mass.) 33 N. E. 1111. Evidence.

of deceased to testify to certain changes in the 2. It was not error to permit the mother latter's appearance, and that they indicated to her that the daughter was pregnant; especially where the objection was not to the statement of opinion, but to the evidence generally. -Commonwealth v. Thompson, (Mass.) 33 N. E. 1111.

the dying declarations of deceased, it is prop3. Where the mother is called to testify to er to permit her to state that the latter said at the time that she was dying.-Commonwealth v. Thompson, (Mass.) 33 Ň. É. 1111.

Accident.

Insurance, see "Insurance," 23.

ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. See, also,, "Compromise;" "Payment;" "Re lease and Discharge."

Accepting check offered in payment.

Plaintiff sent a bill of $670 to defendant for medical services, and defendant, while not disputing the services, objected to the amount, and declined to pay the bill rendered, but sent a check for $400, stating that it was to be in full satisfaction of plaintiff's claim. retained the check, but sent another bill for the Plaintiff of the check as part payment. same amount, on which he credited the amount Defendant at on condition that it should be received in full once notified plaintiff that he had sent the check payment of his bill, and that plaintiff must either keep it on that condition, or immediately return it. Held, that the debt, which was unliquidated, was satisfied by the retention of the check, since its acceptance involved the acceptance of the condition also. 16 N. Y. S. 158, reversed.-Fuller v. Kemp, (N. Y. App.) 33 N. E. 1034.

Accounting.

Between partners, see "Partnership," 1-6.
By executors and administrators, see "Execu-
tors and Administrators," 6, 7.

Acknowledgment.

Defective, notice to grantee, see "Vendor and
Purchaser," 8, 9.

In what counties notary may take, see "Notary
Public."

Acquisition.

ACTION.

6. The fact that, if reformation were decreed, the plea in abatement would be useless, as the note itself would show that it was not of homestead, see "Homestead,” 1. due, furnishes no objection to this manner of pleading, on the ground that it would compel a party to cut up his defenses; for, as the decree would furnish the proof necessary to make out the plea in abatement, the entire case would be tried and disposed of on the ne pleading.— Scott v. Norris, (Ind. App.) 33 N. E. 227. v.33N.E.-72

See, also, "Abatement and Revival;" "Limita tion of Actions;" "Parties;" "Pleading," "Practice in Civil Cases;" "Trial."

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ADVERSE POSSESSION.

See, also, "Limitation of Actions."
What constitutes.

1. The construction by the owner of land
bounded by navigable tide water of a marine
railway from his land into the water for the
purpose of hauling up boats is not an adverse
possession of the land below high-water mark
within Code Civil Proc. § 368, providing that,
where plaintiff in ejectment has shown legal
title to be in himself, defendant must prove ac-
tual adverse use of the property during the
statutory period.-De Lancey v. Piepgras, (N.
Y. App.) 33 N. E. 822.

2. As to the one-third interest of a widow
in lands sold to pay decedent's debts no title
by adverse possession can be acquired, as
against her children, since no right of action
for its recovery can accrue to them during her
life; Rev. St. 1881, § 2484, limiting the right
of a widow of any decedent to convey real
estate acquired by her first marriage during a
second coverture, and providing that if, dur-
ing a second marriage, a widow shall die, her
interest in the real estate of her first husband
shall go to her children by her first marriage.--
Irey v. Mater, (Ind. Sup.) 33 N. E. 1018.
3. Though the deed of land sold to pay
decedent's debts, and in which the widow had a
third interest, is void, 20 years' adverse posses-
sion by the grantee vests a good title in the
purchaser as to the remaining two thirds, as
against the children of decedent.-Irey v. Ma-
ter, (Ind. Sup.) 33 N. E. 1018.

4. A statement in the agreed facts that
G. and his grantees "were in the undisturbed
possession of the land for 20 years and up-
wards" does not show title in them by adverse

possession, under Code Civil Proc. § 369, declar-
ing possession adverse "where the occupant, or
those under whom he claims, entered into the
possession of the premises under claim of title
exclusive of any other right, founding the claim
upon a written instrument as being a convey-
ance of the premises, * * and there has
been a continued occupation and possession of
the premises included in the instrument
for 20 years under the rame claim."-Kneller v.
Lang, N. Y. App.) 33 N. E. 555.
Color of title.

5. Where a person conveys by warranty
wards a deed of the property is made to him,
deed land to which he has no title, and after-
and he conveys it to a second grantee, the said
deed to him cannot be relied on by his second
grantee as color of title in good faith, within
the meaning of the statute of limitations, since
the title acquired by such deed inured imme-
diately to the first grantee.-Guertin v. Mom-
bleau, (II. Sup.) 33 N. E. 49.

6. A person who takes possession of land
under a judicial sale has color of title, though
the judicial proceedings were void.-Irey v.
Mater, (Ind. Sup.) 33 N. E. 1018.

Agency.

See "Principal and Agent."

Alcoholic Liquors.

See "Intoxicating Liquors."

ALIENS.

and Distribution," 4, 5.

Alien kindred, rights of widow, see "Descent
Right to sue for partition, see "Partition," 1-3.
Right to hold land.

nonresidents cannot acquire or hold lands, the
1. In Act June 16, 1887, providing that
exception permitting the heirs of aliens who
have previously acquired lands, or who may
do so
under the provisions of the act, to
hold such lands for a limited time, cannot be
extended by implication to the alien heirs of
citizens.-Wunderle v. Wunderle, (Ill. Sup.)
33 N. E. 195.

*

2. The treaty of December 20, 1827, be-
tween the United States and the Hanseatic
Republic of Bremen, provided that the citizens
of either country "shall have power to dispose
of their personal goods within the jurisdiction
of the other by sale, donation, testament, or
estate, the said heirs would be prevented from
otherwise,
and if, in the case of real
entering into the possession of the inheritance
on account of their character of aliens, there
shall be granted to them the term of three
years to dispose of the same." Held, that citi-
zens of Bremen, being heirs of one who died in-
testate, seised of land in Illinois, after passage
resident aliens incapable of inheriting land,
of the Illinois act of June 16, 1887, making non-
ilege of selling within three years the interest
were entitled, in spite of said act, to the priv-
which they would have inherited but for their
alienage. Schultze v. Schultze, (Ill. Sup.) 33
N. E. 201.

Effect of treaties.

3. Act June 16, 1887, which declares that
nonresident aliens "shall not be capable of ac-
quiring title to or taking or holding any lands
or real estate in this state by descent, devise,
purchase, or otherwise," is not invalidated by
treaties between the United States and foreign
powers except in regard to citizens of countries
who are by treaty given the right of inheriting
and holding land in the United States.-Wun-
derle v. Wunderle, (Ill. Sup.) 33 N. E. 195.

4. The treaty of December 11, 1871, be-
tween the United States and the German em-
pire, providing that, "in all successions to in-
heritances, citizens of each of the contracting

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