the populace the more plain, popular, and even vulgar manners of Ferdinand, who had won their hearts by the share which he took in their mirth and their games on occasion of public festivals. Murat was a foreigner, and obnoxious to all objections, real or imaginary, which nations make to a strange ruler. Neither did he possess either wisdom or moderation to balance the popular prejudice against him as a Frenchman. Brave as a lion in war, Murat was at once ambitious and irresolute in his politics, undertaking enterprizes beyond his means, and abandoning them, when, by some fortuitous train of circumstances, he might possibly have succeeded. In person, he was fond of show, dress, and decoration, and obtained among the French soldiers the nickname of Franconi, from a celebrated Parisian mountebank so called.

Such a character was not likely to possess the political skill, prudence, and sagacity, necessary for the security of his dominions in critical times. Murat was aware, that at the Congress his deposition had been urged by Talleyrand, that the English and Austrian courts considered his conduct during the campaign in Tuscany as too dubious to merit favour, and would afford him no further protection than the state of Europe might require. Alarmed at those indications of evil intentions towards him, Murat, by his minister, the Duke of Campochiaro, drew up a laboured vindication of his good faith towards the allies. But this statement was met by a detailed report from the Austrian General Nugent, and another from Lord William Bentinck, both of whom had acted with Murat in the campaign of Italy, and both now contended, that he had totally failed to fulfil his engagement with the allies, and had, instead, played false with all parties, endeavouring to keep the balance

in his own hands, till he could determine on which side he could most safely incline it. To complete the impressions to Murat's prejudice, Talleyrand exhibited, first to the Duke of Wellington, and afterwards to Lord Castlereagh, some documents of correspondence, in which Murat, while acting with the allies, appeared to have expressed himself still favourable to the cause of his brother-in-law. Of five documents thus produced, two were stated by the Moniteur, during Buonaparte's usurpation, to have been manufactured by the French ministry, for the purpose of imposing on Lord Castlereagh. This forgery, or sophistication, if such existed, must have been a work of gratuitous immorality, for the conduct of Murat had been so vacillating as completely to indicate his want of faith; and although the Congress had not settled on the line of conduct to be adopted toward him, there can be no doubt that the throne of Tancred tottered under its new possessor. His conduct, and the line of policy which, in justice and good faith, was to be observed with him, became the subject of an interesting debate in the British House of Commons; but from the documents then produced, and especially from the facts and arguments of Lord William Bentinck, and General Nugent's Memorials, the members were convinced, that the vacillation of Murat in his engagements with the allies, left them free of any obligation towards him. Still, however, the question of political expedience remained undecided; and it was founded upon by Murat himself, as the best guarantee of his cause, that he was in actual possession of the kingdom in dispute, enjoyed its apparently unanimous homage, and, with the reputation of a great general, commanded an army of eighty thousand men.

May 2.

While the views of the allies to

wards the King of Naples excited his doubts, his vanity and ambition were flattered by the hope of becoming the liberator, and, in consequence, the monarch of all Italy. The northern part of that fine country was filled with soldiers, who, trained to arms in the wars of Buonaparte, retained an affection for him, and for all his family. The rule of Austria in the Italian dominions has never been either gentle or popular, and at this time there existed a violent ferment in Milan, which was near breaking out into absolute revolt. An alarming riot took place at the theatre of that city, with such acclamations in favour of Italian independence, of Eugene Beauharnois, and even of Napoleon, that the Austrian commandant, Marshal Bellegarde, deemed himself obliged to take the most prompt and severe measures. The theatre was surrounded by the troops of the garrison, and as the contumacious audience issued forth, those who had headed the disorder were taken into custody. Their examinations gave rise to a belief, that this disturbance was but the premature explosion of a general disaffection to the Austrian government. The city was declared to be in a state of siege; eight capital executions, and other punishments, suppressed the appearances of disaffection. This tumult indicated only one branch of the general conspiracy through Italy, of which Murat trusted to avail himself, to further his gigantic plans. His correspondence with Excelman and with Buonaparte had the same object; and thus, while he ought to have studied how to secure the kingdom of Naples, he aspired at the sovereignty of all Italy. It is needless to dwell upon this miserable policy. The struggle which was about to take place would have enabled Murat to make his own terms with the allies, in order to detach him from Buonaparte; and a so

lemn guarantee of his kingdom of Naples would have been the least they would have offered for his neutrality.

Murat's army was such as made him formidable; and he had of late augmented, both his forces by new levies, and his means of supporting them by heavy imposts, neither of which had rendered his government more popular. He possessed about 45,000 troops of the line, and an equal number of militia, and the former were trained to arms under French officers. His court was the residence of revolutionists from all parts of Italy, who kept up an active and efficient correspondence with the various states they belonged to. But the effective strength of his army was much weakened by the recall of many French officers by Louis XVIII., and by his own dismissing others, in order to render himself more popular with the Neapolitans. And the character of the troops of Naples stood very low since 1799, when the French General Champion net routed them with such inferior numbers.

In these circumstances, departing from the neutrality which was his best chance of safety, Murat demanded permission of Austria to march 80,000 men through her Italian dominions, to repel an attack from a French army, which, he pretended to believe, designed to cross the Alps, with the purpose of dispossessing him of his kingdom of Naples. The Austrian minister replied to these strange propositions, that his imperial majesty was determined to maintain the tranquillity of Italy. And to do so with effect, a large body of troops was instantly put in motion to reinforce those in the Italian provinces. Thus the only effect of Murat's first warlike demonstration was, to induce the power who was chiefly threatened to strengthen his forces on the points exposed to danger.

On the 5th of March, Murat learn ed Buonaparte's departure from Elba; and from that moment he appears to have determined to keep pace with his brother-in-law, maintaining, how ever, as long as possible, the appearance of fidelity to his treaty with the allies, so as to have ground to retreat upon, in case Buonaparte should prove unsuccessful. While, therefore, he gave directions for putting his army into motion, he assembled his cabinet, and solemnly declared his resolution of adhering to the allies. Buonaparte's failure at Antibes seems to have checked his resolution of proceeding; but on hearing that he had been joined by the military, and had taken possession of Lyons, his schemes of ambition were again reassumed. He demanded from the Pope leave to march two of his divisions through the Roman territories, doubtless because the mountains of Abruzzo, which he must otherwise have traversed, afford roads difficult or impracticable for the march of an army, Pius VII, refused this permission, and protested against the violation of his territorities; on which two Neapolitan divisions instantly penetrated to Rome, and occupied the capital of the holy see. The Pontiff was preparing to bear his part in a religious procession, when he had information of their approach, through means, it was supposed, of Lucien Buonaparte. He had but the necessary time to throw himself into a carriage, and withdraw to Florence, and from thence to Genoa, where he put himself under protection of the heretical army of England. The various foreign ministers, the members of the sacred college, even the old King and Queen of Spain-all followed the example of the holy father, and no one chose to await the arrival of Murat, the character of whose army, as well as his own reputation for rapine, made his approach dreaded by

all who had any thing to lose. While a part of his troops thus occupied the ancient capital of the world, Murat himself advanced to Ancona, where he established his head-quarters. His troops immediately commenced marching, in four columns, on the routes of Bologna, Modena, Reggio, Ferrara, and thus threatening the whole line of the Po, while a fifth division defiled into Tuscany through the passes of the Appenines. They speedily drove the Austrian garrisons from Cesena and Rimini, and at the latter town Murat published a proclamation which threw complete light on his purpose. It was addressed to the Italians, and assured them March 31. that Providence called on them to assert their independence, and that every trace of foreign domi. nation should in future be erazed from the soil of Italy. Eighty thousand Italians of Naples had sworn it should be so, and invited their countrymen of every denomination to join them. England, free herself, could not, it was asserted, refuse her suffrage to an effort for freedom. The Italians of Milan, Bologna, Turin, Venice, Brescia, Modena, and Reggio, were all called on to remember the sufferings of their exiled and imprisoned patriots. They were summoned to arms, and were promised a national representation, and a constitution worthy of them and of the age. This remarkable production was subscribed Joachim Napoleon, Murat having now reassumed the latter name which he had formerly laid aside.

But Italy had been too long divided into petty states, and these too long accustomed to transfer their allegiance from one foreign conqueror to another, to feel any thing arousing in the name of independence. In Bologna some of the students in the once celebrated university, caught by the sounds of liberty and honour, always so dear to

youth, enrolled themselves under the standard of Murat when his forces arrived in that city. But in most other places of Italy, particularly in the Roman and Tuscan territories, the indifference of the inhabitants to the advantages promised by Murat, and their extreme and peculiar aversion to the Neapolitans, prevented his receiving any partizans. "It is probable," says an intelligent author, "that when Murat made an appeal to the valour of Italians, the number of singers, dancers, improvisators, abbés, and players, who form the delight of the society of that country, greatly exceeded that of the men who prepared to combat for the independence proposed."

But Murat's force was of itself sufficiently formidable. He attacked an Austrian army of about ten thousand men, under General Bianchi, who occupied the banks of the Panaro, on the road from Bologna to Modena. The advantages of superior bravery and discipline were unable to counterbalance that of numbers, and after a desperate resistance of six hours, the Neapolitan General of Division Carascosa, whose troops were composed of deserters from almost all nations, and fought with remarkable desperation, carried the bridges, and the Austrians were driven from their possession of Sammoggia. This victory opened to Murat the possession of Modena, to which he soon added that of Tuscany, and its capital, Florence. The Austrian General Nugent fell back to occupy the passes of the Appenines, and join with the British troops in defence of Genoa.

At this period of his fortunes, Murat might have made a treaty with the allies on his own terms. Buonaparte was again in power, and it was of the last importance to prevent Murat from joining him. Austria is said to have offered him, not only to guarantee the crown of Naples to him and his heirs,

but to have added the Marches of the Papal See. Britain caused it at the same time to be announced, that, having made truce with Murat at the solicitation of Austria, that truce would last no longer than his good intelligence with her ally. But Murat, it is said, rejected the proposals contained in the Austrian dispatches, repeating frequently as he read them, "It is too late Italy desires freedom, and she shall be free."

This obstinacy proved fatal to him. Austria declared war against him, and expedited the reinforcements which she had ordered into Italy. Britain prepared an armament to invade his Neapolitan territories, where Ferdinand continued to have many partisans.

Murat, meanwhile, from his headquarters at Ancona, directed the march of his army. His generals, Liveron and Pignatelli, had already sustained a check in an attempt to press upon the rear of General Nugent, which he had not only repulsed, but driven them back to Florence with loss. The Austrians, under General Frimont, prepared to defend the line of the Po. Murat resolved to force the passage, and his scheme was that of an able disciple of Napoleon.

While he affected a grand movement to the westward, as if to attack Placentia, Cremona, and Casal Maggiore, he trusted to a real assault upon Ferrara, by which, had it succeeded, he would have obtained possession of the Lower Po, and been able, perhaps, to stir up insurrections in Lombardy, and the Venetian territories. In the former province, where the inhabitants are more martially disposed than in other states of Italy, it was supposed that he might have received a reinforcement of several' thousand veterans, who had served under Napoleon, and were ready to rise and join with Joachim.

But the

manœuvres of Murat had failed to deceive the Austrians. To succeed in his attack on the Lower Po, it was necessary to carry the bridge and town of Occhiobello, in order to be master of the passage of the river. The Neapolitans were not only unable to carry this place, but were attacked on different points by the moveable columns of the Austrians

as they retired from the points of attack, and sustained a severe loss. Upon receiving this check, Murat seems at once to have renounced his undertaking as desperate. He evacuated not only Parma, Reggio, Modena, and Bologna, but Florence and all Tuscany; thus avouching, by a general retreat on his whole line, that he abandoned the north of Italy to its fate. All, and his own soldiers first of all, became aware that his hopes were chimerical, and that he had undertaken an enterprize too great both for his courage and understanding. The consequence was total discouragement to the soldiery, with its usual attendants, disorder, insubordination, and desertion. The evacuation of Florence, General Pignatelli Stromboli is said to have executed without Joachim's knowledge, and contrary to his orders. It was a measure of disastrous consequence, as it put the Austrians at once in possession of the shortest and best road to Rome, and exposed the left flank and rear of Murat's army to their hostile manœuvres.

Having once resolved on a retreat, Murat ought to have executed his purpose as speedily as possible. But he was so ill advised as to linger in the Roman territory, in the vain hope of maintaining his ground there against the Austrians. This was so obviously contrary to all military rules, that it has been ascribed to the arts of Napoleon, whose interest it was to keep Murat as long opposite to the Austrians as possible; because

in doing so, he detained a large army, which, when disengaged from the Italian campaign, would certainly enter France.

The delay was fatal to Murat, for General Frimont, now reinforced with the troops from Austria, adopted a plan of tactics, which had for its object his utter destruction.

General Neipperg was sent against Murat, with instructions to engage his attention by false demonstrations, and detain him in the north-east of Italy; while General Bianchi, proceeding by forced marches from Bologna to Foligno, should intercept his retreat to the Neapolitan territory; and while General Nugent, advancing from Florence, should recover possession of Rome, and proceed forwards to Capua and Naples.

Murat, in the meanwhile, made serious reflections on his situation, and saw it was full time to solicit the peace he had lately rejected. The chief of his staff, April 21. Millet de Villeneuve, wrote to the Austrian commander in chief to request an armistice, and to represent all that had looked like hostility in Murat's conduct, including two or three severe battles, besides skirmishes, together with the siege and assault of strong places, and all the circumstances of an active invasion conducted by a sovereign at the head of his army, as a train of unhappy misunderstandings and fortuitous accidents, arising from some unlucky discharges of musketry at Cesena, which had engaged King Joachim innocently, and against his inclination, not only in war with Austria, but in a dispute with England, who seemed disposed to take the part of the Emp ror Francis. On the whole, upon thinking better of it, the King of Naples, it was said, had resolved to commence some new negociations at Vienna, and proposed a