respect to the second. It is, however, abundantly clear, that the necessity of guarantees for the future, has become more sensible and urgent than at the period of the signature of the treaty of Paris. The subsequent events have carried consternation and alarm to every part of Europe; at a moment when the sovereigns and their people flattered themselves, that, after so many af. flictions, they were about to enjoy a long interval of peace, these events have every where produced agitation, as well as the burthens and sacrifices inseparable from a general arming. It is impossible so soon to efface from the minds of cotemporaries the recollection of such a convulsion. That which was sufficient to satisfy them in 1814, cannot content them in 1815. The line of demarcation which appeared to guarantee the security of the states bordering on France, at the epoch of the treaty of the 30th of May, can no longer satisfy the just pretensions which they now prefer.

It is indispensable that France should offer some new pledge of security. She ought to take this step, as well from sentiments of justice and expediency, as from her own interest well understood. For, in order that the French may be happy and tranquil, it is absolutely necessary that their neighbours should be happy and tranquil also.

Such are the powerful considerations that have induced the allied powers to demand of France some territorial cessions. The inconsider able extent of these cessions, and the selection of the points upon which they bear, sufficiently prove, that they have nothing in common with views of aggrandizement and conquest, and that the security of bordering nations is their only object. These cessions are not of a nature to compromise the substantial integrity of France. They embrace only detached districts or

points remote from her territory; they cannot really weaken her in any relation either administrative or military, nor can her defensive system be affected by them. France will remain not the less one of the best rounded and best fortified states of Europe, as well as one of the richest in means of every description for resisting the danger of invasion.

Without entering into these higher considerations, the plenipotentiaries of France admit, however, the principle of territorial cession, as far as respects the points added to Old France by the treaty of Paris.

The undersigned find it difficult to understand upon what this distinction can be founded, or under the point of view adopted by the allied powers, in what the essential difference between ancient and recent territory consists. It is impossible to suppose, that the plenipotentiaries of France wish to revive in the actual state of affairs the doctrine of the pretended inviolability of the French territory. They too well know that this doctrine, put forward by the chiefs and apostles of the revolutionary system, formed one of the most revolting chapters in that arbitrary code which they wished to impose on Europe. It would be to destroy entirely every idea of equality between the different powers, if it were once established as a principle, that France may without difficulty extend her limits, acquire new provinces, and unite them to her territory either by conquest or treaty, whilst she alone shall enjoy the privilege of never losing any of her ancient possessions, either by the misfortunes of war, or by the political arrangements that may result from it.

With regard to the latter part of the note of the plenipotentiaries of France, the undersigned reserve themselves for a serious explanation in the

next conference which they will have the honour of proposing to the plenipotentiaries of France.

(Signed)

RASUMOFFSKY, CAPO D'ISTRIA, WEISSENBERG, HUMBOLDT, METTERNICH, HARDENBERG, CASTLEREAGH.

BARBARY STATES.

Memorial of the expediency and the means of putting an end to the piracies of the Barbary States, presented by Sir W. Sidney Smith to the Congress at Vienna.

At a time when the means of effecting the abolition of the slave-trade on the western coast of Africa are under discussion-when civilised Europe is straining every nerve to extend the benefits of commerce as well as those for the security of person and property in the interior of that vast continent, peopled by a race of men who are mild, industrious, and capable of enjoying the advantages of civilization in the highest degree, it is matter of astonishment that no attention is paid to the northern coast of the same quarter of the globe, inhabited by Turkish pirates, who not only oppress the natives in their vicinity, but trepan and buy them as slaves, to employ them in vessels fitted out as privateers, for purpose of tearing honest cultiva tors from their fire-sides and peaceable inhabitants from the shore of Europe. This abominable system of robbery is not only revolting to humanity, but operates as a very formidable restraint upon commerce, as no mariner can navigate at the present day the Mediterranean, or even the Atlantic, in a merchant vessel, without the dread and

the

the liability of being taken by the p rates and carried as a slave into Ãí

rica.

The government of Algiers is com posed of the officers of an orta, or regiment of Janizaries; a rebellious soldiery, who do not, even in appearance, acknowledge the authority of the Ot toman Porte, which however does not recognise their independence.

The Dey is always the officer most distinguished among them for cruelty.

He holds his situation at the head of the divan or regency, by enriching his associates that is to say, by permit. ting them to indulge in every sort of violence in Africa, and to carry on a piratical warfare on the seas against the weaker states of Europe, or those whose immediate vengeance dreaded.

The Ottoman flag even is not suff cient to protect its Greek subjects, and to secure them from the attacks of the Algerine corsairs. The Dey of Algiers not long ago, either in a fit of cruelty or actuated by some barbar. ous scheme of policy, the object of which was to destroy the commerce of his rivals of Tunis and Tripoli, or dered the crews of several vessels from the Archipelago and Egypt, laden with grain, to be hanged. The Ba shaw of Egypt, in revenge, caused all the Algerines in his states to be arrest ed, and in vain claims the restitution of the cargoes unjustly seized by the Dey of Algiers.

The Ottoman Porte beholds with jealousy and indignation a rebellious vassal daring to perpetrate the most outrageous and atrocious acts against her peaceable subjects, and to impose shackles on that trade of which this government stands in greater need than ever, for the purpose of paying the troops of the bashaws employed on the eastern frontier of the Ottoman empire, to carry on the war against the Wechabites and the other nume

rous Arabian tribes, who, under the influence of these sectaries, are incessantly threatening, by aggressions, the very existence of that tottering government.

On the other hand, Europe has an interest in upholding the Ottoman government, both as a recognised autocracy, and as a power that can restrain the revolted bashaws and beys, and prevent them from committing robberies on the seas. This interest of Europe becomes still more obvious and important, from the necessity under which she frequently is of importing corn from the Black Sea or from the Nile, whence a surplus produce may always be derived, provided an unfavourable season in the northern parts of the Ottoman territory be regularly counterbalanced in the same year by a favourable season in the south, and vica versa.

Now, if a barbarian, calling himself an independent prince, though not recognised as such by the sultan his legitimate sovereign, can at pleasure menace, terrify, and make prison. ers of the Greeks and the vessels of small European states, who alone car ry on a trade which the ships of the great powers do not find sufficiently advantageous to pursue, because they cannot do it at so low an expense; if that audacious chief of pirates may, when he shall think fit, intercept cargoes of grain destined for Europe, the civilized nations are by this capricious act under the control of a chief of robbers, who have it in their power to aggravate their sufferings, and event ually to starve them in a season of scarcity.

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The barbarian likewise possesses formidable means of extorting money from Christian princes: he threatens them, as he recently did with respect to Sicily, to put to death such of their subjects as have fallen into his power;

his well-known cruelty rendering these menaces very formidable, becomes in his hand an engine for extorting money from one Christian prince to carry on the war which he declares against another. In this manner he can lay all Europe under contribution, and compel each in its turn to pay tribute to his ferocity, by purchasing from him peace, and the lives of the unfortunate slaves.

It is superfluous to show that such a state of things is not only monstrous but absurd, and that it is not less outrageous to religion than it is to hu manity and honour.

The progress of knowledge and of civilization ought necessarily to effect the suppression of such abominable practices.

It is evident that the military means hitherto employed by the Christian princes to hold the Barbary states in check, have been not only inadequate to the purpose, but have generally had the effect of consolidating more and more the dangerous power of these barbarians.

Europe seemed for a long time to place her dependence upon the gallantry of the Knights of St John of Jerusalem, and did not consider that this order of knights has not had in these later times either sufficient power, or perhaps sufficient energy, to counterbalance and repel the ever-increasing aggressions of these hordes of pirates. Besides, the order of Malta, being by its institution prohibited from entering into negociations with infidels, could not avail itself of all the resources of policy by entering into treaties of alliance with those around them, who are themselves ra ther the passive victims of the pirati cal system than active co-operators; as, for example, Tunis, and Morocco, both governed by princes born in these states, and who have shown themselves

to be well disposed and capable of maintaining with European powers the relations of commerce and friendship. It is therefore obvious, that the resurection of that order, after the political suicide of which it has been guilty, would not alone be sufficient to accomplish the object in view. This laudable object is to secure Europe for ever from the outrages of the African corsairs, and to cause governments favourable to commerce, and in peace and amity with all civilized nations, to succeed to states radically and necessarily piratical ever since the days of Barbarossa.

What are the means to be employed to accomplish this desirable object? The undersigned would wish that he could prevail upon all Europe to participate in his conviction, the result of thirty years close study and investigation. He did not cease, during his ministry at the Ottoman Porte, to employ himself upon the subject which he now treats; it engaged his attention in the camp and in the fleets of the same power, and during the whole course of his well-known intercourse with the nations and tribes of Africa and of Asia.

This firm conviction of the possi. bility of crushing the system of rob. bery and outrage acted upon by the Barbary States, cannot be better proved than by the offer which he makes of undertaking the direction of the expeditions, provided the necessary means be put at his disposal.

Animated by the recollection of his oaths of knighthood, and being anxious to excite the same ardour in other Christian knights, he proposes to the nations most interested in the success of this noble enterprize to engage them. selves, by a treaty, to furnish their respective contingents of a maritime, or, as it may be called, an amphibious force, which, without compromising any flag, and without being influenced

by wars, or any political crisis incident to nations, shall constantly guard the shores of the Mediterranean, and have the important duty of watching, stopping, and following all the pirates both on the seas and on land. This power, recognised and protected by all Europe, would not only render commerce perfectly secure, but would eventually civilise the coasts of Africa, by prohibiting the inhabitants from continuing their piratical depredations, to the prejudice of industry and lawful commerce.

This protecting and imposing force should begin by a rigorous blockade of the naval forces of the barbarians, wheresoever they can be found. At the same time, the ambassadors of all the sovereigns and states of Christendom ought mutually to support each other in representing to the Ottoman court, that it must be held responsible for the hostile acts of its subjects, if it shall continue to permit recruiting in its states for the garrisons of Africa, (which_garrisons will be of no use, as these forces would be better employed against its enemies than against European friendly powers,) and by exacting from the Porte a formal disavowal and an authentic interdiction of the wars which those rebel chiefs declare against Europe.

The Ottoman court might be engaged to give promotion and rewards to those among the Janizaries captains of frigates, and other Algerine sailors, who would obey the injunction of the Sultan; and thus the Dey would soon find himself abandoned, and without the means of annoyance or defence.

The same influence might be used more effectually at Tunis, as that country is at war with Algiers, from which it has really everything to fear. Besides, the head of the Tunisian government is of a quite opposite nature to that of Algiers. It would voluntarily co-operate in any measure tend

ing to civilise the state and promote the prosperity of the empire. The peace between Tunis and Sardinia, which has suffered so much from the trepanning of her subjects, ought to form the first link of the chain, and from this moment nothing ought to be neglected to complete it.

The ulterior details will be easily developed, when the sovereigns shall have adopted the principle, and when they shall deign to grant to the undersigned their confidence and their authority, which are requisite for the success of the enterprise (Signed) W. SIDNEY SMITH.