first moment of irritation, cannot be continued after the declaration of his majesty's sentiments upon the transaction, except in a spirit of hostility.

It might have been fairly contended, that, in the first instance, the exercise of such an act of power, before reparation was refused or unduly protracted, was incompatible with the purposes and essence of pacifick negotiation, and with a demand of redress through that channel; but such have been his majesty's conciliatory views, that this argument has not been insisted on, although it might now be the more forcibly urged, as it appears that the government of the United States was from the first sensible, that, even had hostility been meditated by the British government, it would not have commenced it in such a manner. But the exception taken, is to the enforcement continued up to the present time of measures highly unfriendly in their tendency, persisted in, not only after the disavowal in question, the promise of the proffer of suitable reparation, and the renewed assurances of his majesty's amicable dispositions, but after security has been given in a publick instrument bearing date the 16th of October, 1807, that the claim to the seizure of deserters from the national ships of other powers cannot again be brought forward by his majesty's naval officers. It is unnecessary to dwell upon the injury and indignity to which his majesty's service is exposed, both as touching the freedom and security of correspondence of his agents and accredited ministers in the United States, or as resulting from a measure, which, in time of war, excludes the whole of his navy from all their ports, which ports are completely open to the fleets of his enemies. It will be sufficient to observe, that, even where exemptions from it are granted, they are made subject to such conditions, that of the three last British ships of war, which have entered these ports upon publick business, two of them, his majesty's ship Statira having on board a minister sent out for the adjustment of the present differences, and a schooner bearing despatches, in consequence of their inability to procure pilots, were obliged to enter their waters without such assistance, and were exposed to considerable danger. Great Britain, by the forms established, could repair the wrongs committed, even to the satisfaction of the United States, no otherwise than by the channel of negotiation, yet she avowed distinctly, that a

wrong was committed, and that she was ready to make reparation for it; it cannot therefore be contended, that the unavoidable delay of actual reparation subjected her to the imputation of persisting in an aggression, which was disclaimed from the first; if this is true, however much she will regret any impediment in the adjustment of a difference, in which the feelings of this nation are so materially interested, can she, consistently with a due care of her own honour and interests, allow it to be concluded on her part under an adherence to a conduct, which has a decided character of enmity in the proceedings held towards her by the other party.

I know not in what view the perseverance in the President's proclamation, up to this moment, can be considered, but in that of a measure of retaliation; or of self-assumed reparation; or a measure intended to compel reparation; unless it be that which, if I rightly understand, you define it to be, a measure of precaution.

If, when a wrong is committed, retaliation is instantly resorted to by the injured party, the door to pacifick adjustment is closed, and the means of conciliation are precluded. The right to demand reparation is incompatible with the assumption of it. When parties are in a state of mutual hostility, they are so far on a footing, and as such they may treat but a party disclaiming every unfriendly intention, and giving unequivocal proofs of an amicable disposition, cannot be expected to treat with another, whose conduct towards it has the direct effects of actual hostility. If then the enforcement of the President's proclamation, up to the present moment, is a measure of selfassumed reparation, it is directly repugnant to the spirit and fact of amicable negotiation; if it is a measure to compel reparation, it is equally so; and by the perseverance in it Great Britain is dispensed with the duty of proffering redress. But if it is a measure of precaution, in order to secure reparation, or in order to compel it, it falls under the objections I have just stated. If it is a precaution adopted as a guard against acts of violence apprehended on the part of his majesty's naval officers, it surely cannot be considered as being as effectual a security as that arising from the renewed assurances of his majesty's friendly disposition, which imply a due observance of the rights of nations, with which Great Britain is in amity, by all persons

holding authority under his majesty's government, from the disavowal of the pretension of the search of national ships, and from the further assurance of that disavowal, given in his majesty's proclamation of the 16th of October last : neither under these concurrent circumstances can the plea of necessity be maintained; and if such a proceeding has not the plea of necessity, it assumes the character of aggression. If these concurrent securities against such an apprehension have any value, the necessity no longer exists; if they are of no value, negotiation cannot be attempted, as the basis upon which it rests, the mutual confidence of the two parties, would be wholly wanting.

From the moment, after the unfortunate affair of the Chesapeake, that his majesty's naval commanders in these waters had ascertained that they were safe from the effervescence of that popular fury, under which the most glaring outrages were committed, and by which they were very naturally led to the supposition that they were objects of particular hostility, and that a state of war against them, requiring precautions on their part, had commenced, no conduct has been imputed to them, which could vindicate the necessity of maintaining in force the President's proclamation. Since that time such of those officers, as have been necessitated by the circumstances of the war to remain in these waters, have held no communication with the shore, except in an instance too trifling to dwell upon, and instantly disavowed by the commanding officer; and they have acquiesced quietly in various privations, highly prejudicial to the service they were upon, and in consequence of an interdict, which, had they been regardless of their duties towards a state, in amity with their sovereign, and had they not carefully repressed the feelings its tone and language had a direct tendency to provoke in them, would have rather excited, than have averted the evils it was stated to be intended to prevent; were they regardful of these duties, it was unnecessary. Had they felt themselves obliged completely to evacuate the waters of the United States, especially whilst an enemy's squadron was harboured in them, they could have done it; but under the admission of hostile compulsion, and under such compulsion, carried into full effect, his majesty could not have dissembled the extent of the injury received.

In the several cases adduced, in which Great Britain required certain preliminaries, previously to entering into negotiation, she regulated her conduct by the same principles to which she now adheres; and refused, whilst no hostility was exhibited on her part, to treat with powers, whose proceedings denoted it towards her; and who maintained their right in what they had assumed.

From the considerations thus offered, I trust that neither the order of reason or that of usage are in contradiction to the demand I have urged, nor am I aware how the order of time opposes the revocation, in the first instance, of that act, which affects injuriously one of the parties, and is still avowed by the other.

The subject is thus presented to you, sir, in the light in which it was natural that it should offer itself to his majesty's government. It certainly conceived the President's proclamation to rest chiefly, and most materially, upon the attack made upon the frigate of the United States, the Chesapeake, by his majesty's ship Leopard, although other topicks were adduced as accessories. In this apprehension, it may be held to have been sufficiently warranted by the precise time, at which, and the circumstances under which, it was issued, and by its whole context; and the more so, as the impulse under which it was drawn up appears to have been so sudden as to have precluded a due examination of all the grounds of allegation contained in it. And here I beg leave to assure you, that, with respect to the spirit and tone of that instrument, it would be highly satisfactory to me, if I could feel myself justified in expressing, on the part of his majesty, any degree of coincidence with the opinions you have announced, or, when thus appealed to, and making every allowance. for the irritation of the moment, I could dissemble the extreme surprise experienced by Great Britain, that the government of a friendly nation, even before an amicable demand of reparation was made, and yet meaning to make that demand, should have issued an edict directing measures of injury very disproportionate to what it knew was an unauthorized offence, and both in its terms and its purport so injurious to the government to which that demand was to be addressed, and tending to call forth in both nations the feelings under which a friendly adjustment would be the most difficult. But if, as I learn from

you, sir, the proclamation rests substantially on other causes, it is then peculiarly to be regretted, that, together with the demand for redress made in September last, the government of the United States did not think fit to offer a negotiation, or an explanation of so momentous a measure, or to declare that its recall must be more or less connected with the adjustment of other alleged wrongs. Neither did it think it necessary to return any answer to the remonstrance given in by his majesty's envoy at Washington, on the 13th July, 1807, in which he represented, "that he considered that interdiction to be so unfriendly in its object, and so injurious in its consequences to his majesty's interests, that he could not refrain from expressing the most sincere regret, that it ever should have been issued, and most earnestly deprecating its being

enforced."

It could not be supposed that a circumstance of so great weight could be overlooked by his majesty's government, in determining the line of conduct to be held in the negotiation; and as little could it be expected to pass it over, when, on the failure of the discussion with Mr. Monroe, it directed a special mission to be sent to the United States. It had the less reason to imagine that any other grievances could be connected with that, for the adjustment of which I am empowered to negotiate, as Mr. Monroe, in his letter to Mr. Canning of the 29th of July last, had stated with respect to other subjects of remonstrance, that it was improper to mingle them with the present more serious cause of complaint; an opinion to which Mr. Canning declared his perfect assent in his letter to that minister of the 2d of the subsequent month; so that this act was left as single and distinct, to be singly and distinctly considered. His majesty's government, therefore, could not consistently with any view of the subject then before it, or indeed with the just object of my mission, direct or empower me to enter upon matters not connected with that of the Chesapeake; and they could with the less propriety do it, as, in order to render the adjustment of differences of such a nature the more easy and the more conspicuous, the ministers charged especially with such offices have been, with few, if any exceptions, restricted to the precise affair to be negotiated. With respect, therefore, to those other causes of complaint, upon which you inform me that