government in the year 1804, according to which the British commanders and vice admiralty courts were instructed "not to consider any blockade of the islands of Martinique and Guadaloupe as existing, unless in respect of particular ports which may be actually invested, and then not to capture vessels bound to such ports, unless they shall previously have been warned not to enter them."

The absurdity of substituting such diplomatic notifications in place of a special warning from the blockading ships cannot be better illustrated than by the fact, that, before the notification of a proposed blockade of Cadiz, in the year 1805, was received here from our minister at London, official information was received from Cadiz, that the blockade had actually been raised by an enemy's fleet.

It may be worth your attention, that a distinction has been admitted by the British prize courts, in consideration of the distance of the United States from the European blockades, between their citizens and those of states less distant; the notice required for the former being more positive than is made necessary for the latter. You will be able to avail yourselves in the discussion, and perhaps in the modification of the article, of the reasons on which such a distinction rests.

There remains, as an object of great importance, some adequate provision against the insults and injuries committed by British cruisers in the vicinity of our shores and harbours. These have been heretofore a topick of remonstrance, and have in a late instance been repeated with circumstances peculiarly provoking, as they include the murder of an American seamen within the jurisdictional limits of the United States. Mr. Monroe is in full possession of the documents explaining a former instance. Herewith will be received those relating to the late one. They not only support a just demand of an exemplary punishment of the offenders, and of indemnity for the spoliations, but call for some stipulations guarding against such outrages in future. With this view it is proper that all armed belligerent ships should be expressly and effectually restrained from making seizures, or searches, within a certain distance from our coasts, or taking stations near our harbours, commodious for those purposes.

In defining the distance protected against belligerent proceedings, it would not perhaps be unreasonable, con

sidering the extent of the United States, the shoalness of their coast, and the natural indication furnished by the well defined path of the Gulf Stream, to expect an immunity for the space between that limit and the American shore. But at least it may be insisted, that the extent of the neutral immunity should correspond with the claims maintained by Great Britain around her own territory. Without any particular inquiry into the extent of these, it may be observed, 1st. That the British act of parliament, in the year 1736, 9 G. 2 c. 35, supposed to be that called the hovering act, assumes for certain purposes of trade the distance of four leagues from the shores. 2d. That it appears, that both in the reign of James 1. and Charles. 11.* the security of the commerce with British ports was provided for by express prohibitions against the roving or hovering of belligerent ships so near the neutral harbours and coasts of Great Britain, as to disturb or threaten vessels homeward or outward bound, as well as against belligerent proceedings generally within an inconvenient approach towards British territory.

With this example, and with a view to what is suggested by our own experience, it may be expected, that the British government will not refuse to concur in an article to the following effect:

"It is agreed, that all armed vessels belonging to either of the parties engaged in war shall be effectually restrained by positive orders and penal provisions from seizing, searching, or otherwise interrupting or disturbing vessels, to whomsoever belonging, and whether outward or inward. bound, within the harbours, or the chambers formed by headlands, or any where at sea within the distance of four. leagues from the shore, or from a right line from one head land to another. It is further agreed, that by like orders. and provisions all armed vessels shall be effectually restrained by the party, to which they respectively belong, from stationing themselves, or from roving or hovering so near the entry of any of the harbours or coasts of the other, as that merchantmen shall apprehend their passage to be unsafe, or a danger of being set upon and surprised; and that in all cases where death shall be occasioned by any proceeding contrary to these stipulations, and the offender

* See L. Jenkins, vol. 1, and vol. 2.

cannot conveniently be brought to trial and punishment under the laws of the party offended, he shall on demand made within months be delivered up for that

purpose."

If the distance of four leagues cannot be obtained, any distance not less than one sea league may be substituted in the article. It will occur to you, that the stipulation against the roving and hovering of armed ships on our coasts, so as to endanger or alarm trading vessels, will acquire importance, as the space entitled to immunity shall be narrowed.

Another object, not comprehended in the instructions of 1804 to Mr. Monroe, is rendered important by the number of illegal captures and injuries, which have been committed by British cruisers since that date. An indemnity for them is due on every consideration of justice and friendship, and is enforced by the example heretofore given by Great Britain herself, as well as by other nations, which have provided by treaty for repairing the spoliations practised under colour of their authority. You will press this as an object too reasonable not to be confidently expected by the United States. Many of the claims, indeed, for indemnification are so obviously just, that a refusal to satisfy them cannot be decently made, and ought not therefore to be presumed.

The two modes most readily presenting themselves for a comprehensive provision for the claims are, first, the establishment of a board, analogous to that provided for in the 7th article of the treaty of 1794; secondly, the substitution of a gross sum to be distributed among the claimants, according to a liquidation to be made under the authority of the United States.

The second is the mode most eligible, if the gross sum to be allowed be thought to approach the amount of losses to be indemnified. To assist you in estimating these, the statements addressed to this department by the underwriters, and others, are herewith transmitted. These statements, with those furnished by Mr. Lyman, to November 1st, will be to be reduced according to the redress which shall have been judicially afforded, and on the other hand to be augmented by the addition of cases not reported here, and to be collected from the sources of information within your own reach.

If the first mode should be adopted, great care will be requisite, in describing the cases, to employ such general terms as will comprehend all that are fairly entitled to redress. It will be well at the same time to secure by specifying such of the cases as can be specified, and as are least susceptible of objection. Under this head may be classed, 1st, cases in which the official communication made by lord Hawkesbury to Mr. King, of the 11th day of April, 1801, has been violated: 2d, cases in which the rules of blockade, stated in Mr. Merry's communication to the department of state, on the 12th day of April, 1804, have been violated: 3d, cases where the territorial jurisdiction of the United States has been violated.

The list of neutral rights, asserted in the report of the Secretary of State to the President on the 25th day of January, 1806, will suggest other specifications which may be attempted. It may be worth recollecting, that the British order of council, bearing date 24th June, 1803, and subjecting to capture vessels on a return voyage, which had carried contraband in the outward voyage, was never promulged, nor was it known that such a rule was to be enforced, until the summer of 1805. Could the rule be regarded otherwise than, as it certainly is, an innovation on the law of nations, all captures before it was made known, and contrary to antecedent practice, would be marked by an unjust surprise, fairly entitling them to redress.

The business to come before such a board may be much diminished by the reference of cases, particularly of costs and damages, and such others whose description by common consent entitles them to redress, to the king's advocate, and an advocate to be named on your part, who may be authorized to report the sums due, subject to the approbation, in each case, of Mr. Lyman, our agent. As far as the cases fall within the observation here made, a liquidation of them may be carried on during the period of negotiation.

Although the subject of indemnifications for past wrongs is to be pressed as of great magnitude, in a satisfactory adjustment o. our differences with Great Britain, yet as the British government may be inflexible in refusing an arrangement implying that her maritime principles of capture were contrary to the law of nations, whilst she

would not be inflexible in stipulating a future practice conformable to our wishes, it is not thought proper that a provision for indemnities should be an absolute condition of the repeal of the act of Congress concerning British manufactures, provided satisfactory arrangements shall be made relative to impressments, and the trade with enemies colonies. Still, however, it is to be kept in view, that there are claims founded on acts of British cruisers, violating the law of nations, as recognised by Great Britain herself, and others founded on unexpected departures, without notice, from rules of practice deliberately settled and formally announced. Of these, examples have been referred to in the communication of lord Hawkesbury to Mr. King, and of Mr. Merry to the department of state.

With respect to claims of these several kinds, it is evident, that provision is clearly due for them, and that it may be made without any implication which can alarm the pride or the caution which may be professed. You will not fail, therefore, to bring, if necessary, these claims into view, as distinguished from others founded on controverted principles; and to let it be understood, that a refusal of them will be a painful ingredient in the negotiations for extinguishing discontents on both sides, and consolidating and perpetuating the friendship between them. In case this distinction should operate in the adjustment, it will furnish an additional reason for preferring a gross sum, to the liquidations of a joint board. First, because it will admit of a liberal sum, if the British government should be liberally disposed, on presumptions not affecting her maritime principles. Secondly, because it will leave the United States free to apply the gross sum, in redressing claims, according to our maritime principles. A precedent for such an expedient may be found in the convention of January, 1756, between Great Britain and Prussia; whereby a gross sum of 20,000 pounds sterling was paid to the latter as an extinguishment of claims on account of illegal captures, without reference to the precise rules by which it was to be applied. The treaty of Pardo, in January, 1739, between Great Britain and Spain, is another precedent. In that treaty the sum of 95,000 pounds sterling was stipulated, in the like general manner, to be paid to Great Britain by Spain, as a compromise for all reparations of maritime injuries.