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The result of his deliberations which I am now to state to you, is, that it does not comport with his views of the na tional sentiment or the legislative policy, that any treaty should be entered into with the British government which, whilst on every other point it is either limited to, or short of strict right, would include no article providing for a case which, both in principle and in practice, is so feelingly connected with the honour and sovereignty of the nation, as well as with its fair interests; and indeed with the peace of both nations.

The President thinks it more eligible, under all circumstances, that if no satisfactory or formal stipulation on the subject of impressment be attainable, the negotiation should be made to terminate without any formal compact whatever; but with a mutual understanding, founded on friendly and liberal discussions and explanations, that in practice each party will entirely conform to what may be thus informally settled. And you are authorized, in case an arrangement of this kind shall be satisfactory in its substance, to give assurances that, as long as it shall be duly respected in practice by the other party, more particularly on the subjects of neutral trade and impressments, it will be earnestly and, probably, successfully recommended to Congress by the President, not to permit the nonimportation act to go into operation. You are also authorized to inform the British government that the Presi dent, adhering to the sentiments which led him to recommend to Congress at the commencement of the session a suspension of that act, and trusting to the influence of mutual dispositions and interests in giving an amicable issue to the negotiations, will, if no intervening intelligence for bid, exercise the authority vested in him by the act of continuing its suspension from the 1st day of July to the time. limited by the act, and which will afford to Congress, who will then be in session, the opportunity of making due provision for the case.

You will perceive that this explanation of the views of the President requires, that if, previous to the receipt of it, a treaty not including an article relating to impressments should have been concluded, and be on the way; the British commissioners should be candidly apprized of the reason for not expecting its ratification; and that on this ground they be invited to enter anew on the business,

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with an eye to such a result as has just been explained and authorized.

Having thus communicated the outline assigned by the President as your guide in the important and delicate task on your hands, I proceed to make a few observations which are suggested by the contents of your last despatches, and which may be of use in your further discussions and your final arrangements.

Impressments.

The British government is under an egregious mistake in supposing that "no recent causes of complaint have occurred," on this subject. How far the language of Mr. Lyman's books may countenance this errour, I cannot say, but I think it probable that, even there, the means of correcting it may be found.

In the American seas, including the West Indies, the impressments have, perhaps, at no time been more numerous or vexatious. It is equally a mistake therefore to suppose "that no probable inconvenience can result from the postponement of an article" for this case.

The remedy proposed in the note from the British commissioners, however well intended, does not inspire the confidence here which gave it so much value in their judg ment. They see the favourable side only of the character of their naval commanders. The spirit which vexes neutrals in their maritime rights is fully understood by neutrals only. The habits generated by naval command, and the interest which is felt in the abuse of it, both as respects captures and impressments, render inadequate every provision which does not put an end to all discretionary power in the commanders. As long as the British navy has so complete an ascendency on the high seas, its commanders have not only an interest in violating the rights of neutrals within the limits of neutral patience, especially of those whose commerce and mariners are unguarded by fleets, they feel moreover the strongest temptation, as is well known from the occasional language of some of them, to covet the full range for spoliation opened by a state of

The rich harvest promised by the commerce of the United States, gives to this cupidity all its force. Whatever general injuries might accrue to their nation. or whatever surplus of reprisals might result to American

cruisers, the fortunes of British cruisers would not be the less certain in the event of hostilities between the two nations.

Whilst all these considerations require in our behalf the most precise and peremptory security against the propensities of British naval commanders, and on the tender subject of impressment more than any other, it is impossible to find equivalent or even important motives on the British side for declining such a security. The proposition which you have made, aided by the internal regulations which the British government is always free to make, closes all the considerable avenues through which its seamen can find their way into our service. The only loss consequently which could remain, would be in the number at present in this service, with a deduction of those who might from time to time voluntarily leave it, or be found within the limits of Great Britain, or of her possessions: and in the proportion of this reduced number who might otherwise be gained by impressment. The smallness of this loss appears from the annual amount of impressments, which has not exceeded a few hundred British seamen ; the great mass consisting of real Americans, and of subjects of other neutral powers. And even from the few British seamen ought to be deducted those impressed within neutral ports, where it is agreed that the proceeding is clearly unlawful.

Under this view of the subject, the sacrifice which Great Britain would make, dwindles to the merest trifle; or rather there is just reason to believe, that, instead of a loss, she would find an actual gain, in the excess of the deserters who would be surrendered by the United States, over the number actually recoverable by impressment.

In practice, therefore, Great Britain would make no sacrifice by acceding to our terms; and her principle, if not expressly saved by a recital, as it easily might be, would in effect be so by the tenour of the arrangement; inasmuch as she would obtain for her forbearance to exercise what she deems a right, a right to measures on our part, which we have a right to refuse; she would, consequently, merely exchange one right for another; she would also, by such a forbearance, violate no personal right of individuals under her protection. The United States, on the other hand, in yielding to the claims of

Great Britain on this subject, would necessarily surrender what they deem an essential right of their flag, and of their sovereignty, without even acquiring any new right; would violate the rights of the individuals under the protection of both; and expose their native citizens to all the calamitous mistakes, voluntary and involuntary, of which experience gives such forcible warning.

I take for granted that you have not failed to make due use of the arrangement concerted by Mr. King with lord Hawkesbury, in the year 1802, for settling the question of impressments. On that occasion, and under that adminis tration, the British principle was fairly renounced in favour of the right of our flag: lord Hawkesbury having agreed to prohibit impressments altogether on the high seas, and lord St. Vincent requiring nothing more than an exception of the narrow seas, an exception resting on the obsolete claim of Great Britain to some peculiar dominion over them. I have thought it not amiss to enclose another extract from Mr. King's letter, giving an account of that transaction.

In the note of November 8, from the British commissioners, the security held out to the crews of our vessels is, that instructions have been given, and will be repeated, for enforcing the greatest caution, &c. If the future instructions are to be repetitions of the past, we well know the inefficacy of them. Any instructions which are to answer the purpose, must differ essentially from the past, both in their tenour and their sanctions. In case an informal arrangement should be substituted for a regu lar stipulation, it may reasonably be expected from the candour of the British government, that the instructions. on which we are to rely, should be communicated to you.

Colonial Trade.

It may reasonably be expected that on this subject the British government will not persist in attempting to place the United States on a worse footing than Russia. In agreeing to consider the storing for a month, and changing the ship, as a naturalization of the property, the concession would be on our side, not on theirs; and in making this a condition on which alone we could trade with enemy colo

nies, even directly to and from our own ports, beyond the amount of our own consumption, we should make every sacrifice short of a complete abandonment of our principle, while they would retain as much of their pretension as is compatible with any sacrifice whatever; a pretension too which they have in so many ways fairly precluded themselves from now maintaining. In addition to the many authorities for this remark, already known to you, you will find one of the highest grade in 5th vol. of Tomlin's cdition of Brown's cases in Parliament, p. 328, Hendricks and others against Cunningham and others, where it was expressly admitted by the house of lords, in a war case before them, that" it is now established by repeated determinations, that neither ships nor cargoes, the property of subjects of neutral powers, either going to trade at or coming from the French West India islands, with cargoes purchased there, are liable to capture; and therefore, when a ship and cargo so circumstanced are seized and condemned, the seizure and condemnation shall be reversed, and the value of the ship and cargo accounted for and paid to the owners by the captors.'

As it has generally happened, that the British instructions issued to the vice-admiralty courts and naval commanders, have not come first to light in British prints, I enclose one of November 14, which has just made its appearance in ours. As it relates to the present subject, it claims attention as a proof that all question as to the legality of the voyage, in a Russian trade with the enemies of Great Britain, is excluded, by limiting the right of capture to cases where the innocence or ownership of the articles are questioned. The instruction may at least be considered as co-extensive in its favourable import with the article in the Russian treaty, which you have been authorized to admit into your arrangements; and in that view, as well as on account of its date, the instruction may furnish a convenient topick of argument or expostulation.

If the British government once consent that the United States may make their ports a medium of trade between the colonies of its enemies and other countries, belligerent as well as neutral, why should there be a wish to clog it with the regulations suggested? Why not, in fact, consent to a direct trade by our merchants, between those colonies and all other countries? Is it that the price may be a little