point, it may, perhaps, be advisable not to increase the present discrimination. The last clause of this article, which stipulates that the same duties of exportation and importation shall be paid on all goods and merchandise, and that the same drawbacks and bounties shall be allowed in both countries, whether the same be in British or American vessels, will, it is also hoped, be found of very essential advantage to the United States. The right which Great Britain had reserved by the treaty of 1794, to countervail the difference of duty payable in the United States on European and Asiatick goods, when imported in British or American vessels, had been productive of very serious injury. The duties which had been imposed by the British government on American productions, on that principle, were so high, making in most cases a difference of

shillings per ton in favour of British vessels, that it must have been impossible, in peace, for our navigation to have borne it. The evil was the greater, because the species of commercial warfare in which it engaged us, in consideration of the comparative value and bulk of the articles subject to it in each country, furnished no remedy. On the contrary, as the principle was unfavourable, the farther it was carried, the worse would be its effect. By this clause it is presumed that the evil will be completely done away, while we flatter ourselves that the stipulation in favour of drawbacks and bounties, without exposing us to any inconvenience, will be productive of some advantage.

It is proper to remark that we did not omit to propose an arrangement on the subject of export duties, by which the United States should at least be placed in that respect upon the footing of all other nations. The discrimination to our prejudice in the British duties on exportation, which took their rise in the convoy duty of the last war, has undoubtedly an unkind and oppressive effect. This discrimination is found in the 43. Geo. 3, ch. 68, a permanent act, (which repealed the then existing duties, and substituted others) and in the 43. Geo. 3, ch. 70, which imposes additional duties during the present war. Taking the war duty and the permanent duty together, the consumers in the United States of certain British manufactures [for the duties in question apply only to British manufactures, and not to all of them; British cotton yarn and manufactures,

and some other articles being excepted] pay two and a half per cent. ad valorem more than the consumer in Europe, or within the straits, pays on the same goods.

The only mode in which it could be supposed to be possible, that this unpleasant distinction could be removed, was by applying to the subject the rule of the most favoured nation. Great Britain was not likely in her present situation to stipulate against all export duties, or even to agree to a maximum. Neither was she likely, by considering the actual duties as originally, and even now convoy duties, and therefore in their principle applicable only to the navigation which her convoys protect, to relieve from them, wholly or in part, such merchandise as should be carried to our country in American vessels, and leave them to oppress her own tonnage; thus offering a bounty in favour of American ships against her own. The rule of the most favoured nation was therefore finally suggested, with a hope that it would meet with no objection. It was, however, perseveringly opposed. We were told that the single effect of such an arrangement would be to compel Great Britain to raise the export duties against other countries, not to reduce them as to us, and that this would be of no advantage to the United States, but might be a serious embarrassment to Great Britain. It was urged on our part, that, if Great Britain could not give up entirely the excess of export duty, now paid by us, it did not follow that it might not be fairly distributed among the consumers of her merchandise in every part of the world, so as still to produce the same revenue with more regard to justice; that, as her best customers, we had a right to be placed upon at least an equal footing with other nations, and to complain if we were rather distinguished by the peculiar burdens which she undertook to impose upon us; that the discrimination against us, upon the notion that the duty had reference to convoy, was a fallacy, since part of the discrimination was permanent, and of course a peace, as well as a war duty; since we, who paid the duty, derived no benefit from the convoy, which was professed to be the consideration of it; and since the protection of their own trade in their own navigation, being a general and national concern, there was no sound reason why the relative expense of particular convoys should be allowed to suggest the relative measure of the duties, which were to supply

the means of affording them. They replied to the idea of distributing the amount of the discrimination among all the consumers of their merchandise, by referring us to the present state of Europe. They reminded us that their own colonies in America paid the same export duty that was paid by us, and repeated, that as it was only the discrimination between the United States and Europe, of which we could have any right to complain, we could not demand to have any part of the duty against which we remonstrated, withdrawn from us, and that we could gain nothing by forcing this country to add to the burdens of others, already overwhelmed and impoverishing by the calamities of war. We were obliged, though very reluctantly, to abandon this object.

The sixth article relates to the commerce with the West Indies, which it was found impossible to arrange in a satisfactory manner. There were many serious obstacles to an agreement on this point, some of which seemed to be peculiarly applicable to the present time. The British West India merchants had at an early stage represented, that by the trade which our citizens enjoyed with the colonies of their enemies, we had so completely stocked the markets of the continent with West India productions as to shut those markets on them. They had remonstrated earnestly against any arrangement of that point which should sanction, in any degree, our trade with those colonies. This question had taken deep hold of the minds of a great proportion of this community, among whom may be classed, not those in the mercantile line only, who were immediately engaged in the trade, but the whole commercial interest, and many in other circles of great consideration in the country. Of this fact sufficient proof was furnished by the debate which took place in the last session of parliament, on the bill for regulating the intercourse between the United States and the West Indies. The British commissioners seemed to have taken from that debate, more especially from the support which their opponents apparently received from the publick in it, a very strong admonition not to touch the subject by treaty at this time. They were apprehensive that any regulation of this trade, however fair it might be, which should ac-. company their sanction of that with the colonies of their enemies, would produce the worst effect with all parties,

and endanger any treaty which might be formed. They were, therefore, desirous of postponing the subject for the present; to which we agreed. In the stipulation which provides for the postponement, we have, as you will perceive, in conformity with our instructions, reserved the right to our government to counteract any regulations by which the British government may exclude us from a fair participation in that commerce. While the war lasts we shall enjoy it in a certain degree, with the consent of the British government, by necessity. And the reservation cannot fail to be considered by it as a powerful weapon of defence, to be used when occasion calls for it. It must be seen that it will be impossible for the Congress to prohibit an intercourse between the United States and the West Indies, in British vessels, without producing a very serious effect on their whole navigation and commercial interests. We flatter ourselves, therefore, that it may be found practicable, and perhaps not difficult, to arrange this business hereafter to the satisfaction of both countries.

The seventh article relates to the appointment of consuls by each party in the territories and ports of the other. It was taken from the treaty of 1794.

The 8th article, which specifies the causes for which vessels may be captured or detained, including among them the circumstance of their having enemies' property on board, is (except the last clause) a transcript of the seventeenth article of the treaty of 1794. The stipulation contained in that clause, that the parties shall be allowed adequate damages and charges of the trial in all cases of unfounded detention or other contravention of the regulations of the present treaty, will, we presume, produce the salutary effect contemplated by it. There is, perhaps, no principle in the maritime pretensions of this country, which has been more abused in practice, than that which this provision is intended to remedy. That da mages should be allowed in all such cases is,, it is true, a doctrine recognised by the court of admiralty. It canhot, however, be doubted that, by providing for them in the treaty, the obligation to allow them will acquire greater force with the court, and even the government itself, while it cannot fail to give an useful admonition to the cruisers.

The ninth article regulates what shall be deemed contraband of war. You will observe that tar and turpentine, except when destined to a place of naval equipment, are not comprised in it, and that provisions are altogether omitted. We endeavoured to exclude from it naval stores, but without effect. We succeeded, however, in exempting the vessel on the return voyage, after depositing her cargo at the port of her destination, from being detained on the pretence that it consisted of contraband articles.

The provision in the tenth article, relative to vessels sailing without knowledge of a blockade, is somewhat altered from the treaty of 1794. The precise effect of the change cannot perhaps be pronounced with certainty; but it seems to be clear that it cannot be otherwise than advantageous. The alterations consist in the introduction into the preamble of " the distance and other circumstances incident to the situation of the contracting parties," and of the word "such" into the provision which follows. The first amendment appears to justify an inference, that, on account of the peculiar circumstances, local and relative, thus recited as the reasons why, in the opinion of the contracting parties, "it may frequently happen that vessels may sail for a port or place without knowing that it is besieged, blockaded, or invested," our vessels ought not to be liable to be judicially affected with knowledge of a blockade, so as to subject them to penalty, by the evidence usually held to be sufficient for that purpose. Sir W. Scott decided in 1799, that, in consequence of the distance of the United States from Europe, we were entitled to a more favourable rule in that respect than other countries, and our article may be fairly considered as adopting that idea and acting upon it. On the foundation of the single fact of distance, sir W. Scott justified a conjectural destination from America to Amsterdam, although the blockade of that port had been notified; and the parties concerned were proved to have known of the commencement of it. The article, as it now stands, seems necessarily to imply at least the same indulgence; and, if it does, it certainly goes farther than sir W. Scott's opinion, which does not admit that an inquiry can be made of the blockading force, as our article unquestionably does, in the cases to which it applies. It does not appear to be unreasonable to hold,