commons to the king, of obtaining the co-operation of other powers, the United States were held particularly in view. The British commissioners proposed the article, and shewed great desire that we should agree to it. As this stipulation was not comprised within the scope of our instructions, we have thought it our duty to explain to you the cause to which its admission into the treaty is to be attributed.

The twenty-fifth article was introduced for the purpose of protecting other powers, having treaties with either party, in the enjoyment of the rights secured by them. The stipulation contained in our treaty with France, in 1803, of certain commercon privileges in favour of French and Spanish subjects for a defined term in Louisiana, made such a provision particularly necessary.

The twenty-sixth article fixes the term of the treaty at ten years from the date of the exchange of the ratifications.

We are sorry to add that this treaty contains no provision against the impressment of our seamen. Our despatch of the 11th of November communicated to you the result of our labours on that subject, and our opinion that, although this government did not feel itself at liberty to relinquish, formally by treaty, its claim to search our merchant vessels for British seamen, its practice would, nevertheless, be essentially if not completely abandoned. That opinion has been since confirmed by frequent conferences on the subject with the British commissioners, who have repeatedly assured us, that, in their judgment, we were made as secure against the exercise of their pretension by the policy which their government had adopted in regard to that very delicate and important question, as we could have been made by treaty. It is proper to observe, however, that the good effect of this disposition, and its continuance, may depend in a great measure on the means which may be taken by the Congress hereafter to check desertions from the British service. If the treaty is ratified, and a perfect good understanding produced by it between the two countries, it will be easy for their governments, by friendly communications, to state to each other what they respectively desire, and in that mode to arrange the business as satisfactorily as it could be done by treaty.

We regret also to be under the necessity of stating that no provision has been made by the treaty to indemnify our citizens for their losses by the late seizures, and other violations of the law of nations. This object engaged our attention in every stage of the negotiation, and was not abandoned by the signature of the treaty. On the day it was signed, we stated in explicit terms to the British commissioners, that we could not conclude, without having a satis factory assurance, by them, of the part their government intended to take, equally in regard to the vessels and cargoes which had been condemned, and the suits that were depending. The principle established in the correspondence between Mr. King and d Hawkesbury, we admit ted should form the boundary of our claim, in respect to the seizures for an imputed illegal trade; for every violation of which, in cases of condemnation, we expected a full indemnity, and a dismission of all the causes still depending that were protected by it. The British commissioners observed, that it was neither their wish nor expectation that we should relinquish our claim; on the contrary, they were willing we should preserve it: with which view they proposed that we should present them a paper, bearing date prior to the signature, which should make the reservation in such form as we thought best suited to the object. They intimated that, in cases of vested right, it was not in the power of their government to interfere to the prejudice of the parties, and that it would be hard on the government, and unpopular in the ministry, to apply the publick money to such a purpose; still they said nothing to preclude that expectation; on the contrary, they encouraged it, and were still more explicit in suggesting that the depending cases would not be unfavourably adjudged. They seemed desirous that, while we should reserve our claim, their government should retain a right to pursue such a course of conduct in regard. to it as might be dictated hereafter by circumstances. To enter into an engagement in favour of our claim in the present state of things, appeared to them as being likely to expose their government to the imputation of having done it by coercion, and to deprive it of a claim to any merit for such an accommodation as it might, under other circumstances, be disposed to yield. Should the circumstances of collision which had taken place between the two countries be done

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away, and their commerce and friendly relations be reestablished, as they hoped was already in a great measure done, and would be so completely by this treaty, their vernment, they thought, would feel itself more at liberty to yield accommodations on this topick than in the actual state. This was the substance of the communication made us on this subject by the British commissioners before the signature of the treaty, on which, and our declaring explicitly that we would reserve the right in the manner they had proposed, in full confidence that their government would respect it, we proceeded to sign the treaty. have had an interview with the British commissioners since the signature, and were happy to find that they had not forgotten what had passed between us on that occasion. We had asked the interview, as we informed them, for the purpose of conferring on this subject, and of obtaining their sentiments in so distinct a form as to leave us under no embarrassment in the communication it was our duty to make to you on it. Nothing passed in this interview, on their part, to change the ground on which the business had been placed in the former one. They intimated, however, that it might be advantageous, and would certainly be proper for us, in the present stage, to confer with lord Howick on this subject, since any declaration from him could not fail, according to its import, to merit the peculiar attention of our government. We have accordingly seen and conferred with lord Howick upon this topick, whose sentiments appeared to correspond strictly with those which had been delivered to us by the British commissioners. He intimated, however, that it would be better for us to address the note which should contain a reservation of our rights to indemnity, to him than to the commissioners, to which we assented, as we could not perceive that that circumstance would make any difference in the We are engaged in preparing this paper, which we expect to present to his lordship in a few days, though we fear it will not be ready in time to enable us to obtain his answer to it to be forwarded to you with this despatch. We shall not fail to communicate to you, without delay, whatever may occur on this subject. We think it our duty, however, to add, that we do not wish our government to be too sanguine in the expectation of a satisfactory result. 'In the deliberations on this subject, it may, perhaps, be

case.

better to presume that such a one may not be obtained, as it is not provided for in the treaty. The above statement is nevertheless perfectly correct, and we beg you to be assured, that we shall continue to exert our best endeavours to secure an object which we consider of so much importance. We shall send you a statement of the cases of condemnation, and of the causes still depending, which is less extensive in both views than may have been supposed.

It happened, when the negotiation had reached a very advanced stage, that an account was received here of the decree of the emperor of the French at Berlin, of November 21, which declared Great Britain and Ireland in a state of blockade, and all British manufactures and the produce of British colonies lawful prize. This circum stance produced a strong impression on this government, which was very seriously felt in our concerns. It seemed probable for some days that it would subject the negotiation to a long suspension, if it did not entirely defeat its object. The British commissioners informed us, that the decree of the government of France had opposed a pow erful obstacle to the conclusion of any treaty with us, be fore our government should be consulted on the subject, and its answer obtained as to the part it might take in re gard to it that in case the United States submitted to a violation of their neutral rights by France in the manner contemplated by that decree, it would be impossible for Great Britain to respect them; that by concluding a trea ty with the United States, by which they should not only bind themselves to the observance of such rights, but agree to concessions or relaxations of what they conceived to be their unquestionable rights of war, after knowing the contents of that decree, they might be understood to restrain themselves from counteracting the policy of France, which it would be improper to do, unless our government should engage to support its rights against the measures of France. In consideration of these circumstances, they proposed that we should proceed in the business so far as to agree on all the articles of the treaty, to reduce them to form, and then transmit the instrument to the United States, to become obligatory in case our govern ment should enter into a satisfactory engagement of the kind proposed. We replied in very explicit terms to the

British commissioners that we considered their proposition altogether inadmissible on our part, and not likely to accomplish, if we could agree to it, the object which they contemplated by it: that such a proposition to our government, under the circumstances attending it, would amount, in substance, to an offer to it of the alternative between the treaty and a war with France, since, if our government refused to give the satisfaction which they desired, the treaty would be lost: and if such satisfaction was given and the treaty concluded, and France should persist to execute her decree according to the construction given of it here, wars eemed to be inevitable: that if it should happen that our government should approve the treaty, it was not to be presumed that it would make any sacrifice, or stipulate any thing not contained in the instrument, especially so very important an act as that alluded to, as the condition on which it was to be obtained; that the arrangement of our differences and other concerns with Great Britain was an affair which rested on its own ground, and had no connection with our relations with France; that his majesty's government ought to suppose that the United States would not fail in any case to support with becoming dignity their rights with any power, and that it must be sensible that it would be more at liberty to enter into suitable friendly explanations with the government of France, on the subject of the decree in question, after the adjustment of their differences with Great Britain, than while they existed, as it likewise must be, that the prospect of obtaining satisfactory explanations on that point of France would be better while they acted under their own impulse as an independent and friendly power, than it would be in case they entered into an engagement of the kind proposed with her adversary. The British commissioners admitted, that these considerations were entitled to much attention: at length, however, after the subject had been, as we had reason to believe, maturely weighed in the cabinet, they informed us that their government still thought it incumbent on it to make a reservation of their right to counteract the policy of France, in case our government did not give them the satisfaction they desired, either by suitable assurances before the ratification of the treaty, or by its conduct afterwards. With this view they presented us a paper which we have the ho