their own process to bring in the offender. The indictment was in that Court, and though that Court might have acted on it, a single magistrate had no right to do so. Ferrard, for the prosecution.-I believe that the granting of a warrant in this way is in the ordinary course of business; and besides, as the constable was commanded by the magistrate's warrant to take the party, and it being a case over the subject matter of which the magistrate had jurisdiction, namely an assault, the constable had nothing to do but to execute the warrant. Mr. Justice PARK.-I have signed warrants over and over again on the certificate of the clerk of assize; and I should expect some authority to be cited to shew me that the practice is illegal. A Judge's warrant is not the warrant of the Court, but of the Judge personally. Where a thing is the act of the Court, the Judge's personal name never appears to it at all. There are some particular affidavits that must be sworn before a Judge, and there the Judge's own name must be signed to them. Even at the Assizes, where I sign warrants continually, I alone am not the Court without the clerk of assize or some other commissioner being joined with me; and if an indictment came in from the Grand Jury now, while I am sitting in Court, I should not grant a warrant upon it without a certificate being first given by the clerk of assize. I will, however, confer with my learned brother on the point, as there is much business of this kind in the Court of King's Bench. His Lordship, having conferred with Mr. Justice Patteson, said "My learned brother has no doubt; he is done every day." Ferrard, for the prosecution. As to the practice respecting the granting of Judge's warrants on indictments found in the Court of King's Bench, see 1 Gude's says Verdict-Guilty. it Cr. Off. Prac. 85; and the forms of 1831. REX v. STOKES. 1831. SHREWSBURY ASSIZES. BEFORE MR. JUSTICE PATTESON. July 30th. The treating act and their agents. HUGHES v. MARSHALL and Others. ASSUMPSIT for goods sold. Plea-General issue. This action was brought for the price of ale and other refreshments, supplied to the voters of Mr. Slaney, M.P. for Shrewsbury, during the election there in the year 1830. The defendants were not members of Mr. Slaney's committee; and it was proved, that they had ordered the refreshments in question, and had signed a paper stating that fact and the amount of the account. The defence was, that the plaintiff had given credit to Mr. Slaney's committee, and that this account had been included in another account, which had been paid by that committee; and Campbell, for the defendant, also contended, that the plaintiff could not recover, as this account came within the treating act 7 & 8 W. 3, c. 4 (a), since which no bill for treating at an election could be recovered. Mr. Justice PATTESON.-That act only applies to candidates and their agents. If I was to go and run up a bill during an election, there is no doubt that I must pay it. By this act of Parliament, candidates and their agents are prohibited from treating voters; but still, as many of the voters come from a distance, they must have accommodation and refreshment, and for that they must either themselves be liable, or any one else may be liable who gives the order, provided he be neither a candidate nor an agent. (a) Cited ante, Vol. 3, p. 401, n. See the case of Ward v. Nanney, Id. p. 399. His Lordship left the case to the Jury on the first ground 1831. In the ensuing term Godson obtained a rule nisi for a new trial, which was subsequently discharged. (Crown Side). BEFORE MR. JUSTICE PARK. REX v. HICKMAN. July 29th. for manslaughter charged, that the deceas ed was on horse back, and that the prisoner struck him with MANSLAUGHTER. The first count of the indict- An indictment ment stated the death of the deceased to have been by blows. The second count stated, in substance, that the deceased, John Randell, was riding on horseback, and that the prisoner made an assault upon him, and struck him with a stick; and that the deceased, from a well-grounded apprehension of a further attack upon him, which would have endangered his life, spurred on his horse, whereby it became frightened, and threw the deceased off, giving him a mortal fracture, &c. There was no evidence to support the first count; and it appeared, that the prisoner and the deceased, being both on horseback, had a quarrel; and that the prisoner struck a stick, and that the deceased, from a wellgrounded appre hension of a furwhich would ther attack, have endangered his life, spurred his horse, which be came frightened, and threw him, giving him a mortal fracture. The evidence was, that the prisoner struck the deceased with a small stick, and that the latter rode away, and the former rode after him; whereupon the deceased spurred his horse, which then winced, and threw him, whereby he was killed:-Held, that this evidence sufficiently supported the indict ment. 1831. REX v. HICKMAN. the deceased with a small stick, and that he rode away along the Holyhead road, the prisoner riding after him; and that, on the deceased spurring his horse, which was a young one, the horse winced, and threw him. Bather and C. Phillips, for the prisoner, objected— First, that the fall ought to have been laid as the cause of the death; whereas, the cause stated was the blow of the stick and the frightening of the horse; and, secondly, that the blow and the frightening of the horse were stated jointly to have been the cause of the death, whereas the blow, it was evident, could not have caused it, ever so remotely; and, besides that, it was stated, that the deceased was apprehensive of a further attack upon him, which would endanger his life, of which there was not the slightest evidence. Mr. Justice PARK.-I think the second count is sufficiently proved. The death of this individual was clearly caused by the frightening of his horse. In indictments for robbery, terror and force are always both stated, but it is sufficient to prove one of them. However, in this count, it is not stated that the deceased died of any blow. In the case of Rex v. Evans (a), it was held, that if the death of the deceased, who was the wife of the prisoner, was partly occasioned by blows, and partly by a fall out of a window, the wife jumping out at the window from a wellgrounded apprehension of further violence that would have endangered her life, the prisoner was as much answerable for the consequences of the fall, as if he had thrown her out at the window himself. Verdict-Guilty. Whateley, for the prosecution. Bather and C. Phillips, for the defence. (a) 1 Russ. C. & M. 425. See the case of Rex v. Culkin, ante, p. 121. GLOUCESTER ASSIZES. BEFORE MR. JUSTICE PATTESON. 1831. REX v. WARREN JAMES. INDICTMENT on the riot act, 1 Geo. 1, st. 2, c. 5, s. 1(a). The indictment stated, that, on the 8th of June, 1 Will. 4, the prisoner and certain evil disposed persons, to the number of one hundred and more, did unlawfully, riotously, and routously assemble; and that, while so assembled, Edward Machin, one of his Majesty's Justices of the Peace for the county of Gloucester, did go, as near as he safely could, to proclaim silence; and afterwards did, as near as he safely could, make proclamation (setting out the proclamation (b)); and that the prisoner, and the other persons, to the number of twelve and more, afterwards, and notwithstanding the proclamation, did remain together for the space of an hour and more, against the form of the statute. C. Phillips, for the prisoner.-I submit that this indictment is bad. In an indictment for a riot, it is necessary that the indictment should state it to have been in terrorem populi. That was decided in the case of Rex v. Hughes (c); and it is so laid down by the text writers. This indictment begins with charging a riot, as, without that, the magistrate had no right to make proclamation; and it being necessary to charge that a riot was com (a) Set forth ante, Vol. 4, p. 442. (b) Care ought to be taken to set out the proclamation exactly as the Justice made it. Several of the printed precedents, in setting out the proclamation, vary from the proclamation as given in the act, and as given in Chetw. (c) Ante, Vol. 4, p. 373. See |