1831.

REX

v.

BELL.

gistrate's clerk who heard it, and that he may refresh his memory by the aid of the written paper.

Clarkson then further objected, that, as the rules of law required that the best evidence should be given, the parol statement of the clerk was not receivable. The paper ought to be used as a confession, or the evidence should not be received at all.

GASELEE, J.-After again consulting with Lord Tenterden, C. J., said, we are still of opinion that the clerk may give the whole in evidence, refreshing his memory by the written paper.

The confession was then read by the magistrate's clerk in the third person, and the prisoner was convicted and executed.

Walsh and Brett, for the prosecution.

Clarkson, for the prisoner.

In a case which occurred on the Norfolk Circuit, where a statement made by a prisoner, which was proved to have been taken under similar circumstances, as far as regarded the completion of the evidence against him, was offered in evidence. Sydney Taylor, for the prisoner, objected, and cited Rex v. Fagg. The depositions were produced, and it appeared

that they had been drawn up as if the whole evidence had been taken before the confession was made. Lord Lyndhurst, C. B., rejected the evidence, on the ground that the document was false; but intimated, that he did not consider the objection as tenable, upon the ground mentioned in the authority referred to.

165

NORFOLK SUMMER CIRCUIT.

1831.

BEFORE LORD LYNDHURST, C. B., AND MR. BARON GARROW.

BEDFORD ASSIZES.

BEFORE MR. BARON GARROW.

REX v. JAMES DEERING and JOHN ATKINSON.

THE prisoners were indicted for burglary in the dwelling-house of John Bull, and stealing a quantity of watches, &c.

Austin, for the prosecution, stated that he should call a person named Westwood, who had been lately discharged from Cambridge gaol, and who would depose to a conversation between himself and the prisoner Atkinson relating to the robbery in question. He was proceeding to state the conversation to the Jury, when

Smith, for the prisoners, objected, on the ground that various circumstances might arise in the progress of the cause, rendering the conversation inadmissible in evidence; and he submitted that it was better that the Jury should not hear that in statement, which they could not afterwards act upon as evidence.

ect of the conA person indicted with

versation.

others for an

against whom

offence, but

the bill has been
thrown out,
may, if he be
in custody at
the time of the
trial of the

others, be placed at the bar to be identified as one who was in their company.

1831.

REX

บ.

DEERING.

GARROW, B.-If the counsel for the prosecution thinks fit to open the evidence, I cannot control him (a).

A person named Ward had been indicted with the two prisoners for the offence in question, but the Grand Jury had thrown out the bill against him; but he was present in Court in the custody of the gaoler of Cambridge, having been brought by him to answer this charge, and, being detained in such custody, to be taken back to Cambridge, to answer another charge there. It was proposed on the part of the prosecution to place him in the dock beside the prisoners who were on trial, in order that he might be identified as a person who was in their company.

Smith, for the defence, objected, that as the Grand Jury had thrown out the bill, he was as free from the present charge as if it had never been preferred against him, and therefore ought not to be treated as if the bill had been found and he was actually on his trial.

GARROW, B., said, that there was no doubt as to the right to have the party produced in order that he might be identified; and Ward was, in consequence, placed at the bar. His Lordship afterwards observed, that the same course had been adopted on the trial of Thistlewood and others at the Old Bailey.

Austin, for the prosecution.

Smith, for the prisoners.

Verdict-Guilty.

[Attornies-Swain & Co., and Isaacs.]

(a) In a case tried on the same Circuit, in March, 1831, a similar objection was made, and a similar decision given by Alderson, J.; but in the case of Rex v. Swatkins and

Others, Vol. 4 of these Reports, p. 548, Bosanquet and Patteson, Js., were of opinion that the correct practice was only to state the general effect of the conversation.

BURY ASSIZES.

BEFORE LORD LYNDHURST, C. B.

1831.

REX v. TUFFS.

THE prisoner was indicted for stealing two heifers, the
property of James Suker of Mildenhall. The heifers were
not missed by the prosecutor or any person in his service,
and the only evidence against the prisoner was his own
statement, when questioned on the subject, that he had
driven away two heifers from his uncle's premises, "the
World's End Dolver," (Dolver meaning, in that part of
the country, a fen). The prosecutor and another person
proved that the prosecutor's farm was called by that name,
but they could not undertake to say that there was
any other of that name.

not

July 22nd.

A prisoner, in

dicted for steal

ing two heifers, said: "I drove

away two heif

ers from "the

World's End

Dolver," (i. e.
Fen). The pro-

secutor's farm

was called by he could not was not any

that name, but

swear that there

other of the same name in the neighbourhood:-Held, insufficient to

viction.

Lord LYNDHURST, C. B., upon this, told the Jury, that, warrant a conunder the circumstances, there was not any evidence of a stealing as to the heifers of the prosecutor; though, if it had been proved that his farm was the only "World's End Dolver," it would have been sufficient.

Verdict-Not guilty.

1831.

July 23rd.

To justify the acquittal of a

prisoner indicted for murder,

on the ground of insanity, the Jury must be satisfied that he was incapable of judging be

tween right and

wrong, and at

the time of committing the act

did not consider

that it was an offence against the laws of God

and nature,

REX v. OFFord,

THE prisoner was indicted for the murder of a person named Chisnall, by shooting him with a gun, The defence was insanity. It appeared that the prisoner laboured under a notion that the inhabitants of Hadleigh, and particularly Chisnall, the deceased, were continually issuing warrants against him with intent to deprive him of his liberty and life; that he would frequently, under the same notion, abuse persons whom he met in the street, and with whom he never had any dealings or acquaintance of any kind. In his waistcoat pocket a paper was found, headed, "List of Hadleigh conspirators against my life." It contained forty or fifty names, and among them "Chisnall and his family." There was also found, among his papers, an old summons about a rate, at the foot of which he had written, "This is the beginning of an attempt against my life." Several medical witnesses deposed to their belief, that, from the evidence they had heard (a), the prisoner laboured under that species of insanity which is called monomania; and that he committed the act while under the influence of that disorder, and might not be aware that, in firing the gun, his act involved the crime of murder.

Lord LYNDHURST, C. B. (in summing up), told the Jury that they must be satisfied, before they could acquit the prisoner on the ground of insanity, that he did not know, when he committed the act, what the effect of it, if fatal, would be, with reference to the crime of murder. The question was, did he know that he was committing an offence against the laws of God and nature? His Lordship referred to the doctrine laid down in Bellingham's case (b)

(a) See Rer v. Haswell, Russ. & Ry. C. C. R. 458, cited Carr.

Sup. p. 72.

(b) The prisoner was indicted