1831. V. HILL. go out freight free, the defendant would not have got any DE MEDEIROS thing if he could not have discharged his cargo of salt. He would have been taken if he had gone, as there was a blockade; and, if there had not been a blockade, he would have been in time to bring back fruit, provided he had sailed in November, when he was at liberty to go. At all events, no more than nominal damages can be recovered; but I submit that the action is not maintainable. I shall shew that a letter was received at Lloyd's, on the 18th of March, 1829, from the Foreign Office, stating that intelligence had been received of an effective blockade of the port of Terceira by the existing government. We have nothing to do with the disputes between Don Miguel and Don Pedro; if our government considers the government blockading as an existing government, and the blockade is effective, that is enough, and every contract to elude it is illegal. The ship must either have been taken or have returned. It would have been no advantage to the plaintiff to have brought his salt back. The letter was then put in and read. Jones, Serjt., in reply.-The notification of the blockade was in March, 1829, and the contract was in September, 1830. There is no evidence that there was any blockade; and, in point of law, the contract is not illegal. TINDAL, C. J.—I do not say it is illegal. I shall tell the Jury that it is legal; but it is a question of damages. Jones, Serjt.-Then, as to the damages; salt was not a prohibited article, and therefore the vessel would not have been in danger of being taken. As the delay in returning from Plymouth was the cause of the injury, the plaintiff is entitled to damages to the amount of the profit on the salt, and also on the fruit, which was to be brought back. It is evident that the objection, on the ground of the blockade, was merely an after-thought. TINDAL, C. J. (in summing up) said-It seems that the captain did not merely go to Plymouth, but went on to Exeter, and stopped on his return at Fowey. There is, therefore, undoubtedly a breach of the charter-party in that respect. But, when he returned to Liverpool, on the 23rd of November, he objected to the voyage, on the ground that Terceira was blockaded. The defendant's counsel contends, that the blockade made the contract illegal, just as if there had been war between our country and the blockading government. But it does not appear to me, that the mere circumstance of there being a blockade prevented the parties from speculating if they pleased, knowing the fact at the time; yet it may materially affect the question of damages. If the captain had gone, and waited at Terceira for a time, and found the blockade still continuing, the voyage would have been unproductive; yet, if the parties, knowing the fact, chose to enter into a contract like this, the party breaking it is liable to an action. The question is, whether the ship, when she arrived off Terceira, would have been prevented from entering, by an effective blockade, if she had gone there; for, if that were the case, then the verdict should be for nominal damages only. The only evidence as to the nature of the blockade is from a witness who left in March, 1830, at which time there was a blockade, and returned on the 12th December, 1830, at which time there was no blockade. If you think, that though there was a blockade at an earlier period, it did not continue till the time in question, you will regulate the damages accordingly. If you think that the ship would not have found an effective blockade when she arrived, or that, by waiting a reasonable time, she could have got in, then you will not confine yourselves to giving nominal damages. And, with respect to the amount, I think it was rather incumbent on the plaintiff to shew, if he seeks to recover the larger sum for the sale of the salt in the retail way, that he had some person at Terceira, to 1831. DE MEDEIROS v. HILL. whom it was to be delivered, and who would have so sold it for him; as the duty of the captain would only be to leave it at the place. Verdict for the plaintiff-100%. Jones, Serjt, and Shee, for the plaintiff. Taddy, Serjt., and Tomlinson, for the defendant. IN the ensuing term, an application for a new trial was made; but the Court were of opinion that the case had been properly decided at Nisi Prius, and refused a rule. Dec. 21st. BREMRIDGE and ROBERTS v. CAMPBELL, Knt. Two of the elec- ASSUMPSIT for money paid, &c. tors of a borough went to a banker there, and said, they wished to draw The plaintiffs were two of the electors of Barnstaple, and the defendant a candidate to represent that borough in Parliament. It appeared that, a short time before the checks upon the bank. The election, the plaintiffs went to a banker's in Barnstaple, banker promis- and said they wished to draw checks upon the bank; and the bankers promised to honour their checks. There was no evidence of any joint payment of money into the bank; and all the checks on the bank were signed by one of the plaintiffs only. There was much contradictory evidence ed to honour any checks they might draw. The checks drawn were signed by one only, but the account in the banker's books was open ed in the joint names:-Held, that they might maintain a joint action against the candidate, in whose interest they were, if he adopted the payments made. Semble, that, where the same sum is given to every voter coming from the same place to an election, for his travelling expenses, it is bribery; and it is not the less so, though all the candidates agree in the payment of the same amount. But it is for the Jury to say, in an action by an agent of the candidate, to recover the amount from his principal, whether the money was bond fide paid for expenses, and expenses only. as to whether the payments sought to be recovered were or were not adopted by the defendant, as having been made by the plaintiffs for the advancement of his interest in the borough. It appeared clearly that it was not distinctly known at the time when several of the payments were made, whether the defendant would stand for the borough or not, though a requisition had been sent to him. A considerable portion of the money was spent in payments of 20., 15., 10., and 6%., to various voters, who came from London, Bristol, and other places, as for their expenses. There were three candidates; and it was agreed among them, that a voter from London, giving a plumper, should receive 20%. from the candidate for whom he voted; and that one who voted for two should receive 107. from each. The expenses of voters from other places were also agreed upon, at a certain sum. It appeared also, that the defendant's solicitor and agent had deposited 10007. at another bank in the place, for the purposes of the election. Taddy, Serjt., at the close of the plaintiffs' case, applied for a nonsuit, on the ground that there was no evidence of a joint right of action in these plaintiffs. There was no proof of joint liability, or joint payments by them to the bankers; and all the checks drawn appeared to be in the name of one only. Spankie, Serjt.-According to the evidence, there was a joint fund of credit; and that would have the same effect as a joint fund of money. TINDAL, C. J.—If there was bona fide a joint fund of credit, it is the same as if there was a joint fund of money. I do not think that I can withdraw the case from the Jury; it must go to them, with my observations. In the course of the cause, it was objected, that the 1831. BREMRIDGE v. CAMPBELL. 1831. BREMRIDGE V. CAMPBELL. sums paid for travelling expenses could not be recovered, being evidently given as bribes; being of the same amount to each person coming from the same place. TINDAL, C. J.-I shall leave it to the Jury to say, whether they believe that the money was given bona fide for expenses or not. Each voter from the same place receives the same sum. Now, their expenses could not be the same sum exactly; one might come by steam, and another by coach. Spankie, Serjt., stated, that the Committee of the House of Commons, on a former election for Barnstaple, had allowed 10%. for the expenses of out-voters from London. Merewether, Serjt., stated, that the Evesham election had been declared void, on this very ground, that the expenses were all the same sum. Taddy, Serjt., addressed the Jury for the defendant. Spankie, Serjt., in reply, (as to the expenses).—It is not bribery; because bribery is to give one candidate an advantage over another; and, where all parties agree in the same course of proceeding, it is not bribery. TINDAL, C. J., in summing up, said-There are three questions for your consideration-first, Whether the defendant ever authorized the outlay on his account-and, secondly, Whether the money was advanced out of any fund in which the plaintiffs were jointly interested. These two questions go to the maintenance of the action; and, if you find them both in the affirmative, then will come the third question, viz.-How much the plaintiffs are entitled to recover; and that will depend upon the nature of the payments. If any of them were made to bribe the voters to vote for Sir Colin Campbell; or, if any part comes within |