ing beast, as such an animal would be of no manner of use; and if a man is not allowed to keep a sharp dog, he cannot keep his property secure from depredations. Wilde, Serjt., in reply.-A party has no right to keep a dog of this sort, so as to command the way to his stable. It was the bounden duty of the defendant to have given the plaintiff an express caution on this occasion. TINDAL, C. J. (in summing up).—The first question is, whether this dog was of a savage disposition to the knowledge of the defendant; and, if so, you will then have to consider whether the dog was placed in such a situation, that, by common care, he might have been avoided. Another question will be, whether the plaintiff was bound to take notice of the danger, as he had been told that the dog was there. If you think, that, by reason of the plaintiff's not taking common care, this accident occurred, he cannot recover; however, you may be of opinion, that, the master of the dog walking just before the plaintiff, and, as it were, leading him on, the plaintiff might think he was safe, more especially as no caution was given him at this time by the defendant. I am of opinion, that the plaintiff is entitled to recover, if he did not as it were run himself into the mischief by his own carelessness and want of caution. Verdict for the plaintiff-Damages 201. Wilde, Serjt., and Shee, for the plaintiff. Spankie, Serjt., and Carrington, for the defendant. [Attornies-Rippingham, and W. P. Clarke.] See the cases of M'Kone v. Wood, ante, p. 1; Blackman v. Simmons, ante, Vol. 3, p. 138; and Sarch v. Blackburn, ante, Vol. 4, p. 297. In the case of Jones v. Perry, 2 Esp. 482, Lord Kenyon held, that an action would lie for 1833. CURTIS v. MILLS. 1833. CURTIS v. MILLS. tomed to bite mankind, was kept on the defendant's premises, and the injury received in consequence of the plaintiff imprudently going there, an action would not lie; but Lord Kenyon said, that, where an accident arose from a mischievous bull, and it appeared that there was a contest respecting a right of way through the field in which it occurred, he had held that the defendant was liable. In actions of this kind, the defendant's knowledge of the animal's being vicious is essential. In the case of Mason v. Keeling, 12 Mod. 332, the de claration stated, that the defendant kept a dog, which was very fierce, and suffered it to go unmuzzled about the streets, so that, by the want of care of the defendant, the plaintiff, while walking in the street, was bitten. This declaration was held bad, because it did not state a scienter. The following cases also decide the scienter to be material: Dy. 25 b; Bayntun v. Sharp, Lut. 33, 2 Salk. 662; Jenkins v. Turner, 2 Salk. 662, Lord Ray. 109; Smith v. Pelah, 2 Str. 1264. COURT OF EXCHEQUER. Adjourned Sittings at Westminster, after Hilary BEFORE MR. BARON GURNEY. (Who sat for the Lord Chief Baron.) A sheriff had obtained judg SARJEANT v. COWAN and Another. ASSUMPSIT for money had and received. Plea--the ment against A. general issue. in an action on a bail bond. On It appeared that the defendants, who were Sheriff of this a fi fa. is Middlesex, had been plaintiffs in an action on a bail bond, against a person named Wigeon, and obtained a verdict sued, directed to the coroner. S., who was attorney for the sheriff, and also for others, indorsed the name of a sheriff's officer on the writ; the coroner's broker seized a barge, which was bought by B., and the price paid to the officer; subsequently, the barge was claimed by others, and B. lost his purchase:-Held, that, under these circumstances, the officer was not the agent of the sheriff, so as to make the sheriff liable in an action for money had and received at the suit of B., although it was proved to be the practice at the sheriff's office, to indorse the name of the officer on the writ. and judgment, in consequence of which a writ was issued, directed to the Coroner of Middlesex, by which a barge, alleged to be the property of Widgeon, was seized and sold by the coroner's broker. The writ had the names of Simpson and Burder indorsed on it, who were at the time officers of the Sheriff of Middlesex, which names were indorsed by Smith, Son, & Merriman, who were attornies for the sheriff as well as others. Simpson was called as a witness for the plaintiff, and proved that he did not execute the writ, but had received the money from the broker, and retained it in his possession, and did not pay it over to the defendants, for a reason which he stated. The action was brought to recover back the money paid by the plaintiff for the barge, on the ground that the consideration had failed, as other persons had claimed the barge as theirs, and deprived the plaintiff of the profit of his purchase. GURNEY, B., inquired of the plaintiff's counsel how he fixed the defendants with the possession of the money. J. Williams. I rely on the fact, that the money was received by a person, who was at the time an officer of the sheriff, and whose name was on the writ, and who must therefore be taken to be the agent of the defendants. GURNEY, B.-An officer of the sheriff is not a general agent of the sheriff to receive money. He is the particular agent of the sheriff appointed in each particular case. Here the legal authority to sell was given by the coroner. You do not shew that these defendants gave any authority in the matter. J. Williams. For this reason I wish to inquire into the course of business in the sheriff's office. Simpson was allowed to be recalled, and said, that he had been an officer of the sheriff for twenty years, and 1833. SARJEANT v. COWAN. 1833. SARJEANT ย. COWAN. that the practice was, when the sheriff gave a warrant to his officer, to put the name of the officer at the tail of the writ. J. Williams.-I submit, that inasmuch as it appears that the writ was not indorsed in the coroner's office, but in the office of the sheriff's attornies, and as the person whose name was on it was an officer of the sheriff at the time when he received the money, he must be taken to have received it on behalf of the sheriff, as the practice of the sheriff's office was to indorse the writ with the name of the officer. And the reason he gave for not having paid over the money to the sheriff was matter of arrangement between the defendants and him, and would not prevent the plaintiff from suing the sheriff. W. H. Watson, on the same side.-The action is not against the defendants qua sheriff, but as persons suing out the writ directed to the coroner. GURNEY, B.-I think that mode of stating the argument is most correct, which assumes that the defendants are not charged as sheriff, but as plaintiffs in the former action. Yet I think that the plaintiff has not fixed them with the possession of the money, and therefore he must be nonsuited. Nonsuit. J. Williams and W. H. Watson, for the plaintiff. Holt, for the defendant. [Attornies-West & Morris, and Smith & Co.] IN the ensuing term, J. Williams moved to set aside the nonsuit; but the Court Refused a rule. NICHOLSON V. HARDWICK, ESQ. and Another. ASSAULT and false imprisonment. Plea-Not guil ty (a). A 1833. Feb. 6th. woman died after a very short illness. Rumours were generally in cir culation in the neighbourhood husband had and a great crowd was col lected in front of his house; upon which the constable of the any warrant, conveyed him before a magis The plaintiff sued in formá pauperis. It appeared that the plaintiff's wife died, after an illness of only a few hours, on the morning of the 12th June; and in the where she had course of that day a great sensation was excited in the lived, that her neighbourhood in which the plaintiff lived; and rumours poisoned her, were in general circulation, that he had poisoned his wife. A great crowd was collected about six o'clock in the evening; and, in consequence of the rumours, the defendant Brooman, who, it was proved, acted as constable of the parish, without parish, without any warrant, took the plaintiff into cus- took him into tody, and conveyed him before the other defendant, Mr. custody and Hardwick, who was a police magistrate. The plaintiff was detained in custody till the next day. He was not put into any cell, but allowed to sit by the fire at the police station; and, as soon as the medical men who opened the body had reported that the woman died from natural causes, he was immediately discharged. It appeared after- Held, that if the jury were of wards, and was proved at the trial, that the woman was opinion that the taken very ill in the street, about half-past eleven in the evening of the 11th June, and was carried by a patrol to Bishopsgate watch-house, and conveyed home in a cabriolet. The patrol, who proved this, said that the husband assisted him in taking her up stairs, and that she spoke of The jury her husband in the highest terms. trate, who de tained him till medical men had reported the cause of death, and then dis charged him:— constable had reasonable ground of sus picion to justify the apprehen sion, the action could not be maintained. thought that there was such ground, and found a verdict dants. GURNEY, B., to the plaintiff's counsel.-If this is to for the defenrepel any suspicion of your client's having poisoned his wife, there is no necessity for it, for that is not suggested now. The question is, what was the notion at the time? What is known now was not known then. (a) Vide stat. 21 Jac. 1, c. 12, s. 5, referred to ante, Vol. 1, p. 41. Notice of action was proved pur- |