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should be allowed till after the party is taken and brought to his trial (a).



F. V. Lee.-I am informed, that since his discharge the prisoner is not to be found. Here, theprosecutor has preferred his indictment, and has done all that he could do; and for the discharge of the prisoner he is in no way to blame.

Mr. Justice TAUNTON.-I think that, as the bill has been preferred and found, I may, under the word "prosecuted” in the section you refer to, order the expenses. But, if the witnesses had merely appeared here according to their recognizances,and no bill had been preferred, I think that I should have had no authority.

Expenses allowed.

F. V. Lee, for the prosecution.


(a) See the case of Rex v. Hunter, ante, Vol. 3, p. 591.

See the stat. 7 Geo. 4, c. 64, ss.

22 to 30, respecting the allowance
of expenses and rewards, set forth
Carr. Supp. p. 106 et seq.

Rex v. Evans. False pretence. The indictment charged that B. E. A person who on &c., at &c., a certain counterfeit letter in writing, in the on delivering a name of one John Roe, as a true letter of the proper hand- forged letter, writing of the said John Roe, falsely, fraudulently, and de- the bearer W.T. ceitfully, to one John Brooks did deliver, and also did four yards of then and there falsely pretend to the said John Brooks, J. R., is not inthat he had brought the same from the said John Roe for dictable for ob

taining goods by false pretence,

as this is an uttering a forged request for the delivery of goods, which is a felony under sect. 10 of the stat. 1 Will. 4, c. 66.

have for J. R.

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v. Evans.

the articles specified therein; and by which false and counterfeit letter it was mentioned, that the said John Roe desired the said John Brooks to supply the bearer thereof with four yards of Irish linen and a waistcoat; and which said false and counterfeit letter is as follows, that is to say:

“ Mr. Brooks-- Please to let the bearer, William Turton, have for J. Roe four yards of Irish linen and a waistcoat. " Jan. 6, 1833.

“ John Roe.”

By means of which counterfeit letter and of the said false pretences, the said B. E: did obtain &c.

Mr. Justice TAUNTON.- This is a forged request for the delivery of goods. This case comes within the 10th sect. of the stat. 11 Geo. 4 &1 Will. 4, c. 66 (a). It is clearly an uttering of a forged request for the delivery of goods.

W.J. Alexander, for the prosecution.--I submit that it is still a false pretence within the stat. 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29,

s. 53.

Mr. Justice TAUNTON.-No; it is uttering a forged re

(a) By which it is enacted,“ that if any person shall forge or alter, or shall offer, utter, dispose of, or put off, knowing the same to be forged or altered, any deed, bond, or writing obligatory, or any court roll, or copy of any court roll relating to any copybold or customary estate, or any acquittance or receipt either for money or goods, or any accountable receipt either for money or goods, or for any note, bill, or other security for payment of money, or any warrant, order,

or request for the delivery or transfer of goods, or for the delivery of any note, bill, or other security for payment of money, with intent to defraud any person whatsoever, every such offender shall be guilty of felony, and, being convicted thereof, shall be liable, at the discretion of the Court, to be transported beyond the seas for life, or for any term not less than seven years, or to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding four years or less than two years."


quest for the delivery of goods. It is a felony, and not a misdemeanor. The prisoner must be acquitted.

Verdict—Not guilty.



W. J. Alexander, for the prosecution.

F. V. Lee, for the prisoner.

been built for
an oven to bake

not under the

horse. Neither

Rex v. HauGHTON.

March 15th. ARSON. The prisoner was charged with setting fire A building had to an outhouse;" and in another count with setting fire to a “stable,” the property of Joseph Owen. In other bricks, but after

wards was roofcounts, the outhouse and stable were stated to be the pro- ed, and a door

put to it. In perty of John Sparrow.

this place the

prosecutor kept It appeared that the place burnt had been an oven to

a cow; adjoinbake bricks, and that the prosecutor had made a door-way ing to it, but (with a door) into it, and had put boards and turf over the same roof, was

a lean-to, in vent-hole at the top. It also appeared that two poles had

which another been fixed across it at about half its height, on which person kept a boards had been laid, so as to make a loft-floor. In this the prosecutor

nor the person place, the prosecutor kept a cow; and adjoining to it, of whom he

rented this but not under the same roof, was a lean-to, in which a

building had person named Cope kept a horse; but this latter building any house or

farm-yard near was not injured by the fire.

it, nor did any

with any dwellC. Phillips, for the prisoner.—I submit that this indict. ing-house, the

nearest dwelling ment must fail. This was a building for burning bricks, being one hun

dred yards off, which has latterly been used as a cow-house, but never as and not belonga stable. It is not a stable, as it was only used for cows;

ing to either the

prosecutor or indeed, the witness calls it a cow-house.

his landlord:Held, that the

building was The prosecutor being recalled, said, that the building ner act out

neither a stable was about one hundred yards from any dwelling-house, house; and that and that the owner of the nearest dwelling-house had no it on fire (the

lean-to not

being burnt),

he was not indictable for arson.

wall connect it

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interest in it; and that no dwelling-house or farm-yard of
either himself or Mr. Sparrow was near it; and that there
was no wall to connect it with any dwelling-house.




C. Phillips.—This is not an outhouse. It is not within the curtilage. The next point is, whether it is a stable.

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Mr. Justice Taunton. I think that it is not properly described as a stable.-The question is, whether it is an outhouse?

C. Phillips.-On that point, I would refer to the case of Elsmore v. St. Briavel's (a). That case shews, that where a house was built for a particular purpose, but was used for other purposes, it could not be described as a building of the kind that it was used for. There, though the house had been used as a barn, and had never been used for any thing else, yet, being three stories high, and built as a dwelling-house, it was held not sufficient to describe it as a barn. The building, in the present case, was a brick oven, used as a cow-house. I also submit that this is not an outhouse, as it is not attached to any dwellinghouse, or within the curtilage of any dwelling-house.

Greaves, on the same side.—I will call your Lordship’s attention to the common law, and then to the acts of Parliament, and I think I shall shew that the legal meaning of the term “outhouse" has never been altered. Mr. Serjt. Russell (6) says, in treating of the common law respecting the burning of a house—“ It may be briefly observed, that the term “house' extends not only to the dwelling-house, but to all outhouses which are parcel thereof, though not adjoining thereto, or under the same roof (of which kind of outhouses mention has been made in a former part of this work);" and he then refers to the

(a) 8 B. & C. 461; and 2 M. & R. 514. (6) Russ. Cr. & Misd. 488.




cases of such outhouses within the curtilage, in which,
till very recently, a burglary might have been committed.
The first act of Parliament which notices outhouses is
the riot act, 1 Geo. 1, stat. 2, c. 5, in which the words are,
“barn, stable, or other outhouse;" the word "outhouse"
is also contained in the stat. 9 Geo. 1, c. 22, with respect
to arson: and by Breeme's case (a) it appears that that
statute created no new offence with respect to the burning
of outhouses; and this also appears from the judgment of
Lord Ellenborough, in the case of Hyles v. The Hundred
of Shrewsbury (6). I, therefore, submit, that where any
term has obtained a precise and definite meaning at common
law, and it is used in an act of Parliament, it will be taken
to have the same meaning that it had at common law; and
for this I would refer to Bac. Abr. tit. Statute (H. 4), and
the cases of Moore v. Hussey (c), and Smith v. Harmon (d).
In the stat. 43 Geo. 3, c. 55, the term “outhouse" is
again used; and it is repeated in the stat. 7 & 8 Geo. 4,
c. 30. If this were an outhouse, almost every building, of
whatever nature and however applied, would be within
the statute: and a very strong argument is to be drawn
from the statute itself, that outhouses within the curtilage
were the only outhouses meant to be included in this
term "outhouse;" because, if it were otherwise, the words
“stable, coach-house, office, shop, hop-oast, barn, or gran-
ary,” need not have been used. The question then is, whe.
ther this was an outhouse within the meaning of this act of
Parliament. It is proved that there was no house near
this building; and the term “outhouse" evidently refers
to some building that has a relation to the house-a
building outside the house, but having a relation to it;
and it is clear, that the converting of a building to a
particular use does not, for this purpose, alter its nature.
That was decided in the case of Elsmore v. St. Briavels,
where it was held that a place having been used as a barn,

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