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On the trial at bar of an information, the Special Jury were summoned from a distant county, in which the offence was not charged to have been committed:-Held, that the Court had no power to order their expenses to be paid. The Jurors who tried this information were only paid one guinea each, and other Jurors who had come from the same county, and had been summoned to try another information, which was not tried, were not paid any thing. Rex v. Pinney, 254 JUSTICE OF THE PEACE.

See MAGISTRATE.

LANDLORD AND TENANT. See DISTRESS.

1. A., the landlord of premises, sued B. as assignee of a lease, for rent due, with a count for use and occupation. At the trial, A. put in the lease, which was a lease to W., who had taken the benefit of the Insolvent Debtors' Act. It was proved that B. had occupied the premises, and had treated A. as landlord, and had paid rent to him; but that the lease had never been assigned:Held, that A. could not recover against B., either for the rent or for the use and occupation. Hyde v. Moakes,

42

2. In ejectment against a weekly tenant, the notice proved was, to quit on Wednesday, the 4th of August.

LANDLORD & TENANT.

The witness who was called to prove that Wednesday was the expiration of the current week of the tenancy, said, "that he guessed" the defendant came in "about a Tuesday or a Wednesday, but had no recollection which:Held, insufficient. Doe v. Bayley, 67

3. A tenant from year to year of a house is only bound to keep it wind and water tight. A tenant, who covenants to repair, is to sustain and uphold the premises; but that is not so with a tenant from year to year. Auworth v. Johnson,

239

4. A., a tenant, owed rent to B., his landlord; B. distrained for more rent than was due, and removed the goods to the auction rooms of C.; A. gave C. notice not to sell, and C. delivered the goods back to the person from whom he received them:―-Held, that, as some rent was due from A. to B., C. was not liable to A. in an action of trover. Whitworth v. Smith, 250

5. In case for selling goods under a distress, without appraisement, if the sum produced is less than the fair value to the tenant, he may recover the difference without any allegation of special damage. Knotts v. Curtis, 322

6. A. rented land of B., who was trustec of certain property, a part of which was this land, the rents of which B. was to pay in certain shares; one of these shares belonged to the wife of A. B. had in his hands a greater amount due to A. in right of his wife, than the rent amounted to:-Held, that this could not be set off against the rent, without a special agreement to that effect. Willson v. Davenport, 531

In replevin, a defendant avowed, for rent payable yearly, for rent payable half-yearly, and for rent payable quarterly, and to each of these avowries the plaintiff pleaded non tenuit, and riens in arrear. A holding at a rent payable half-yearly was proved, and half a year's rent to be due, and the jury were directed to find for the plaintiff on the first and fifth is

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1. An indictment for stealing a bank-note did not conclude contra formam statuti:-Held, by the 15 Judges, that it was bad. Rex v. Pearson, 121 2. A. went to the shop of B., and asked for shawls for Mrs. D. to look at; B. her five; she pawned two, gave and three were found at her lodgings. Mrs. D. was not called as a witness:Held, that A., on this evidence, could not be convicted of a larceny in stealing the goods of B. Rex v. Savage, 143

3. A. had consigned three trusses of hay to B., and had sent them by the prisoner's cart; the prisoner took away one of the trusses, which was found in his stable, but not broken up: Held, no larceny, as the pri soner did not break up the truss. Rex v. Pratley,

533

4. A bible had been given to a society of Wesleyans, and it had been bound at the expense of the society. B. stated that he was one of the trustees of the chapel, and also a member of the society. No trust deed was produced:-Held, that, in an indictment for stealing the bible, the property was rightly laid in B. and others. Rex v. Boulton,

537

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LEGITIMACY.

1. If a husband have access, and others at the same period have a criminal intimacy with his wife, and she have a child, such child is legitimate; but, if the husband and wife live separately, and the wife is notoriously living in adultery, a child born under such circumstances would be illegitimate, although the husband had an opportunity of access. Cope v. Cope, 604

2. On the trial of an issue, in which the question is, whether A. is the legitimate son of B., neither the declaration of B., nor of his wife, the mother of A., are receivable to shew that A. is illegitimate. Ibid.

LIBEL.

See EVIDENCE, 3, 4, 10, 11, 12.— SLANDER.

1. The declaration in an action for libel alleged that the plaintiff was a good and faithful subject, &c., and that he was a medical practitioner, and stated the libel to have been published of and concerning him, and of and concerning him in his said practice.

No evidence was given of any licence or authority to practise, nor was the plaintiff mentioned in the libel as a regular medical man, but merely as "Physician extraordinary to several ladies of distinction," and "doctor, or rather quack:"-Held, that this did not withdraw the claim to damages in the medical capacity from the consideration of the jury, but that they might give such damages as they thought right, both for that and the libel on the plaintiff's private character. Long v. Chubb,

55

2. Every wilful unauthorized publication, injurious to the character of another, is a libel; but, where the writer is acting on any duty, legal or moral, towards the person to whom he writes, or where he has, by his situation, to protect the interests of that other, that which he writes, under

such circumstances, is a privileged communication; and no action will lie for what is thus written, unless the writer be actuated by malice. Cockayne v. Hodgkisson, 543 3. A., being a tenant of B., was desired by B. to inform him if he saw or heard anything respecting the game. A. wrote a letter to B., informing B. that his gamekeeper sold game:Held, that, if A. had been so informed, and believed the fact to be so, this was a privileged communication, and that the gamekeeper could not maintain any action for a libel. Ibid.

4. In such a case the defendant may give in evidence representations made to him as to the conduct of the gamekeeper, but cannot go into evidence of the acts done by the gamekeeper.

Ibid.

5. Libel, imputing that the plaintiff had received rose wood, knowing it to have been stolen. Pleas of justification, stating that B. had stolen the rose wood from A., and that the plaintiff had received it, knowing it to have been stolen:-Held, that the defendant's counsel might ask what B, said, with a view of proving that B. committed the larceny; and held, also, that the plaintiff's counsel might ask the defendant's witnesses, what was the plaintiff's general character for honesty. Powell v. Harper,

LIEN.

590

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1. If, since the stat. 9 Geo. 4, c. 14, a defendant by a letter admit a balance to be due, without stating the amount, this will take the case out of the statute of limitations, so as to entitle the plaintiff to nominal damages. Dickenson v. Hatfield,

46

2. The object of the stat. 9 Geo. 4, c. 14, was to procure that in writing for which words were previously sufficient. Ibid.

3. A letter, stating that an appointment of funds to pay a debt due from the defendant to the plaintiff had been made, and that Mr. Y. was one of the trustees, but that some time must elapse before the trustees would be in cash, will not take the case out of the statute of limitations, as it is at most only a promise to pay as soon as the trustees are in cash. But, semble, that the creditor's remedy would be by a bill in equity against the trustees. Whippy v. Hillary,

209

4. A defendant had written a letter to T., to make a proposition to the plaintiff respecting a debt he owed him; and in this letter he desired T. to arrange with the whole of his creditors. T. wrote a letter to the plaintiff, offering an acceptance for 7s. 6d. in the pound on the debt;-Held,

not sufficient to take the case out of the statute of limitations. Gibson v. Baghott,

211

5. A., who was tenant for life, with a power of appointment by will attested by three credible witnesses, by his will attested by three witnesses appointed the lands to B. for life, and after her death to C. in fee. B. was one of the witnesses to the will, and the appointment to her was therefore void. On the death of the testator, the husband of B. entered, and held the land till his death, which was three years after the death of B.:-Held, that the statute of limitations did not begin to run against C. till the death of B. Doe d. Allen v. Blakeway, 563

MACHINE BREAKING.

On an indictment on the stat. 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 30, s. 4, for breaking a threshing machine, the Judge allowed a witness to be asked whether the mob by whom the machine was broken did not compel persons to go with them, and then compel each person to give one blow to the machine; and also whether, at the time when the prisoner and himself were forced to join the mob, they did not agree together to run away from the mob the first opportunity. Rex v. Crutchley.

MAGISTRATE.

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1. The general rules of law require of magistrates, at the time of a riot, that they should keep the peace, and restrain the rioters, and pursue and take them; and to enable them to do this, they may call on all the king's subjects to assist them; and all the king's subjects are bound to do so, upon reasonable warning. In point of law, a magistrate would be justified in giving fire-arms to those who thus come to assist him, but it would be imprudent in him to do so. Rex v. Pinney, 254

2. It is no part of the duty of a

magistrate to go out and head the constables, neither is it any part of his duty to marshal and arrange them; neither is it any part of his duty to hire men to assist him in putting down a riot; nor to keep a body of men, as a reserve, to act as occasion may require. Neither is he bound to call out the Chelsea pensioners, any more than the rest of the king's subjects; nor is it any part of his duty to give any orders respecting the fire-arms in the gunsmiths' shops. Nor is a magistrate bound to ride with the military; if he gives the military officer orders to act, that is all that is required of him. Ibid. 3. Mere good feeling and upright intention in a magistrate will be no defence, if he has been guilty of a neglect of his duty. Nor will the fact of his having acted under the advice of others be any defence for him. The question is, whether he did all that he knew was in his power, and which could be expected from a man of ordinary prudence, firmness, and activity. Ibid.

4. On the trial of a magistrate for neglect of duty, he ought not to be found guilty, unless all the Jury are satisfied that he has been guilty of jurors think him guilty of one act of the same act of neglect; and if four neglect, and eight think him guilty of another act of neglect, that is not sufficient. Ibid.

5. A magistrate may assemble all the king's subjects to quell a riot, and may call in the soldiers, who are subjects, and may act as such; but this should be done with great caution. At the time of a riot, a magistrate may repel force by force, before the reading of the proclamation from the Riot Act. Rex v. Kennett, 282, n.

6. If, on a riot taking place, a magistrate neither reads the proclamation from the Riot Act, nor restrains nor apprehends the rioters, nor gives any order to fire on them, nor makes

any use of a military force under his command, this is prima facie evidence of a criminal neglect of duty in him; and it is no answer to the charge for him to say that he was afraid, unless his fear arose from such danger as would affect a firm man; and if, rather than apprehend the rioters, his sole care was for himself, this is also neglect. Ibid.

MALICIOUSLY SUING OUT A COMMISSION OF BANKRUPT.

In an action for maliciously suing out a commission of bankrupt, it is not sufficient to prove merely that the commission was superseded, as a supersedeas may proceed upon strict legal grounds, and does not, therefore, furnish evidence of the want of probable cause. Hay v. Weakley, 361 MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

1. In an action for malicious prosecution against A. and B., if it appear that both A. and B. entered into a joint recognizance to prosecute and give evidence, but it also appear that A. only employed the attorney, and that B. attended before the magistrate and the Grand Jury at the request of the attorney, the Judge will direct the acquittal of B. Eager v. Dyott,

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between the parties. The appearance of the injury was consistent with the supposition, either of a blow with a hammer, or of a push against the lock or key of a door:- Held, that, if it was occasioned by a blow with a hammer or any other hard substance held in the hand, it was sufficient to support the indictment; but otherwise, if it was the result of a push against the door. Rex v. Martin, 128

2. An indictment for manslaughter charged, that the deceased was on horseback, and that the prisoner struck him with a stick, and that the deceased, from a well-grounded apprehension of a further attack, which would have endangered his life, spurred his horse, which became frightened, and threw him, giving him a mortal fracture. The evidence was, that the prisoner struck the deceased with a small stick, and that the latter rode away, and the former rode after him; whereupon the deceased spurred his horse, which then winced, and threw him, whereby he was killed:-Held, that this evidence sufficiently supported the indictment. R. v. Hickman, 151

3. An indictment for manslaughter charged that A. gave to the deceased divers mortal blows at P., in the county of M., and that the deceased languished and died at D. in the county of K.; and that the prisoner was then and there aiding in the commission of the felony:-Held, that the indictment was good, and that the word there referred to P., in the county of M. Rex v. Hargrave, 170

4. Although all persons present at and sanctioning a prize fight, where one of the combatants is killed, are guilty of manslaughter, as principals in the second degree; yet they are not such accomplices as to require their evidence to be confirmed, if they are called as witnesses against other parties charged with the manslaughter. Ib.

5. It is not every slight provocation, even by a blow, which will, when

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