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tion to the fact, that the second count did not state that the article was to be published in the Juvenile Library, but was only a promise to pay 100 guineas for the article, which, it appeared from the evidence, the defendants had offered to do.

Wilde, Serjt.-The contract was to publish in the Juvenile Library, and that is sufficient.

TINDAL, C. J.-I do not think it turns upon the second count, but upon the quantum meruit in the third count.

His Lordship afterwards (in summing up) said-The plaintiff does not seek to recover the whole sum contracted for, but only a fair remuneration for that part of the article which he had prepared, and which was rendered useless by the discontinuance of the work in which it was to appear. The object of the defendants evidently was, to have a publication adapted to persons in the younger classes of society. The question you have to consider is, what degree of credit you give to the defence; which, it appears to me, must amount to this, or it amounts to nothing-That, after the contract was broken, an entirely new arrangement was made, to furnish the matter for publication in a separate form. It seems, that in the month of November the plaintiff thought that the subject was one better suited for separate publication; but undoubtedly, up to that time, he had been preparing it for juvenile readers; and the form and size of the proposed new work were not settled on that occasion. It might be, that the plaintiff considered the subject matter was better adapted for a separate publication, without admitting that the MS. and drawings already prepared were suited to such a publication. It will be for you to say, whether you think that this was a separate bargain, in which the plaintiff gave up the old contract altogether; for if you do, then you must find your verdict for the defendants. The question is, was the first agreement en








tirely abandoned with the consent of the plaintiff, and an entire new agreement made between the parties?—for only in such case can the verdict be for the defendants.

Verdict for the plaintiff-Damages 50%.

Spankie, Serjt., submitted that the verdict could not be taken on the quantum meruit, and that the special count did not accord with the evidence.

TINDAL, C. J., thought that the plaintiff might recover on the quantum meruit; but said, that he would take a note of the objection.

Wilde, Serjt., and Kelly, for the plaintiff.

Spankie, Serjt., and Dodd, for the defendants.

[Attornies-Lithgoe, and Sharon & T.]

A motion was made, but the Court refused a rule.

June 17th.

A member of a committee of management,

taking an active

part in the con

cerns of a char

itable institution supported by voluntary contributions, is

liable for goods

Adjourned Sittings at Westminster after Trinity

Term, 1831.


ASSUMPSIT for goods sold and delivered. The plain

tiff was a butcher, and the defendant one of the committee of managers of the Royal Western Hospital. The claim was for meat furnished for the use of the hospital from the 8th of May to October, 1829. The institution had at first

furnished by a tradesman for the use of the institution, although it appear that such tradesman did not furnish them on any contract with the committee, but, having at first furnished goods on the credit of an individual, who, previously to the formation of a committee, had the sole management, continued to send them in afterwards on orders given, as before, by the servants of the institution, without any inquiry as to who was liable to pay him.

been under the management of a person named Sleigh, on whose credit the plaintiff had for some time furnished goods, before any committee of the governors was formed; and it appeared that the goods in question were ordered by the servants of the hospital, in the same manner as they had previously been. The defendant became a member of the committee in March, 1829. The committee was in the habit of meeting about once a-month. At a meeting on the 6th of April, 1829, the defendant acted as chairman, and it appeared from the minutes (which were always signed by the chairman), that Mr. Sleigh called the attention of the committee to the advantage of purchasing provisions by wholesale, in which the committee concurred. Subscriptions to the institution were paid in to the account of the committee with a banker. The committee examined other tradesmen's bills, and ordered them to be paid, sometimes in full, sometimes in part only; and also engaged and discharged servants. On one occasion, when drugs were wanted, it was regularly moved and seconded that they should be bought; and, on another occasion, the form of a letter was agreed to, which was to be sent to the ground landlord of the premises, stating that if he would co-operate with the committee in procuring funds, they would take a lease on certain terms. The defendant attended at various meetings of the committee, during the period in which the plaintiff's demand accrued, and took an active part in the business. Mr. Sleigh was also a member of the committee, and originated most of the propositions which were adopted by the committee. The plaintiff's bill was headed "Mr. Sleigh's Hospital." Three receipts had been given for sums paid on account, one was "Received of Mr. Sleigh;" another "Received of Mr. Sleigh & Company, the Committee of the Royal Western Hospital," the words "Mr. Sleigh & Company" being struck through with a pen; and the third was "Received of the Governors of the Royal Western Hospital."









Wilde, Serjt., for the plaintiff, contended, that although he was only a subscriber to a public charity, and had no personal interest in the subject matter, yet, as a committee man, he had the means of limiting the engagements of the institution, and also of being acquainted with the extent of its resources. When a tradesman sees respectable gentlemen managing a concern of this kind, may he not reasonably expect to be paid by them. The cases of Cullen v. The Duke of Queensberry (a), and Horsley v. Bell (b), establish the principle for which I contend.

Spankie, Serjt., for the defendant.-In point of law, when a man seeks to charge one of a number of persons having no interest in the matter, he must shew that those persons made the contract with him, or that he furnished the goods on their credit. Cullen v. The Duke of Queensberry, and Horsley v. Bell, differ from the present case; for, in both, the parties sued had made the agreement with the parties suing; and, in the latter case, much stress is laid upon the improbability of a tradesman making a contract on the credit of tolls, which it was in the power of the defendant to raise or not at pleasure. But, in the present case, there is no power to raise money.

Wilde, Serjt., in reply.-Though, under Horsley v.
Bell and the other cases, I admit that persons may so limit

(a) 1 Brown's Chancery Cases, p. 101. The marginal note of this case is, "Committee of a voluntary society entering into agreements with tradesmen, for the whole, sufficient to make them parties to a bill, and not necessary to include all the subscribers."

(b) Ib. p. 101, n.. This was a bill filed by the undertaker of a navigation at Thirsk in Yorkshire,

against the commissioners (named
in the act of Parliament for carry-
ing it on), who had signed the
several orders. The principal
question was, whether the defend-
ants were liable in their private
capacities, or the plaintiff had
given credit to the fund; and it
was held that they were personal-
ly liable.

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their responsibility as to prevent their being made personally liable to a tradesman; yet, I contend also, under those cases, that when there is a committee receiving funds, paying money, meeting at stated periods, engaging and discharging servants, &c., it must be taken that they are liable, unless they have distinctly intimated to the tradesman that they do not intend to be personally answerable.

TINDAL, C. J. (in summing up) said-This is an action for goods sold and delivered; and the question for you is, with whom was the contract for the sale and delivery of those goods made. But, when I say this, I do not mean the very individual who received the meat or gave the order, because, in all probability, it would be a menial; but you are to look and see who were the masters of those persons. It is not necessary that a tradesman should know, at the time of furnishing the goods, who the person was for whom they were obtained; but, if they are obtained by an agent, and it is afterwards found out that he had a principal, the tradesman may sue the principal. The question, therefore, will be in this case, whether the meat was supplied on a contract made, personally and individually, with Mr. Sleigh, or on the credit of the persons who managed this institution; for, if there are persons who manage institutions of this description, they make themselves liable for the orders given by their servants. The question therefore is, whether the committee did so conduct and hold themselves out as the managers and employers of the persons who gave the orders, as that any tradesman, at the time knowing this, might reasonably conclude that he was supplying his goods on their credit. It appears, that the defendant became a committee-man in March, 1829, and that the debt was incurred during the time that he continued so. The plaintiff rests his claim to a verdict on the acts of these persons, claiming, as committee-men, to control the proceedings. It appears that, on one occasion, Mr. Sleigh called their attention to

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