A.was entitled to ASSUMPSIT to recover commission as an agent on the introducing to a sale of the defendant's business of a wine merchant. commission for tradesman a purchaser for his was to be paid on the completion of the bargain. troduced the purchaser, but was settled, he became bankrupt, and his assignees brought an action for the It appeared that, in consequence of a letter written by business, which the plaintiff to the defendant, informing him that he should be able to procure a friend of his to become the purchaser After he had in- of the business, a letter was written in answer by the defendant's authority, containing the particulars of the busibefore the matter ness, the quantities of stock, the value of the trade, &c. This letter was written for the purpose of being shewn to the plaintiff's friend, but contained an inclosure marked private, which was in these words:-" If the sale is completed, I shall be happy to give you a liberal sum upon the premium." The plaintiff became a bankrupt after he had introduced the purchaser, but before the bargain was finally concluded; and his assignees brought an action for money. A. up- the commission. After a time, however, they discontinued on this brought the action, paid the costs to the defendant, and wrote to the plaintiff, saying that they disclaimed all right to the was not entitled money. The plaintiff had not obtained his certificate. commission, which they af terwards discontinued, and wrote to him, saying that they disclaimed all right to the an action in his own name: Held, that he to recover. Sir J. Scarlett and Steer, for the defendant, contended that the plaintiff's bankruptcy was an answer to the action, as, after the transfer of his rights to his assignees, he could not have any title to sue. Campbell and R. V. Richards, for the plaintiff, replied that the disclaimer of the assignees left the plaintiff at liberty to sue in his own right; and that, as the whole of the work had not been done at the time of the action by the assignees, the bankrupt might at least maintain assumpsit for his work and labour for the part which occurred subsequent to the bankruptcy, although he had not obtained his certificate. Lord TENTERDEN, C. J.-I am clearly of opinion that the assignees had no right to transfer the claim in question to the bankrupt or to any body else. The debt was part of the bankrupt's estate, which they were bound to get in for the benefit of the creditors. The bankrupt could only recover for introducing the purchaser, he having nothing to do with the valuation; and, although he could not recover any thing till the matter was complete, yet, when it was complete, the cause of action would refer back to the time when the work was done, and that was before the bankruptcy. The assignees, therefore, were the parties entitled to sue, and they have renounced their right. I am of opinion that the plaintiff must be called. Nonsuit. Campbell and R. V. Richards, for the plaintiff. [Attornies-W. B. Ogden, and Reynolds.] 1831. HILLARY V. MORRIS. 1831. BEFORE MR. JUSTICE PATTESON, (Who sat for the Lord Chief Justice.) July 1st. Practice as to certificates for BARFORD V. NELSON. CASE for an injury occasioned by the negligent driv execution, under ing of a coach, called the Leeds Courier, of which the dethe statute 1 W. fendant was proprietor, to a cart belonging to the plain 4, c. 7, s. 2. tiff. The case was one of contradictory evidence, and the Jury, after retiring for a considerable time, found a verdict for the plaintiff. Curwood, upon this applied to PATTESON, J., for a certificate, to entitle the plaintiff to immediate execution. F. Pollock, for the defendant, said that Lord Tenterden had laid down a rule, that, if there was a reasonable ground of defence, the case should take the ordinary course of the law; and that he understood that Lord Lyndhurst had, in the Court of Exchequer, laid down a similar rule; and he submitted that, according to those rules, the present case, about which the Jury had so long deliberated, was not one in which the certificate should be given. PATTESON, J.-As I am informed that Lord Tenterden has laid down a particular rule, I should be desirous to act, and I will act here, upon that rule. I think it is for the Judge at the time to decide the matter, as the words of the act are—" that, in his opinion, execution ought to issue," &c. And in this case I should say, that it is one in which there ought to be instant execution, as it was clearly a question for the Jury, and there can be no possibility of disturbing the verdict hereafter. I think that the plaintiff ought to have the fruits of his verdict at once; but I will communicate with Lord Tenterden on the subject. 1831. BARFORD v. Campbell and Curwood, for the plaintiff. F. Pollock and Holt, for the defendant. [Attornies-C. E. Reynolds, and Pritchard.] We are informed by Mr. Bellamy that no certificate was granted. In the case of Wright v. Guiver, which was also an action for negligent driving, tried before Lord Lyndhurst, in the Exchequer, on the 20th of June, Bompas, Serjt., for the plaintiff, asked for execution at any time his Lordship pleased in the course of the vacation. Andrews, Serjt., for the defendant, submitted that the act of Parliament was not intended to apply to cases of this description. Lord Lyndhurst, C. B., refused to grant the application, being of opinion that it was not a case in which there should be any departure from the usual course. In the case of Crookshank v. Rose, post, p. 19, which was an action on a bill and a note, given for a public house score, to which the defence was, that part of the demand was illegal under the sta tute 24 Geo. 2, c. 40, being for spirits; Lord Tenterden refused to certify, saying, that he did not think it a case for execution before the ordinary time. In the case of Hambidge v. Crawley, (C. P., June 29, 1831), which was an action for criminal conversation, the plaintiff, to prevent a verdict passing against him in consequence of the prevarication of one of his witnesses, consented to be nonsuited; and Tindal, C. J., on the application of Wilde, Serjt., after hearing Payne, for the plaintiff, in the absence of Storks, Serjt., and after taking time to consider, directed execution to issue at the expiration of a month. The following cases from the Oxford Circuit, being on this subject, we have subjoined them here NELSON. 1831. WORCESTER ASSIZES, 1831.-Coram PARK, J. July 20th. WARD V. CROCKET. DEBT for the price of certain windows sold by the plaintiff to the defendant. There was a verdict for the plaintiff. Godson applied for a certificate to entitle the plaintiff to immediate execution. Mr. Justice PARK.-I shall not allow immediate execution to issue. The action is in debt, and the defendant is obliged to plead, and come to trial, or the plaintiff might sign final judgment without any writ of inquiry, or proof of the amount of his debt. Lord Tenterden does not grant any certificate if the action is in debt. ASSUMPSIT on promissory notes. Plea-General issue. Russell, Serjt., applied for a certificate to entitle the plaintiff to immediate execution. Greaves, for the defendant.-I am in a condition to prove that the writ in this case was issued before the statute of 1 W. 4, c. 7, passed; and I submit that that statute only applies to actions commenced after its passing. The word "brought" of itself is equivocal; but, coupled with the words " may be," its operation is clearly future. In this act of |