1831. FISHER v. FILMER. VAUGHAN, B.-May not all this be matter of inquiry before the officer? It strikes me, that when a retainer and cause of action are proved, then the rest is matter of investigation on taxation. It is in effect calling upon me to tax the bill. Cannot the attorney recover for the retainer and the other part of the suit? Cooper.-I apprehend that an attorney cannot bring an action for his bill during the progress of a suit. VAUGHAN, B., after some further consideration, at first intimated an intention of reserving the point for the consideration of the Court; but afterwards, on the request of Andrews, Serjt., said that he would not do so. The Jury, therefore, under his Lordship's direction, found a verdict for the plaintiff, for the full amount of the bill. His Lordship telling them that, in his opinion, it must go to be taxed by the proper officer. Andrews, Serjt., and Talfourd, for the plaintiff. Cooper, for the defendant. [Attornies-Fisher, and Sutton.] June 7th. SMITH and Another v. BROWN. When two per- ASSUMPSIT on an attorney's bill. At the time when sons are in partnership as attor nies, it is suffi cient, under the statutes 3 Jac. 1, c. 7, and 2 Geo. 2, c. 23, if their bill for business the business was done, the two plaintiffs were in partnership as attornies; but, the partnership was at an end at the time when the bill was delivered. One of the plain done is signed in the name of the firm, without the Christian name of either partner. tiffs signed it in the name of the firm, vix. "Smith & Jago." J. Williams, for the defendant, objected that this was not evidence of the delivery of a signed bill, as required by the statutes 3 Jac. 1, c. 7, s. 1, and 2 Geo. 2, c. 23, s. 23, inasmuch as, without the Christian name, the signature of neither partner could be said to be complete. VAUGHAN, B.-I think there is so much in the objection, that I will reserve the point. It appears to me that the object of the statute was, that the client should know the name of the attorney. And when mention is made of the name of a party, I think it must mean the Christian and surname. Verdict for the plaintiff. Talfourd and Swan, for the plaintiff. J. Williams and Wightman, for the defendant. [Attornies-E. Smith, and W. Murray.] 1831. SMITH v. BROWN. In the course of the Term, a rule nisi was obtained on the part of the defendant; which, after argument, was discharged, the Court being of opinion that the signing was sufficient. Vide Crompt. & Jervis, Vol. 1, p. 542. 1831. Sitting in London, after Trinity Term, 1831. before lord LYNDHURST, C. B. June 15th. A bond was conditioned for the payment, on a certain day, be the date, of a certain sum, with DEBT DIXON v. ROBINSON. on a bond.-Plea, non est factum. The bond was conditioned for the payment on a certain specified ing a year from day, being at the end of a year from the date, of the sum of one thousand pounds, with interest thereon, at the rate interest thereon, of five per cent. It was stamped with a 57. stamp, being the proper stamp, according to the stamp act (a), for a bond "given as a security for the payment of any definitive, and certain sum of money, exceeding 500l. and not exceeding 10007." at the rate of 51. per cent.:Held, that a stamp covering the amount of the principal was sufficient. 66 66 For the defendant it was argued, that the stamp was not sufficient, as the sum for the payment of which the bond was in fact given as a security, was the sum of 1,050l., being 1,000l. the principal, and 50%. for the year's interest. The word in the statute was payment" not 'repayment;" therefore, it could not have reference to any sum advanced as a loan. The fair test by which to try the question was, to consider how much the obligor was entitled to receive, and the obligee bound to pay by virtue of the bond, and to treat that sum which the instrument did actually secure as the sum which it was given to secure. Lord LYNDHURST, C. B., directed a verdict to be taken for the plaintiff, and said he would reserve the point for the opinion of the Court; but, upon being informed that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment of the preceding (a) 55 Geo. 3, c. 184, Schedule, Part 1. term, and it being suggested on the part of the plaintiff that some case had been decided on the question, his Lordship said, that it should stand over till the next morning; and if the plaintiff's counsel should then produce a case, shewing that the stamp was sufficient if it covered the principal sum, without the interest, then he would direct judgment of the preceding term; otherwise he would adhere to his former resolution of reserving the point. On the following morning, Wightman, for the plaintiff, cited the case of Pruessing v. Ing (a), and relied upon the words of Lord Tenterden in that case as very strong upon the question of the sufficiency of the stamp. Payne, for the defendant, contra, contended that the words of Lord Tenterden amounted to no more than an obiter dictum, and also as the decision was given at once upon motion, it was liable to all the objections (if indeed any such were tenable,) sometimes urged against decisions given "in the hurry of Nisi Prius." He also referred to the cases of Israel v. Benjamin (b), and Dickson v. Cass (c). (a) 4 B. & A. 204. That was not the case of a bond, but of a bill of exchange. However, Lord Tenterden, the only Judge who gave an opinion, and for aught that appears by the report, the only one at the time in Court, said that it had been the constant practice under similar provisions applicable to bonds to measure the stamp duty by the principal sum secured. (b) 3 Camp. 40. That was the case of a bill of exchange, drawn for" 501. sterling, with all legal interest for the same." The bill had a 2s. stamp, which, under the stamp act then in force, covered the amount of 50%. only. Garrow, for the defendant, contended that the VOL. V. H stamp was insufficient, as the bill (c) 1 B. & Ad. 343. A bond 1831. DIXON บ. ROBINSON. 1831. DIXON v. ROBINSON. Lord LYNDHURST, C. B., expressed his opinion that the stamp must be measured by the amount of the principal sum; and, therefore, directed that the plaintiff should have judgment of the term. Wightman, for the plaintiff. Payne, for the defendant. [Attornies-Wrigglesworth & R., and Ashurst.] conditioned for the payment of bankers in such cases, and interestHeld, that a 57. stamp (the proper stamp for a bond given to secure a sum exceeding 500/., but not exceeding 1000l.,) was insufficient for this bond, which was to secure the bankers' charges as well as the 10007. Adjourned Sittings in London after Trinity June 22nd. The statements in a special plea, on which judg ment has been given for the plaintiff on demurrer, cannot be used at the trial of the cause FIRMIN v. CRUCIFIX and STAFF. ASSUMPSIT on a bill of exchange, accepted by the defendant Staff in the name of Lardners & Co. The question in the cause was, whether or not the defendant Crucifix was in partnership with Staff, carrying on business under the firm of Lardners & Company. The pleas as an admission were non assumpsit, and a special plea, which stated that on the record by the defendant; the said supposed bill of exchange was accepted by the but the case said defendants in respect of mustard, which the plaintiff warranted to them, and which turned out to be bad. This plea was demurred to by the plaintiff, as not raising a material issue; and judgment by default was given for him. must be tried on the general issue, without any reference to the special plea at all. |