personal property of the United States government, to be removed at its pleasure under its contract with the defendants in error. 1877. January Term. Andrews, Being, then, the property of the United States, is it Ordway & liable to be taxed by the state? This is the question V. V. Green. we have to determine. It has been argued here on Audit'r,&c both sides with signal ability and learning. In my Auditor view of the case, however, much of the learned and Andrews, eloquent argument of the attorney general was di- Ordway & rected to a question that does not arise in this case. He treated the property taxed as real estate, and protested against the right of the United States to acquire or control in any manner any real property within the jurisdiction of the state, except in the mode pointed out in the constitution. Undoubtedly, the jurisdiction of the state is supreme over every inch of her territory, except that which is voluntarily relinquished to another sovereignty. Beyond all question, the right of eminent domain is in the state, and not in the United States. The United States can acquire ownership of the soil within the territory of the state only with the consent of the state. But in this case the property taxed is not land but personal property; and questions as to eminent domain. and exclusive jurisdiction need not be considered. The single question is whether this personal property acquired by the United States for the purposes set forth in the certificate of facts, is a proper subject of taxation by the state. It is certified as part of the facts proved in the court below, that "the said buildings were paid for entirely by the United States and are the property of the United States, and are used by the operatives and employees of the United States in dressing granite to be used in the erection of certain public buildings in Washington for the use and ac 1877. commodation of the state, war and navy departments January Term. of the United States government." Can such property used for such purposes be a legitimate subject of state taxation. Andrews, Ordway & V. V. Green Taxation is an incident of sovereignty, and is coAudit'r,&c extensive with that to which it is an incident. All Auditor subjects over which the sovereign power of the state extends are objects of taxation; but those over which Ordway & it does not extend are upon the soundest principles, exempt from taxation. This proposition may almost be pronounced self-evident. Andrews, Green. In our complex system of government the power of taxation is concurrent in the state and federal governments. These two governments operate on the same. people and over the same territory. The powers of sovereignty are divided between the government of the Union and those of the states; and although both exist within the same territorial limits they are separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independent of each other within their respective spheres. Each within its appropriate sphere is supreme. They are each sovereign with respect to the objects committed to it, but neither sovereign with respect to the objects committed to the other. It is true the government of the United States is one of limited and carefully guarded powers. It must be now taken as an established rule of construction of the constitution of the United States, that the sovereign powers vested in the state governments by their respective constitutions remained unaltered and unimpaired except so far as they were granted to the government of the United States. That the intention of the framers of the constitution in this respect might not be misunderstood, this rule of interpretation was expressly declared in the tenth article of the 1877. amendments: "The powers not delegated to the January United States are reserved to the states respectively Term. or to the people." Andrews, Green V. V. Green. The government of the United States therefore can Ordway & claim no powers which are not granted to it by the constitution, and the powers actually granted must be Audit'r,&c such as are expressly given, or given by necessary im- Auditor plication. But while a government of limited powers, Andrews, yet within the sphere of its granted powers, and in the Ordway & exercise of all these means, and the employment of all those agencies and instrumentalities "necessary and proper for carrying into execution" its granted powers, the government of the United States is as supreme and independent as the states which created it. Mc Culloch v. State of Maryland, 4 Wheat. R. 316; Osborn v. U. S. Bank, 9 Wheat. R. 738; Weston v. City of Charleston, 2 Pet. R. 449; Bank of Commerce v. New York City, 2 Black U. S. R. 620; Bank Tax Case, 2 Wall. U. S. R. 200; Kent's Com. 445–431, (marg.) Let us now apply these principles to the case before us. The property proposed to be taxed is owned by the United States government, and used by that government in preparing granite for the erection of a grand public building in the city of Washington for the accommodation of the navy, war and state departments. The property thus owned and used is not the property of a contractor of that government, but of the government itself, and is used by its employees and agents. Now the power to "erect needful public buildings" is one of the powers expressly granted in the constitution, and even if it had not been expressly granted, it would have been conferred by necessary implication; for the very establishment of the government carried with it the necessity of the power to erect VOL. XXVIII-16 1877. public buildings in which to carry on its great and January Term. varied affairs in its different departments. Ordway & V. V. 66 ' The power to erect needful buildings" necessarily Andrews, carries with it the power to use the proper means to Green erect such buildings. This cannot be done without Audit'r,&c materials, without tools, without machinery, without Auditor engineering often. Expensive and elaborate buildings cannot be spoken into existence or raised by magic. Ordway & Property in varied forms must be employed in providing material, in dressing it into shape and form, in transporting it and placing it in its appropriate place. And all this must be done often, and generally within. the territorial limits of the states. Andrews, Green. Suppose the necessary materials cannot be obtained. within the ten square miles comprising the district of Columbia, or from any other real estate over which the United States holds exclusive jurisdiction and ownership. What then? May not the government acquire by purchase the necessary materials in one of the states; and if so acquired, may it not, must it not, have the right without hindrance or restriction to prepare those materials by the use of all the machinery and all the appliances necessary to that end? If temporary buildings are necessary, may it not put up such buildings under contract with the owner of the soil? If engines and machinery and teams and wagons and other appliances and property are necessary, can this property be taxed when used for this legitimate purpose? I think not. The power to tax carries with it the power to destroy. If the right to impose the tax exists at all, it is a right which in its nature acknowledges no limits. It may be carried to any extent within the jurisdiction of the state or corporation which imposes it, which the mere will of such state or corporation may prescribe. The conse quence would be, that the states might deprive the general government of the exercise of powers essential to its very existence. 1877. January Term. Andrews, Green V. V. Green. Can anything be more dangerous or more injurious Ordway & than the admission of a principle which authorizes every state and every corporation in the Union which Audit'r, &c. possesses the right of taxation, to burthen at their dis- Auditor cretion the exercise of the granted powers of the gen- Andrews, eral government, or those which are necessary and Ordway & proper to carry such granted powers into execution. Within this domain the supremacy of that government cannot be questioned; and in the exercise of its legitimate powers, it must be left free and unembarrassed by any conflicting authority. The power of a state cannot rightfully be so exercised as to impede or obstruct the free course of those measures which the government of the United States may rightfully adopt. In McCulloch v. The State of Maryland (supra), this question was discussed in all its relations by the most distinguished counsel of that day of great men; Daniel Webster, William Pinckney, Wm. Wirt, Luther Martin and Walter Jones being among the counsel who argued the case. Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the court. That opinion stands to-day, as it will stand for all time, as a monument to his wisdom and learning, and among the great emanations of that luminous intellect which made clear and certain every question which it took in its grasp. The principles established by that opinion have been recognized and followed ever since. I give his own interpretation of that opinion, given ten years afterwards, to show its application to the case before us. In Weston v. The City Council of Charleston, 2 Pet. R. 449, 467, he says, referring to the case of Mc Culloch v. State of Maryland, "It was discussed at the bar in |