1877. March Term. Lewis V. executors cut her off from all participation in his estate. But he did not choose to do this; but taking an assignment of the debt to himself,. he did not change his will, by which he made Mrs. Lewis an equal beneficiary with Henry's his other daughters, but filed the bond with the will &als. and codicil, in which he declared, "If my estate have to pay the debt, &c., then his daughter, Mrs. Lewis, should forfeit her interest in his property devised to her. His estate has never paid the debt. The event has never happened. The contingency has never arisen. A court of equity, always slow to enforce a forfeiture, will surely be quick to prevent it when there has not only been a substantial, but, as in this case, literal compliance with the condition imposed. That condition it is manifest was a condition subsequent, made in terrorem to secure the payment of the debt for which the testator was bound as surety. The court is therefore of opinion that the decree of the circuit court of Charlotte is erroneous, and that the same be reversed. The decree was as follows: The court is of opinion, for reasons stated in writing and filed with the record, that the decree of the circuit court is erroneous: First, in holding that the advancements made by the testator to his daughters, M. R. Lewis and Lucy D. Leighton, was a charge upon both the personal and real estate devised and bequeathed to his said daughters in the third and fourth clauses of his will. Second, in declaring that under the codicil to said will the appellant, Mrs. M. R. Lewis, had forfeited her interest under the will, because of the non-payment by her in the lifetime of the testator of the debt of her husband William B. Lewis for 1877. March Term. Lewis V. executors & als. which the testator was bound as surety. It is therefore decreed and ordered, that for these errors the said decree of the said circuit court, be reversed and annulled, (but in all other respects be affirmed); and the appellant being the party substantially prevailing in Henry's this court, it is further decreed and ordered, that she recover of the appellees, Edward W. Henry, Jr., and James S. Buster, executor of Edward W. Henry, deceased, and of Edward W. Henry, Jr., in his own right, her costs by her expended in the prosecution of her appeal here. And this court now proceeding to enter such decree as the said circuit court ought to have entered, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed, that under the true construction to be given to the will of the testator, Edward W. Henry, the advancements made in his lifetime to his daughters, M. R. Lewis and Lucy D. Leighton, are only to be considered in the distribution of the real estate devised to his five daughters, and that the personal estate bequeathed under the fourth clause of said will to his son and five daughters should be equally divided between them without reference to the advancements made to his two daughters, M. R. Lewis and Lucy D. Leighton, mentioned in the third clause of the will. And it is further adjudged, ordered and decreed, that by the codicil to his will the appellant, Mrs. M. R. Lewis, did not forfeit her interest in the testator's estate because the debt of William B. Lewis for which the testator was bound as surety was not paid by her in the lifetime of the testator; that the condition imposed by the will was a condition subsequent, which was fully performed by her in the payment into court of the principal, interest and costs of said debt. And this performance on her part entitles her to a full par March 1877 ticipation in the division of the estate of her father, according to the terms of the will. Term. Lewis V. executors It is therefore decreed and ordered, that the decree of the said circuit court, to the extent in which it is Henry's herein declared to be erroneous, be and the same is hereby reversed and annulled; and that the cause be remanded to the said circuit court, to be further proceeded in in accordance with the principles herein declared. & als. DECREE REversed. Bichmond. ROBERTS' adm'or v. CoсKE, &c. MURPHY V. GASKINS' adm'or. March 16. Absent, Anderson and Staples, J's. 1. Where, during the late war, a creditor resided within the territory of one of the belligerent powers, and his debtor within that of the other of said powers, such debtor would, under the rules of public law, be entitled to an abatement of interest during the time the war lasted. 2. Where the debtor and creditor resided within the same territory, the mere existence of war does not alone furnish any legal ground for the abatement of interest upon contracts during the time such war lasted. 3. In contracts for the payment of a certain sum of money, interest on the principal sum is a legal incident of the debt, and the right to it is founded upon the presumed intention of the parties. 4. Wherever there is a contract, express or implied, for the payment of legal interest, the obligation of the contract extends as well to the payment of interest as it does to the payment of the principal sum; and neither the courts nor the juries ever had the arbitrary power to dispense with the performance of such contracts either in whole or in part. 5. The laws which subsist at the time and place of the making of a contract, and where it is to be performed, enter into and form a part of the contract; and that whether such laws affect its validity, construction, discharge or enforcement. 6. While it is competent for the state to alter or change the remedy on a contract, this can only be done where the change does not impair substantial rights. 7. The act of the general assembly approved April 2, 1873, entitled "An 1877. March Term. 1877. March Term. Roberts' adm'r V. Cocke &c. Murphy act to amend and reënact ? 14, ch. 187, of the Code of 1860, in relation to interest," so far as said act confers upon courts and juries, in the suits therein mentioned, power to remit interest, as therein provided, on contracts entered into prior to April 10, 1865, which said courts and juries did not have under the laws in force at the time such contracts were entered into, is repugnant to the constitution of the United States, and of this state, and is so far null and void. V. 8. And so much of the said act as empowers the courts to review judgGaskins' adm'r. ments and decrees, upon motion, and to abate interest as in said act provided, is repugnant to the constitution of the United States, and of this state, and therefore void. The cases are stated by Judge Burks, in his opinion. F. M. Forbes, for the appellants. Hunton, Brooke & Scott, for the appellees. BURKS, J., delivered the opinion of the court. The amounts in controversy in these cases are small. Besides the costs, in the first case, only $182, and in the second $119.41, not sufficient of themselves to give this court jurisdiction to review the judgments of the court below. Our jurisdiction is invoked, however, upon the ground set out by the plaintiff's in error in their petitions, that the act of the general assembly, under which the judgments were rendered, is unconstitutional and void; and we have given to the question, thus presented for our determination, that consideration which its importance demands. Throughout our deliberations, terminating in the conclusion to which we have come, we have been guided by the wise and salutary rule enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall as long ago as 1810, in the leading case of Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch's R. 87, |