March Term. George V. Pilcher 1877 deposed, &c., all going strongly to evince that no credit was given to his statements, and tending to make that impression on the jury. A witness may be impeached &als. by proving that he is not worthy of credit, or that the facts to which he deposes are not true, or by crossexamination, in which he may be involved in inconsistencies. 3 Starkie 1753, 7, 8. In this case, the crossexamination was of a character from which the counsel manifestly intended to argue that the witness had sworn falsely." Richmond v. Richmond, 10 Yerg. R. 343. & als. In a case in Alabama, where evidence was adduced to contradict a witness on an immaterial point, the party who called him was allowed to introduce witnesses to sustain his general character, although the opposite party disclaimed any intention of discrediting him. Newton v. Jackson, 23 Alab. R. 335. And in North Carolina, in a case decided in 1869 by the supreme court of that state, it was held competent to sustain a witness by evidence of character, where it was sought to impeach him by the very question put to him. State v. Cherry, 63 North Car. R. 493. The most recent case coming under our notice, in which this question was considered, is one decided by the court of appeals of Maryland at the April term 1873. Judge Robinson, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "Mere contradiction among witnesses furnishes no ground, as a general rule, for admitting general evidence as to their character; though if fraud or other improper conduct be imputed to any of them, such evidence will be received. Annesley v. Arglosia, 17 How. St. Trials, 1348. The credit of a witness, however, may be impeached by evidence assailing his character for veracity; or by proof of contradictory statements in regard to the material facts; or by disproving by other witnesses material facts stated by him in his direct or cross-examination. Here the purpose of the state was to discredit the witness Harrison, by disproving material facts testified to by him, and it was competent, therefore, for the prisoner to sustain the witness by proof of his general character for veracity." Davis v. Slate, 38 Mar. R. 15. We are not aware that the precise question passed upon by these decisions, has ever come before this court for determination until now, and in the conflict of authorities in other states, we are called upon to declare the true rule in Virginia; and we are of opinion, that whenever the character of a witness for truth is attacked either by direct evidence of want of truth, or by cross-examination, or by proof of contradictory statements in regard to the material facts, or by disproving by other witnesses material facts stated by him in his examination; or, in general, whenever his character for truth is impeached in any way known to the law, the party calling him may sustain him by evidence of his general reputation for truth. The rule as we declare it, has, we believe, been generally regarded as the true rule by the bench and the bar in this state, and has been generally followed in the practice. We proceed to inquire whether under this rule the character of the witness Charles Mink was impeached in any way in the proceedings in the court below, so as to make it proper to let in the evidence of good character which was offered to sustain him and which was excluded. No direct evidence of character was given with a view to impeach him, nor were any concontradictory statements made by him proved. If he was impeached at all, it was in some other way. 1877. March Term. George V. Pilcher & als. 1877. March Term. George & als. V. Pilcher & als. The only question presented by the issue and to be determined by the jury, was, whether or not a marriage between William O. George and Caroline Jackson had been duly solemnized in the city of Philadelphia on the 21st day of April 1869. The main witness relied on by the plaintiffs in the issue to prove the marriage, was Charles Mink, an alderman of said city. In his examination in chief, he testifies that as alderman he solemnized the marriage between William O. George and Caroline Jackson, in the city of Philadelphia, on the 21st day of April 1869, and on the same day and after the marriage, he made out a certificate of the marriage, signed it in his official character, caused it to be attested by a witness, John Garrigan, or Gogran, and delivered it to the said Caroline, and the certificate, which is a part of the record, being produced, he identified it as the one made out and signed by him on the 21st day of April 1869; and that he afterwards made return of the marriage to the proper office in the city of Philadelphia. It was proved by other witnesses, and not doubted, that according to the laws of Pennsylvania, aldermen are vested with the power to solemnize marriages in that state. Now if this testimony of alderman Mink is true, the marriage was fully proved, and hence all the evidence adduced by the defendants was to prove that it was not true. The witness was subjected to the most searching cross-examination, and no man can read it without being satisfied that the main object and purpose of it was to impeach the credibility of the witness. This design is patent from the character and form of the questions put to him, and from the whole course of the examination. He was particularly interrogated as to the time and place of the marriage, the number, names and description of the persons present at the ceremony. He was asked if he kept any record in a book of the marriages celebrated by him, and if so, to produce the book. The witness having replied that he had kept such a book, but when he went out of office he gave all his records to his constable to be sold for old paper, and therefore he could not produce the book; he was then asked who that constable was, and if he did not know before he went out of office that there was some dispute about the marriage? The witness answered that he did know it. He was then asked why he did not preserve the marriage book. He was further interrogated as to the number of marriages recorded in that book, the names of the parties married, and the times at which the entries were made, how many before and how many after the entry of the marriage of William O. George and Caroline Jackson? The witness having testified that besides Gogran there was a colored man present at the marriage; he was asked why he did not make this colored man a witness to the ceremony as well as Gogran or Garrogan, and whether he had ever on any previous marriage occasion put the name of a witness of the ceremony on his book? Many other questions of like character were propounded on the cross-examination, and in the course of it, in the questions propounded, the marriage is spoken of as the "alleged marriage," the parties married as the "alleged parties," and the entry by the witness as the book kept by him of the marriage as the "alleged record," &c. But we have said enough to show that the intent and object of the cross-examination was to discredit the witness before the tribunal in which the deposition was to be read. It was further attempted to discredit him by showing by another witness, George E. Chambers, that the 1877. March Term. George &als. V. Pilcher & als. 1877. March statement made by him, Mink, about the refusal of the Term. registration officer to receive returns of marriages made by him was not true. George & als. V. Pilcher & als. In fact all the evidence offered by the defendants to disprove the marriage, to which Mink testified, went to discredit him. Such of necessity was the effect of the evidence offered to show the declarations of William O. George, after the date of the alleged marriage, that he had never been married, and evidence of the like character. We are clearly of opinion that the corroborating evidence offered by the plaintiffs, and which was excluded, should have been received. The defendants denied from the beginning, that any marriage between William O. George and Caroline Jackson had ever taken place, and this denial of necessity involved the character of Mink, by whom the marriage was attempted to be proved. Indeed, after his deposition had been taken and filed, the defendants in their answer to the bill, after speaking of the marriage, and the certificate of it, use this language: "And upon investigation these defendants have discovered that the said certificate of marriage was a base fabrication, concocted after the death of the said William O. George, and the discovery that he had died intestate, and the result of a conspiracy on the part of the said Caroline and her children and Willamin, in which they procured the help of the said alderman, one Mink of Philadelphia, to cheat these defendants and Ella Ferguson, the heirs of the said William O. George, of his estate, and possess themselves of it." Such was the charge in the answer, which, although not read in evidence to the jury, was substantially repeated by the counsel for the defendants in the opening statement of the case to the jury; for it appears by the certificate of the chancellor, |