March 1877 Finally, however, he agreed to 30th of January, 1874, Term. saying he might be able to get ready by that time. Dinwiddie V. Stuart, & Co. Before the board adjourned I asked that I might be County allowed to spread the papers upon the record. Mr. Epes objected, saying he did not see what good it Buchanan would do my case. The clerk then said, "I suppose I will be paid for it." I told him yes, to spread them on the record and send the bill to us, and we would pay for it. He then asked me to put them in the order I wanted them to come on the record. I took a pin and did so, handing them to him. I know that all the foregoing occurred on the first Monday in December, 1873. I most undoubtedly left with the belief that all the papers would be spread on the record on that day. This testimony of the counsel prosecuting the claim is corroborated in every essential particular by the clerk of the board of supervisors. He says: "On the first Monday in December 1873, Mr. Thos. G. Watkins, as counsel for Stuart, Buchanan & Co., appeared before the board of supervisors, and presented the claim of Stuart, Buchanan & Co., and orders of the court, and insisted upon their considering the claim and spreading it and the papers relating to the same, upon the record of said board. The board refused to consider the matter, and all other claims, but simply passed a resolution in relation to the death of one of its members, and then adjourned. Mr. Watkins left with me copies of the original papers relating to the claim of Stuart, Buchanan & Co., and which are set out in the record of appeal. Mr. Watkins urged upon the board the consideration of the claim that day, and of spreading all the papers upon the record. All the papers were so left with me at that meeting on that day." He further says no entry of the application was made until the 3rd January 1874. 1877. March Term. Dinwiddie V. Stuart, & Co. Now it is insisted by the learned counsel for the appellant, that it can be shown by the record alone that the claim was presented; and as the record shows that the date of its presentation was 3rd January 1874, it Buchanan is therefore barred by the statute of limitations. I cannot concur in this view. If the board, by its own fault, prevented the recordation of the claim and the papers to sustain it, it cannot be permitted to take advantage of its own default, to defeat a claim presented in due time; and which ought to have been recorded, and would have been recorded but for its refusal. Under the circumstances the board will be estopped from pleading the act of limitations, and the court will regard the recordation of the claim to have been made when it ought to have been made-when the claim was presented, and the papers sustaining it were delivered to the clerk, to wit: on the first Monday in December 1873. I am therefore of opinion that the claim of the appellees was not barred by the statute of limitations. The decision of all the preliminary questions brings me to consider the case upon its merits. This contract of Stuart, Buchanan & Co. with the county of Dinwiddie, for furnishing salt during the late war, like those cases known as the Salt cases, decided by a divided court at the last term, all have two features in common. They all arose out of contracts made by the several counties named, under an act of the legislature of what is called the Richmond government, in contradistinction of what is known as the restored government of Virginia, and which was passed during the war, to wit; on the 9th May 1862. They all are denounced in common, as contracts un March 1877 lawful and invalid, because made and entered into for Term. the purpose of aiding (the so-called) rebellion against the United States, and therefore void under the constitution of the restored government of Virginia. Dinwiddie V. Stuart, & Co. The authority under which the contracts now sought Buchanan to be enforced were made, is an act of the legislature assembled at Richmond, passed May 9th, 1862, entitled "An act to authorize the county courts to purchase and distribute salt amongst the people and provide payment for the same;" and is in the following words: § 1. Be it enacted by the general assembly, that the courts of the several counties of this commonwealth, when a majority of the acting justices of the county is present, or when the justices have been summoned to attend to act upon the matter, are hereby authorized and empowered to order the purchase for the use of the people of said counties respectively, such quantities of salt as the said courts may deem necessary, and to provide for the payment of the same by county levies, or by loans negotiated upon the bonds of said counties, to be redeemed by county levies or otherwise. § 2. The said courts shall have power and authority to distribute the salt thus purchased amongst, or dispose of the same to, the people of their respective counties, in such quantities, upon such terms, and under such regulations as the said counties may prescribe. § 3. For the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this act, the said court may appoint or employ agents or commissioners, and take from them bonds. with approved security, payable to their respective counties, in such penalties as such courts may pre March Dinwiddie scribe, with condition for the faithful performance of 1877. their duties as such agents or commissioners. The Term. bonds so taken shall be filed in the clerk's office of the court in which they are taken, and may be put in County suit from time to time, by the said court in behalf of Stuart, the said counties, or by any person injured by the Buchanan breach of the said conditions. §. This act shall be in force from its passage. It was under this act that the contracts in the case before us, and those known as the Salt cases, are now sought to be enforced. The learned counsel for the counties assail these contracts upon two grounds (common to all the cases). First, That the act of the legislature under which these contracts were made, was the act of a pretended legislature of an unlawful and usurped government; and that therefore all contracts made under this pretended authority of such legislation were illegal and void. Second, That all such contracts come within the prohibition of the present state constitution, which declares that "no county, city or corporation shall levy or collect any tax for the payment of any debt contracted for the purpose of aiding any rebellion against the state or the United States." Art. 10, sec. 10, Const. These are the two grounds upon which these contracts are assailed by the counsel representing the different counties. As to the first position upon which counsel claim that these contracts cannot be enforced, viz: that the contracts were made under the pretended authority of an unlawful and usurped government, it is sufficient to say that the Richmond government (so called), as well as the Confederate government, of which it VOL. XXVIII-68 V. & Co. March Dinwiddie V. 1877 formed a part, have been repeatedly recognized by Term. this court, by the supreme court of the United States, and by the legislature of the restored government, as County at least having all the attributes of a government de facto. Walker v. Christian, 21 Gratt. 291, 302; Walker Buchanan v. Pierce, 21 Gratt. 722; Newton v. Bushong, 22 Gratt. & Co. 628; Ruckman v. Lightner's ex'ors, 24 Gratt. 19; Texas v. White, 7 Wall. U. S. R. 702, 733; Thorington v. Smith, 8 Wall. U. S. R. 1. Stuart, In Walker v. Pierce, Judge Anderson, speaking for the whole court, and referring to an act of the legislature passed in 1863, in reference to Confederate currency, says: "The plaintiff contends that this act has no force or validity as a law. I do not concur in that opinion. It was the act of the legislature of the state, which had the power to enforce all its enactments. It had the force and effect of a law of the state, and was as obligatory on the citizens of the state as is any law passed by subsequent legislatures." The opinion of Chief Justice Chase, in Texas v. White, is as applicable to that portion of this state now recognized as Virginia, as it was to the state of Texas. He says, page 733, "And yet it is an historical fact, that the government of Texas, then in full control of the state, was its only actual government; and certainly if Texas has been a separate state, and not one of the United States, the new government having displaced the regular authority, and having established itself in the customary seat of power, and in the exercise of the ordinary functions of administration, would have constituted, in the strictest sense of the words, a de facto government; and its acts, during the period of its existence as such, would be effectual, and in almost all respects valid. And to some extent this is true of the actual government of |